THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

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South Africa:

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After Three Years of War-The Session-Finance

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NOTE

The Round Table is a co-operative enterprise conducted by people who dwell in all parts of the British Empire, and whose aim is to publish once a quarter a comprehensive review of Imperial politics, entirely free from the bias of local party issues. The affairs of The Round Table in each portion of the Empire are in the hands of local residents who are responsible for all articles on the politics of their own country. It is hoped that in this way The Round Table will reflect the current opinions of all parts about Imperial problems, and at the same time present a survey of them as a whole. Opinions and articles of a party character will be rigidly excluded.

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THE VICTORY THAT WILL END WAR

PERHAPS the most significant development of the past winter has been the growth of the sentiment that this war is in essence a war against militarism in all its forms, in the common phrase a war against war, and that somehow or other the outcome must be such as will provide effective guarantees against another such war in the future. The dominant feeling to-day among all nations which have seriously felt the war is that there is far more at stake than the attainment of the limited objects with which they entered it, and that nothing can compensate them for the sacrifices they have made, save that thereby mankind should be freed for ever from liability to the appalling catastrophe of the past three years.

This sentiment has found expression partly in an ill-considered pacificism, to which we will return later, and partly in a number of practical schemes for the prevention of war. All these schemes may be broadly grouped into one of two categories. The first includes those which in one form or other can be classed as proposals for the constitution of the League of Nations. The second includes those which have emerged from the Russian revolution, and which may be briefly summarised as peace without annexations on the basis of the self-determination of all peoples together with a universal revolution establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat as against the capitalist and bourgeois classes. In view of the approach of the time when practical negotia-

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tions about peace will be initiated and of the necessity of avoiding unwise decisions at that time, it is important to examine how far these ideas will really contribute towards the establishment of universal peace.

I. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE idea underlying the formation of a League of A Nations is that if all the chief nations of the world bind themselves together into a league, the members of which will mutually guarantee not only to respect the rights of the others but to combine against any Power which attempts to infringe those rights, this will be an adequate security against war. The detailed proposals vary from those which rely upon universal disarmament, the establishment of arbitration treaties as the method of settling disputes, and the use of economic weapons in order to enforce decisions, to those which would confer upon a standing council of the League the sole right to raise armies and manufacture munitions of war, and so provide the League itself with ample power with which to uphold its authority. All schemes for the constitution of a League of Nations, however, have one common characteristic. The League would depend for its success upon the representatives of the sovereign States which formed the League and which would presumably consist of at least a majority of those States, reaching an agreement in regard to international problems, which the members of the League would then combine to give effect to and enforce. None of the schemes proposes the unification of the world into a single Commonwealth of Nations with a central authority authorised to frame laws which would be binding on all individuals from one end of the earth to the other and possessed of the supreme power necessary to enforce these laws. They presumably do not do so because their advo-

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cates recognise that with the present strength of national feeling in the world, and the wide differences between races and in degrees of civilisation, it would obviously be impossible to create any body whose decisions on the most vital problems would be considered binding by the national Parliaments. Under existing circumstances the only short road towards the unification of the world would be the German road—the victory of Prussia over all other nations.

The growth in popularity of the general idea symbolised by the League of Nations is one of the most hopeful signs of the times. For the League of Nations implies a recognition of the essential fact that the peoples of the world are essentially members of one family and that war between them is as immoral and unnecessary as civil war. Unless, indeed, nationalism comes to terms with internationalism -in the common acceptance of the principle of the Commonwealth—there is no hope for the future of the human race. The proposal to create a League of Nations recognises that the days when the diplomacy of all nations sought the maintenance of the balance of power as its cardinal object must be left behind. The doctrine of the balance of power implies that every nation has only to think of itself and enters into diplomatic arrangements not for any constructive purpose but simply to ensure itself against being tyrannised over by its neighbours by force of arms. The idea of the League of Nations is that the true basis of international policy ought to be the association of all the progressive nations for the constructive purpose of protecting national rights and of enforcing respect for international law over the whole world. The balance of power, indeed, assumes that nations must by the law of their being be in constant jealous rivalry and conflict with one another; the League of Nations assumes that they are essentially friendly neighbours and that what is principally necessary for the prevention of war is the creation of proper machinery for deliberation and concerted action. The one is a Prussian, the other is a

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democratic idea. Finally, the machinery of the League whereby the statesmen and Parliamentary representatives of all nations would meet and discuss international problems face to face, as frequently and with as much publicity as possible, cannot fail to contribute both to the elimination of misunderstandings, hatreds and jealousies between nations, but to the realisation of the fact that international problems can only be handled by looking at them from the point of view of the world as a single whole. The most urgent need of the moment indeed is the swallowing up of national provincialism in the sense that no nation can gain peace for itself except by securing peace and justice and liberty for all nations. In so far, therefore, as the League of Nations will bring into being a system whereby international problems are discussed by the representatives of the nations meeting one another at regular Conferences, instead of through the old-fashioned and secret machinery of diplomatic procedure under which the leaders of the nations practically never met at all, it will immensely contribute towards peace.

It is important, however, to realise clearly the essential limitations of the League of Nations idea. For the chief danger to it is that it should become discredited through its inability to live up to the expectations which have been formed of it. It can never do what many of its advocates think it can do. It can never be in itself a guarantee against war or against those international wrongs which lead to war. No system of organisation can free nations from the efforts and sacrifice which are necessary if justice and freedom, which are the conditions of peace, are to be made secure in this still imperfect human world. Inside the State peace reigns because the community has established through the machinery of legislature, executive, and fudiciary an elaborate system whereby there are practical securities for the rights of all and practical redress for wrong. These securities exist because every citizen is subject to the law, pays the taxes necessary to finance the police and

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the administration, and is liable in the last resort to be called upon to serve in person in order to vindicate the law. It is exactly the same in the outside world. For reasons already given, it is not yet practical politics to think of uniting all nations into one State under one Parliament and one police system. The nations, therefore, will have to do the best they can in the meanwhile with the much less efficient machinery of the League of Nations. No League, however, will relieve them of the practical burden of maintaining law and order in the international sphere, if they are to enjoy lasting peace. No League of Nations can exorcise those divergencies of interest, those genuine conflicts of opinion, those differences in ideals, which agitate progressive mankind, whether within the State or international sphere. There are bound to be problems coming up for settlement, problems connected with colour or race or power, which will be quite as difficult of settlement as any in the past. The only difference will be that while within the State such questions are settled by the judgment of the majority as to what is right, expressed in law, in the international sphere the decision as to what is the right settlement, and the enforcing of respect for the decisions when arrived at, will have to be effected by the more difficult process of agreement and common action among a number of separate Powers. Though the formation of a League of Nations will make the solution of international problems without war easier than it has been in the past, it will not relieve the progressive nations in the least of the obligation of being adequately prepared in whatever way may be necessary to enforce respect for the laws or treaties which govern the world. What the League of Nations will really do will not be to produce a magic millennium, but to bring home to the leading peoples the fact that they can no longer live unto themselves alone, but that they have to shoulder together the burden of maintaining law and order between nations throughout the world.

It is well, too, to realise how difficult a task the creation

of an effective League of Nations is likely to be, for it is only by facing the difficulties from the outset that we shall overcome them. History is full of earlier failures. The most conspicuous example is that of the Concert of Europe. This was brought into being at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when all the Great Powers undertook to respect and enforce the Vienna settlement as the basis of the law of Europe and to meet from time to time to agree upon the modifications of that settlement which from time to time might be necessary. This Concert, however, gradually weakened owing to the divergence of view between the autocratic Powers of Eastern Europe and the democratic Powers of Western Europe as to whether and when the Concert should interfere with the affairs of the various States of Europe. The former were always for intervention, ostensibly in order to put an end to anarchy, in reality to prevent the progress of democracy and to bolster up monarchical rule. The latter were against it, not merely because they had more sympathy for democracy, but because they were mainly absorbed in their own affairs. The Concert received its death-blow from Prussia when Bismarck transformed the map of Europe by war between 1864 and 1871 without even summoning a conference of the Powers to endorse or even to be notified of the changes. Its obsequies were read in 1908 when the Kaiser sent his shining armour ultimatum to Russia and refused to allow the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which involved the abrogation of the treaty of 1878, to be discussed by a conference of the Powers signatory of that treaty. This history shows how an earlier league to enforce peace broke down because the members could not reach an agreement as to how they were to deal jointly with the problems with which they had to deal, and because various Powers when they thought themselves strong enough to do so insisted on settling disputed questions by force in accordance with their own views while the rest acquiesced rather than risk war.

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The experience of this war is an instructive commentary on the value of treaties as security for international rights. The war began because the Central Powers decided to destroy the independence of one of the smaller nations of Europe, refused to allow the questions involved to be discussed by a conference of the Great Powers, and insisted on settling it in their own way by an act of war. When Europe refused to submit to this outrage the immediate outcome was the tearing up of the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, which was the bulwark which previous generations had erected in order to protect Europe against the establishment of a tyranny over Europe. So much for the value of treaties signed by autocratic Powers. Three years later there was another repudiation; this time by the representatives of extreme democracy. If ever there was a case in which a treaty ought to have been good security it was the treaty of September, 1914, which united the nations of Europe in a league of self-defence against the attacks of the most highly organised and the most ruthless military tyranny that the world has ever seen. Yet Russia had scarcely become a republic when, for reasons which may have been good or bad, she repudiated all her obligations to her allies and initiated separate negotiations for peace with the common enemy of human freedom.

It is obvious, indeed, that neither leagues nor treaties can, in themselves, be a sufficient security for universal peace. If we place excessive reliance upon them we shall simply again relapse into the position in which the free nations found themselves before the war through trusting to written agreements drawn up at The Hague and elsewhere, instead of taking the practical steps which would make it impossible for selfish Powers to think of repudiating international right with impunity and success. The real security for peace will always be the determination backed by appropriate preparation among a sufficient number of peoples that right and not might shall prevail in the world. What matters most, therefore, is the fostering of the spirit

that the maintenance of the reign of right and justice in the world is a primary concern of every nation, and that all nations must be prepared to act at any time in order to defend it. Once that spirit is there the machinery necessary to make it effective will soon come into being. But to build machinery without the spirit which alone can make it work successfully is to court certain disappointment, and to set back and not to promote the cause of universal peace.

II. THE BOLSHEVIK PANACEAS

ROM the Russian revolution have emerged a somewhat I different set of ideas. The revolutionaries rely not upon establishing machinery for the peaceable adjustment of international questions, but upon a reconstruction of society which will so liberate and transform human nature that these great wars of State against State will be no more. The Bolshevik preaches that peoples have no quarrels with one another, and that it is governments and aristocracies and capitalists, perpetually seeking for power or profit for themselves, who mislead the peoples through their control over the Press and the machinery of government, and goad them into supporting their own selfish ambitions by means of war. In consequence they affirm that if every people were left perfectly free to determine its own allegiance and form of government, and if the authority of the bourgeois or possessing classes were overthrown, and the proletariat (soldiers, workmen and peasants) took control into their own hands, the real causes of war-the jealousies and intrigues and ambitions of politicians, aristocrats and capitalists-would have been destroyed, and universal peace would reign.

There is some truth in the fundamental Bolshevik diagnosis. All the Allies can see how true it has been of the German Government and the German people. They do not see, perhaps, that in some measure, though in

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greatly lesser measure, it has been true of themselves. In so far as the Bolshevik ideal recognises the essential solidarity of humanity and repudiates the belief that because peoples have national individualities they must therefore inevitably forget their own brotherhood as human beings and regard one another with perpetual jealousy and suspicion, it is destroying one of the great causes of war and paving the way for lasting peace. Further, inasmuch as it stands for trust in the people as against the system whereby high politics and foreign affairs are regarded as the exclusive privilege of the learned few or of those who inherit noble blood or privileged position—it is setting up another safeguard against the possibility of wars for profit or ambition. Finally because the doctrine of self-determination implies that no nation ought to govern another in defiance of its wishes or with the purpose of exploiting it and imposing upon it its own language and Kultur, it is helping to establish a principle whose universal acceptance is essential to lasting peace.

The revolutionary propaganda, therefore, is of value in so far as it represents a robust faith in the essential reasonableness and capacity of all peoples, and recognises that the establishment of universal peace can only come with the growth of a sense of their brotherhood amongst all peoples. But these ideas are quite inadequate in themselves to secure lasting peace, and they are bound up with other doctrines

which are fatal to peace.

Self-determination, if carried to its logical conclusion, can only end in an almost universal free fight. It is no less than the application of anarchy to international affairs. The first difficulty that presents itself is as to the method of determining the limits of a nation or a people. If Ireland is to be allowed to self-determine itself out of the United Kingdom why should not Ulster self-determine itself out of Ireland? And if that right is conceded, how are you going to decide peaceably the boundary between the two, in view of the fact that every attempt at settlement

in the past has broken down on the question of whether or not Tyrone and Fermanagh are to be included in greater or lesser Ireland. Further, according to this theory, why should not Quebec secede from Canada and the Orange Free State from the Union of South Africa? Why should not Cornwall or Wales set up on their own, with tariffs and armies and ambassadors and the other paraphernalia of independent sovereignty complete? How, indeed, is self-determination to be reconciled with the action of Lincoln and the American majority in fighting a four years' civil war, in order to prevent the Southern States from self-determining themselves out of the Union? determination has much to recommend it as the method of settling the issues at stake in a war which has arisen out of the attempt of nations to tyrannise over their neighbours. But if it were accepted as an absolute right whatever the circumstances, it would simply mean the break up of every State in the world and constant war between minorities and majorities everywhere as to whether or not they should be allowed to separate. Further, so far from diminishing war, it would immensely multiply it. We have already seen that the cure for war is progress towards the unity of all nations in a Commonwealth of Nations. Universal self-determination, however, would only mean the arming of an immense number of small States in self-protectiona system which is bound to end in the gradual establishment of a despotic tyranny by one nation or of a combination of several nations over all the rest.

The second mistake of the revolutionary propagandists is that mankind is going to benefit from the inauguration of the class war. The world is not going to gain universal peace by substituting a civil war for a foreign war. It is quite true that we shall never yet secure peace in the international sphere until we get stability and order within the State. But the class war is not the road to internal order and peace. The need for drastic remedies for the present inequalities in the distribution of wealth, for the

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grinding poverty at one end of the scale, and the excessive wealth at the other, is beyond question. There is much to be said for the establishment of a more communal type of society, and for far-reaching reforms in the methods of conducting industry. But no stable society can be founded on the basis of the war of class against class. To begin with, the doctrine of the class war is founded on the fallacy that it is possible to divide a community into two clearly marked categories—the bourgeois and the people. The distinction breaks down immediately under examination. There are all sorts of other lines which cut athwart this so-called economic line, those of religion, race, education, art, occupation, the esprit de corps of great national services, and so forth. Further, vast numbers of working men who invest their savings are in reality capitalists, while many of the so-called governing or bourgeois classes in receipt of salaries are not. The economic line is one of the important lines of cleavage in society, but it has not the supreme importance that the advocates of the class war believe. The fact that it has become so important of late is largely due to the growth of the delusion that happiness comes from material possessions and material power and that capitalists and militarists are in some measure happier than their neighbours.

The Bolsheviks labour under another delusion. Like most of the revolutionaries who have preceded them, they assume that a contented and orderly society can be created by persecuting and driving away all those who possess knowledge, talent, and experience in the business of administration, and substituting for them the ignorant, the illiterate and the inexperienced. Every attempt to conduct national life on this basis has broken down in the past through the failure of the proletariat to maintain a tolerably competent government, as it is now manifestly breaking down in Russia.

Finally, the Bolsheviks are inspired, hardly less than their Prussian adversaries, with the gospel of Kultur and the

doctrine of blood and iron. They seek, as do the Germans to impose their social theories on their own countrymen, in defiance of constitutional right, justice and equity, and at the point of the machine-gun and the bayonet. They are no less bent on imposing them on their neighbours and the rest of the world. They are not really democrats, they do not really care for justice or freedom. They only repre-

sent the autocratic instinct in a new guise.

While, therefore, the Russian revolutionaries have brought certain vital ideas to the front, the common bond of humanity which unites all races and peoples in one great brotherhood and the impossibility of any lasting peace on the basis of the domination of one race by another, they have not solved the problem. We shall gain universal peace neither from the triumph of autocracy, as the Prussians believe, nor from the triumph of anarchic revolution, as the Bolsheviks believe, but only from the steady progress of democracy-government in the interest, and subject to the control, of all the governed. Peace and progress inside the State come from the unselfish co-operation of all classes in promoting the social well-being, from the recognition by the people of their responsibility for their own governments, and from the constitutional responsibility of those governments to all their people, whatever their class or station. Peace-international peace -will similarly only come from the establishment everywhere of stable, well-governed democracies, which will desire to impose neither their domination nor their doctrines on their neighbours, but will combine effectively to secure justice and freedom and the reign of law for all nations, whether great or small.

III. THE VICTORY OF RIGHT ESSENTIAL TO LASTING PEACE

FROM the foregoing it is evident that there is no short and easy road to universal peace. The fundamental causes of war are to be found in the fact that there is little

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effective consciousness of the real unity of the world, that mankind is divided into a vast number of nations, races, and peoples, each of whom is almost wholly concentrated on its own affairs, recognising but the smallest obligation to help its neighbours, and entertaining all sorts of ignorant, domineering and covetous ideas about them. In consequence, instead of combining to maintain the reign of an international law which will secure to all nations their just rights, they have slipped into the habit of regarding one another not as friends and neighbours, but as enemies and rivals from which they have to protect themselves by armaments and war. Various attempts have been made in the past to remedy this state of affairs so as to cure its inevitable consequence, constant war. The first attempt was the creation of the Roman Empire, whereby practically all the civilised world was united through a common citizenship to the Roman Empire and the universal enforcement of its system of law. The second attempt was that of mediæval Christendom, when the Pope and the Emperor endeavoured to establish an universal authority which would enable the one to arbitrate in disputes between nations and dynasties and the other to enforce the judgments. The failure of the third attempt, the concert of Europe, has already been described. Despite all the triumphs of modern invention and the linking up of all peoples through the telegraph and the Press, mankind was perhaps never so divided by jealousies and ambitions, national and racial, as it was in August, 1914. Only through the agony of the war is it slowly coming to recognise its common humanity.

It is in the recognition of the world as essentially a single Commonwealth of many Nations, in the triumph of the sense of trusteeship towards the backward and the weak over the desire to dominate or exploit, in the growth of healthy democracy everywhere, and in the appreciation of the fact that peace in the international sphere can only be attained by the same means as in the national, by the

supremacy of justice, that the real hope of lasting peace Reaction from the war may save the world from its horrors for a time, but nothing but the practical determination among a sufficient number of nations that the world as a whole shall be a place in which all peoples shall have equal rights and equal opportunities, so long as they respect the laws which protect them all, will bring into being effective securities for peace.

But there is one first condition of any progress towards universal peace, and that is to win the war now. Winning the war does not necessarily mean dramatic victory over the Germanic hosts, but it does mean victory for the principle that might is not right, for which the Allies stand. It means the complete establishment of those conditions which were laid down by the British Prime Minister and the President of the United States during the first fortnight of 1918—conditions which imply the total failure of the militarist dreams and promises of expansion, and the total victory of justice and freedom. If there is ever to be an effective League of Nations it will exist in order to protect the weak from wrong and to vindicate international right. If the present League of the Allies, which now includes a majority of the great States of the world, and is in itself the nucleus of the League of Nations, does not succeed in completely re-establishing justice in Europe, what later league is likely to do so? A weak peace would in itself be the destruction of all possibility of any League of Nations.

There is no use in hoping that through compromising with justice now we can gain lasting peace. If the present rulers of Germany can prove that under their leadership Germany has been able not only to withstand the world arrayed in arms against it, but to impose its will both upon its allies and in some degree upon Europe as well, is it likely that the German people will turn against them? Seeing that they will not only have incurred the enmity of all their neighbours but will have succeeded in despoiling them, is it likely that they will disarm and trust to con-

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ferences and treaties for their future? And if they decide to rely upon their own strength for their safety instead of upon treaties and leagues of peace, is it likely that, exhausted as they are, they will start by attacking a Government which has brought them safely and with some measure of victory through the war, which alone could pilot them with any degree of competence through the difficulties of reconstruction, and which would not hesitate to use machineguns against the impious revolutionaries who would seize the citadel of its power? There could be no greater fallacy than to believe that a patched up peace, leaving Germany in possession of conquered territory and still in a position to threaten the liberty of all Europe, would lead to an immediate victory for democracy afterwards. It would only mean that for years the machine which plotted the war and supervised its execution would remain in power, on the one hand poisoning the mind of its own people in order to induce them to maintain the armaments on which its power depends, on the other, filling the rest of the world with intrigue and corruption, suspicion and fear. So long as that happens there can be no real peace. Either no nation will dare to diminish its armaments, or they will believe the specious lies of the Prussian propaganda and open the road once more to their own hearts and the universal triumph of the Prussian sword.

The rulers of Germany, indeed, are not thinking of the terms of peace. They are still thinking of victory. Transferring the greater part of their troops and guns from the Russian front, they are preparing the most colossal of all their attacks on the Western Allies, not in order that they may retain the whole of Alsace-Lorraine or obtain this advantage or that, but in order to establish once and for all their ascendency over Europe. For this purpose and for this purpose only they are preparing to sacrifice another 500,000 lives. Their calculation is that even if they do not succeed in overthrowing the allied armies altogether, they will at least be able to inflict such damage

upon them that the peoples behind will weaken and come to terms. Those terms will not be particularly hard. But they will represent the clear triumph of might over right and they will have been accepted by the Allies because they will have been unable or unwilling to endure any longer the hardships and sufferings consequent upon withstanding the Prussian will. And if they succeed in thus forcing their terms on the Allies they will indeed be the masters of Europe, for no nation therein will ever dare to resist the rattling of their sword. Liberty will have succumbed to despotism.

The only road to a new era of lasting peace is a complete victory for justice and freedom now. If the Allies go through with the task they have undertaken until either the German Government or the Governments of its allies are forced by their own peoples to accept the just terms which have been offered to them, or if they persist in rejecting them, until their authority has been overthrown and a Government responsible to an awakened people is in power, the principal cause of the ambitions and hatreds which have disunited and estranged the nations and thereby caused war will have disappeared. Right will have prevailed over might, a settlement will have been made which contains within itself no seeds of fresh war, and the way will have been prepared for universal peace through proof that a League of free Democracies has in practice been able to vindicate the law of nations against the assaults of the most powerful autocratic combination that the world has ever seen. If they fail, whether through want of resolution, or inability to see clearly the tremendous meaning which the next few weeks or months may have for the future of mankind, or by giving way to the overwhelming desire for peace and plenty and a respite from the horrors of war, they will only doom themselves and their descendants to a new reign of terror and a new war worse than the old. The true peacemakers are not those who shrink from war and would sign a compromise peace in order that they may end it. They are

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those soldiers of the right who recognise that there can be no peace with evil triumphant, and who are prepared to endure whatever sufferings and hardships may be necessary in order that right shall prevail. Now that the Allied aims have been clearly defined, there can be no question as to which side has the right on its side. Let us see to it that we stand firm and that the weakening shall come first from the side that is resisting democracy in order that it may inflict new wrongs.

AMERICA'S WAR AIMS

VER since the outbreak of the war there has been a Lomore or less persistent demand from various sources for a sharper definition of the war aims of the Entente and for an official interpretation of the manner in which the broad principles emblazoned on their common banner were to be applied in practice. It is, however, obvious that the exact formulation of war aims in concrete territorial terms may at times be a futile proceeding and especially so when both the actual military situation is of such a nature as not to offer the prospect of their immediate realization and also the principles animating the two groups of antagonists are absolutely irreconcilable. In such a case a wholly satisfactory peace cannot be secured by negotiation. It can come in the fullness of time only from the conclusive victory which will give the Entente a free hand in the application of their progressive principles. Such is the constantly firmer and firmer conviction of the American people and of their leaders.

To explain in the midst of a war, at a time when the military goal is still hidden by serious obstacles, how general principles, no matter how clearly defined, should be applied is unwisely hazardous. It diverts attention from principles to details and it necessarily involves a measure of compromise and a partial renunciation of far-reaching projects of readjustment that are in themselves eminently desirable. Apart from all other factors, the effort to avoid the apparently quixotic will inevitably lead to an artificial

equation between the desirable and what momentarily appears to be the attainable. The disparity between the ultimate idea and the transiently feasible is apt to be lessened. Hence it was sound policy on the part of the European and American leaders of the Entente to cling steadfastly to fundamentals and to resist the demand for their definition in concrete terms as long as it was impossible to foresee to what an extent the fortunes of war would permit a real equation between the desirable and the attainable.

This reticent policy inevitably encountered considerable opposition from groups animated by various motives. While it is highly improbable that the rulers of Germany, with their keen insight into certain political realities, have not always had a clear conception of the war aims of the Entente and have not known at any time during the past three and a half years on what terms peace could be obtained, there unquestionably has existed in some sections of all the Entente peoples a measure of doubt as to what exactly the war aims of their own Governments implied. When, in the late autumn of 1916, it became apparent that Germany's submarine campaign would inevitably draw the United States into the vortex, President Wilson requested both sets of belligerents to state their war aims, partly in order that the American people might not through the mere force of circumstances be committed to the support of more or less imperialistic and vindictive policies. The joint answer of the Entente satisfied the people and the Administration, and it was on the basis of "the utmost practicable co-operation in counsel and action with the Governments now at war with Germany" that the United States entered the conflict. America's object, as defined by President Wilson in his War Address of April 2, 1917, was not merely to safeguard American rights, but "to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of

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the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of these principles." This vindication of public right had from the outset been the cardinal tenet of Entente policy and had been the central theme of Mr. Asquith's official pronouncements.

On a number of subsequent occasions Mr. Wilson further elaborated this principle and outlined its general application. In his Note to Russia of June 9 he dissociated the United States entirely from the negative and futile programme of a mere restoration of the status quo ante from which, as he stated, "this iniquitous war issued forth." Readjustments, he contended, were essential, but these must be based upon the following principles:—

No people must be forced under a sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be insisted on except those that constitute payment for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power must be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world and the future welfare and happiness of its peoples.

Six weeks later, in his reply of August 27 to the Pope's peace plea, Mr. Lansing emphasised the fact that the object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace of a militaristic and irresponsible Government imbued with the ambition to dominate the world and heedless of treaty obligations and international honour.

While these principles are quite definite, their equitable application to specific problems, in which there is inevitably great diversity of opinion as to essential facts, is exceedingly difficult. In America there was no substantial agreement as to what they actually meant in practice. Hence from various quarters arose a demand, not widespread but persistent, for greater clarity as to concrete aims. In some minor part, at least, this demand was disingenuous; its purpose was to sow discord among the Allies. To some extent also it proceeded from crypto-partisans of Germany

who covertly insinuated that nefarious projects were lurking under the hypocritically high aims of the Allies. These insidious voices were reinforced by the doctrinaire pacifists, who, while free from sinister purposes, were so eager for an early termination of hostilities that almost any peace whatsoever appeared to them to be a satisfactory one. But, in the main, this demand sprang from those who contended that a clear enunciation of the concrete purposes of the Allies would both strengthen the liberal forces in Germany and also prevent the definitive secession of Russia from the Allied cause. The object was to use the moral forces of diplomacy to disintegrate the enemy and to reattach a

wavering member to the coalition.

Whether or no this was sound strategy may possibly always remain a moot point about which future historians will wrangle. In so far as a still unbeaten Germany was concerned, it ignored the vital fact that a peace based upon the Entente principles meant a definite renunciation of ambitions cherished deeply and widely among all classes of the German people. Its fundamental error consisted in an over-estimate of the effect of moral forces upon a people indoctrinated with the Prussian cult of power. Western Liberalism and Prussia-Germany do not speak the same language. In the eyes not only of Admiral von Tirpitz, but also of an overwhelming majority of German leaders, a settlement according to the Wilsonian code of public right would degrade Prussia-Germany into being "the bondslave of Anglo-Americanism." To the English-speaking peoples, not conscious of any intention to interfere with the pacific development of Germany, Admiral von Tirpitz's statement that "Germany's struggle is a terrific battle against the all-devouring tyranny of Anglo-Americanism" is merely vapid rhetoric, but to the German people it is concrete and definite. They have been systematically taught for over a generation to regard the prominent position that the English-speaking peoples have laboriously acquired on all continents as a grievance and will not voluntarily endorse

or regard as conclusive any treaty that promises to perpetuate this situation.

Similarly, the Russian Bolsheviks and Western Liberals use different political tongues. What to the latter are cherished ideals based upon sound political principles appear to the former to be merely the rotting bulwarks of an indefensible social and political system throughout the entire world. No greater contrast is possible than that between Lincoln's ideal of union and the fissiparous policy of ensuring to even the smallest national groups unlimited self-determination. The Bolshevik aim is to abolish the perpendicular lines of State and Nation and to convert the existing war into an even more general conflict along horizontal lines of class against class. In their eyes Prussianism is not the enemy, but capitalism. It was not due to temporary aberration that one of the Press organs of the Bolshevik Party, in commenting upon Mr. Wilson's definition of America's war aims, described him "as the head of a rapacious American imperialism and as the greatest hypocrite history has ever known." Given their premises, this is the logical conclusion.

However wise or unwise it may have been for the Entente statesmen to defer a definition of their concrete war aims until the equation between the essential—not to mention the highly desirable—and the attainable was more nearly established, this reserve could no longer be maintained after the Bolshevik party in Russia had opened peace parleys with Germany and both sides had invited the other belligerents to take part in further negotiations. The challenge implied in this invitation could not be ignored. Its acceptance took the form of comprehensive statements on the part of Premier Lloyd George and of President Wilson. These statements are to a marked degree parallel, yet there are some differences. Both contain some ambiguities, and, if one were to attempt to draw a new map of the world according to them, many specifications would be found wanting. Furthermore, the subtleties of higher

criticism have been brought into play and have led to divergent interpretations of many clauses. Yet it is possible to gain a fairly clear idea of Mr. Wilson's picture of the new world that is to emerge from the present chaos.

In his address of January 8, delivered at a joint session of the two Houses of Congress, Mr. Wilson described the course of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk during which the Central Empires had attempted to acquaint the world with their objects in the war and had again challenged their adversaries to state their war aims.

There is no good reason, he said, why that challenge should not be responded to, and responded to with the utmost candour. We did not wait for it. Not once, but again and again, we have laid our whole thought and purpose before the world, not in general terms only, but each time with sufficient definition to make it clear what sort of definitive terms of settlement must necessarily spring out of them. Within the last week Mr. Lloyd George has spoken with admirable candour and in admirable spirit for the people and Government of Great Britain. There is no confusion of counsel among the adversaries of the Central Powers, no uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail. The only secrecy of counsel, the only lack of fearless frankness, the only failure to make definite statements of the objects of the war, lies with Germany and her Allies.

After referring in most sympathetic tones to the difficulties of the Russian people, whose voice, he said, was to him more compelling than any other "calling for those definitions of principle and of purpose," Mr. Wilson declared that "the day of conquest and aggrandisement is gone by." In so far as the United States was immediately concerned, he stated:

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own

life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealings by the other peoples of the world, as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us.

The programme of the world's peace, therefore, he declared, is America's programme, and that programme-"the only possible programme, as we see it "-Mr. Wilson summarised in fourteen brief articles. Some of these had in view the betterment of future international relations, others outlined the essential territorial adjustments. Among the latter, most stress was placed upon both the evacuation and the restoration of Belgium, "without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations." "No other single act," Mr. Wilson declared, "will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is for ever impaired."

Turning to France, Mr. Wilson naturally likewise stated that all occupied French territory should be both freed and restored, but he further added that "the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace should once more be made secure in the interest of all." This is America's first official pronouncement on Alsace-Lorraine. Like Mr. Lloyd George's prior statement of January 5, insisting upon "a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871," this demand does not necessarily imply the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine as an entity to France. So deep is the admiration for France's heroic stand that public opinion would not scrutinise the merits of the case too closely if this transfer could be easily effected. in reality public opinion is somewhat confused by the

existence of an overwhelmingly large German-speaking element in these provinces, and does not generally appreciate to what an extent this element is permeated with French sympathies. There are partisans of a plebiscite and others who deny that such a procedure will work equitably even under the most rigid international control in view of German colonisation of these provinces and French emigration from them. Moreover, few know what has happened during the war to the male population of Alsace-Lorraine, nor to what an extent the heavy hand of Prussia has intensified French sympathies. Possibly, the soundest solution is that of those who contend that the situation should first be studied from the standpoint of all possible frontiers, that then a plébiscite should be held by small districts under international control, and that, finally, after these returns are in, an international commission should select from the previously determined possible frontiers the one which conformed most closely to the popular will.

As regards Italia Irredenta, Mr. Wilson demanded that a readjustment of frontiers should be effected "along clearly recognisable lines of nationality." This clause unquestionably justifies the Italian claim to the Trentino where it is supported not only by the principle of nationality but also by the fact that the existing frontier is, in the words of Sir Thomas H. Holdich, "fatally opposed to all scientific theories of boundary making." Mr. Wilson's clause is less positive as to Italy's right to Trieste and Istria, and it cannot be interpreted otherwise than as hostile to the extreme claims of the Idea Nazionale group and probably even to the extension of Italian sovereignty

to any part of the Dalmatian coast.

Leaving the West, Mr. Wilson demanded the evacuation of all Russian territory and such co-operation from the other nations as would secure to Russia an unhampered opportunity "for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy." This

clause unquestionably means not only the evacuation of Lithuania, Courland, Livonia, and Esthonia, but also that of Poland. For in another one of these fourteen provisoes Mr. Wilson demanded both the erection of an independent Polish State, composed of all territories occupied by indisputably Polish populations and assured of free and secure access to the sea, and also the international guarantee of this State's political and economic independence and territorial integrity. Literally interpreted, this indubitably implies the incorporation of the Polish parts of Austria-Hungary and of Germany in the new Poland, but not necessarily the territorial separation of East Prussia from Germany.

As regards Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, Mr. Wilson demanded the evacuation and restoration of the occupied areas and the grant of access to the sea to Serbia. In general, he urged that the relations of the several Balkan States to one another should be determined "along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality" and that then their independence and integrity should be

guaranteed internationally.

Distinctly less clear than any of the preceding stipulations was that about Austria-Hungary, which merely stated that the peoples of the Dual Monarchy, "whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." During the preceding summer, in his Russian Note of June 9 and in his Flag Day Address of June 14, Mr. Wilson had emphasized the necessity of frustrating the Mitteleuropa, Berlin to Bagdad, project and had spoken most sympathetically of the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary. On the latter occasion he said of this ambitious plan:—

It rejected the idea of solidarity of race entirely. The choice of peoples played no part in it at all. It contemplated binding together racial and political units which could be kept together only by force—Czechs, Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Turks,

Armenians.

Six months later, in his Address before Congress of December 4, advocating the declaration of war upon Austria-Hungary, the President spoke in a different strain:—

We do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not purpose nor desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, great or small.

In the light of these words it is apparent that America is not committed either to an effective reorganization of the Dual Monarchy or to its disruption in accordance with the principle of nationalism. Apart from the question whether any other course is feasible, this is in effect equivalent to an abandonment of the cause of the Czechs, Slovaks, Roumanians, and Jugo-Slavs. It is justified in the eyes of some Americans since they are convinced—partly, at least, because they wish to be—that the doctrines of ascendancy are on the wane among the Germans and Magyars of Austria-Hungary and that the protesting forces within the Dual Monarchy will be sufficiently potent to effect a radical change in the political system, especially if they be stimulated by some encouragement from without.

Mr. Wilson's opposition to the dismemberment of Empires does not apply to Turkey. He proposes to leave to the Ottoman Empire only its Turkish portions and declares that "the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees." The other nationalities under Turkish rule should, he says, be assured "an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." What is meant is, no doubt, that Arabia, Mesopotamia and Irâk, Armenia, Palestine, and Syria should for ever be freed from the blasting tyranny of the Turk. Public opinion is not quite clear as to the exact

disposition of these peoples. Despite the fact that all prior experiments in international government, whether in Egypt, Samoa, Macedonia, Morocco, or the New Hebrides, have grievously failed, there is considerable sentiment for renewing the attempt. If the experiment is to be repeated, the most favourable places would be Palestine and Syria, where a large measure of self-government is feasible.

As regards the German colonies, President Wilson has followed with some modifications Mr. Lloyd George's original announcement at Glasgow on June 29 and its subsequent repetitions and amplifications to the general effect that this matter should be left to the peace conference for determination in accordance with the sentiments of the natives. Mr. Wilson urges an absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims in which the interests of the populations concerned "must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined." American public opinion is as yet not at all interested in the fate of Germany's South Sea Islands. While it would probably appreciate the strength of Australia's claims, it might be less sympathetic towards those of Japan. On the other hand, it is generally assumed that German South-West Africa will remain British, and this eventuality will be pleasing to the very many Americans who admire in equal measure the stubborn resistance of the burghers during the Boer War and their general loyalty to the Commonwealth during the present crisis. On the whole, opinion is more alert as to the African tropical colonies, but it is still quite fluid. Very little is known as to the essentials of the problem. Few of the facts about German maltreatment of the aborigines have reached American ears, and there is no wide appreciation of the gravity of General Smuts's warning as to the militarisation of Africa. Nor is there a general recognition of the slight economic importance of these colonies to Germany and of the extent to which considerations of power

and prestige enter into German colonial policy. There are vestiges of sympathy with Germany's claim for a colonial outlet, but some plan of international government like that advocated by the British Trade Union Conference finds more favour. It is, however, being pointed out by students of the question that, while an extension of international control is highly advisable, international administration would be disastrous to the real interests of the natives.

The foregoing changes constitute the territorial part of what Mr. Wilson has called "the only possible programme" of world peace. They are almost identical with those advocated by Mr. Lloyd George on January 5 before the Trade Union Conference. Moreover, as any candid inquirer will admit, they are but the concrete expression of the general principles for which the Entente has always stood. As Mr. Balfour said in this connection at Edinburgh on January 10:—

It must be remembered that the pronouncements of Premier Lloyd George and President Wilson contain nothing that was not implicitly stated in the utterances of other statesmen, including the late Premier. The spirit that has animated Britain and her Allies has undergone no profound modification.

It would, however, be folly not to face the facts and not to realise that this territorial programme, extensive though it be, is not a full expression of these principles. It falls considerably short of those unofficial programmes whose ambitious aim was to eliminate all sources of unrest in Europe arising from maladjusted frontiers. The desirable has been considerably pared in order to make it equal to the apparently attainable. This is most markedly the case as regards Austria-Hungary. Beyond what are really mere pious wishes, nothing is to be done to secure the self-expression of the subject nationalities of the Dual Monarchy and no recognition whatsoever is given to the Jugo-Slav claims or to those of Roumanian irredentism. But as long as no satisfaction is given to these deeply cherished aspirations they will continue to be a source of danger to

the world's peace. Mr. Lloyd George frankly admitted this when, on January 5, he said:—

Similarly, though we agree with President Wilson that a break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims, we feel that unless genuine self-government on true democratic principles is granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it, it is impossible to hope for a removal of those causes of unrest in that part of Europe which have so long threatened the general peace.

The mere fact that this end may not be attainable should not blind us to the fact that it is pre-eminently desirable, because otherwise the peace of the world must remain unstable. To some extent, it is to be hoped, this instability will be rectified by the remedial measures planned by Mr. Wilson for the betterment of future international relations. Though it is the last in order of his fourteen provisoes for the world's peace, a future league of nations is in the very foreground of his international programme. "A general association of nations," he said in his Address of January 8, "must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." It is apparent from Mr. Wilson's previous statements that, unless Germany reforms herself, she is not to be admitted to this partnership of free peoples. For instance, in his Address to Congress of December 4 he said :-

This intolerable Thing of which the masters of Germany have shown us the ugly face, this menace of combined intrigue and force, which we now see so clearly as the German power, a Thing without conscience or honour or capacity for covenanted peace, must be crushed, at least shut out from the friendly intercourse of the nations. . . . The worst that can happen to the detriment of the German people is this, that if they should still, after the war is over, continue to be obliged to live under ambitious and intriguing masters interested to disturb the peace of the world, men or classes of men whom the other peoples of the world could not trust, it might be impossible to admit them to the partnership of nations

which must henceforth guarantee the world's peace. That partnership must be a partnership of peoples, not a mere partnership of governments.

From this new international partnership, this projected "League of Honour," inevitably spring two of Mr. Wilson's four remaining stipulations. There can be, on the one hand, he said, "no private international understandings," but diplomacy must proceed "always frankly and in the public view"; on the other hand, armaments must be reduced "to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." In addition, Mr. Wilson insisted upon "the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance." The exact practical meaning of this clause is far from perspicuous. But, in the first place, one very important point should be noted-namely, that the future economic equality is to be limited to the projected international association, which implies that, unless Germany be purged of her autocratic militarism, she is not to enjoy this parity of treatment. Mr. Wilson had made a half-veiled threat to this effect before, in his reply of August 27 to the Pope; and, later, in his address to Congress of December 4, he had declared that it might be impossible to admit an unregenerate Germany to "the free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other partnerships of a real peace." Furthermore, towards the end of the Address of January 8 he had again reverted to this subject, declaring:

We do not wish to injure her (Germany) or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade, if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world—the new world in which we now live—instead of a place of mastery.

But, apart from the specific reference to the economic weapon, what is implied by this general economic clause? Of what "economic barriers" is Mr. Wilson speaking, and of what nature is "the equality of trade conditions" that he has in mind? It is extremely doubtful if he is for an instant considering the possibility of free trade between the states of the projected association. The United States is far from prepared for so radical an economic revolution; in fact, public opinion favours, if anything, an increase in the existing high tariff so as to protect America from a dreaded influx of European goods after the demobilisation of the armies. From a previous utterance in which Mr. Wilson unsparingly condemned the German system of economic penetration under governmental auspices,* it may be inferred that his purpose in part is to secure the elimination of such unfair competition

* In his address of November 12, 1917, at the annual meeting of the American Federation of Labour at Buffalo, Mr. Wilson said:

"There is no important industry in Germany upon which the Government has not laid its hands to direct it, and, when necessity arose, control it. You have only to ask any man whom you meet who is familiar with the conditions that prevailed before the war in the matter of international competition to find out the methods of competition which the German manufacturers and exporters used under the patronage and support of the Government of Germany. You will find that they were the same sorts of competition that we have tried to prevent by law within our own borders. If they could not sell their goods cheaper than we could sell ours, at a profit to themselves, they could get a subsidy from the Government which made it possible to sell them cheaper anyhow; and the conditions of competition were thus controlled in large measure by the German Government itself.

"But that did not satisfy the German Government. All the while there was lying behind its thought, in its dream of the future, a political control which would enable it in the long run to dominate the labour and the industry of the world. They were not content with success by superior achievement; they wanted success by authority.

"I suppose very few of you have thought much about the Berlin to Bagdad railway. The Berlin to Bagdad railway was constructed in order to run the threat of force down the flank of the industrial undertakings of half a dozen other countries, so that when German competition came in it would not be resisted too far, because there was always the possibility of getting German armies into the heart of that country quicker than any other armies could be got there."

in the future. That he dreads a renewal of the German process is quite plain from the fact that he is urging that not only the political but also the economic independence of Poland, Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro be secured by international guarantees. In addition, "equality of trade conditions" in all probability means to Mr. Wilson the full Open Door in all backward countries, whether they are independent or under the rule of one of the colonising Powers. This naturally implies a complete change in the colonial policy of the United States which may encounter considerable opposition. For, as a member of one of the foreign commissions—not the British one—now at Washington observed, there is in America quite a keen interest in free trade—for England.

There is left for final discussion the highly condensed clause about the freedom of the seas, whose exact signi-

ficance is of grave importance. It reads:

Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territoria waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

This clause should not be interpreted separately, but in close conjunction with the entire programme, and especially with the plan for a league of nations. From the very outset Mr. Wilson brought these two ideas into intimate association. On May 27, 1916, in his first public endorsement of the league project, he advocated the establishment of

an universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world.

Ever since the early months of the war Germany has posed as the champion of the freedom of the seas, but the

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submarine campaign is the very negation of this doctrine in whatever form it may be conceived. The occasion of America's entrance into the war was Germany's absolute denial of her long-established and unquestioned rights on the high seas, and it is in defence of the freedom of the seas that the sword has actually been drawn by America. Thus Mr. William S. Kenyon, of Iowa, said in the Senate on January 10, 1918:

Were we ready to give up the freedom of the seas? Are the people of this nation willing to give it up now, to acknowledge the right of Germany to say to us that we could send one boat a week on certain parts of the sea, provided it was painted like a barber's pole?

But, in addition to this, it is quite plain that every war in which sea power is largely employed emphasises the inherent conflict between the rights of neutrals and those of belligerents. In some wars the prevalence of belligerent rights is far more important to civilisation than is the maintenance of neutral trade; in others, diametrically the opposite is the case. But under existing conditions there is no method of determining such cases and differentiating action in them. The League of Nations would supply this mechanism. Apparently it is Mr. Wilson's plan that in any war sanctioned by the associated states sea power should be used to the fullest extent compatible with humanitarian dictates, but that in an unauthorised war of aggression neutral rights should remain fully intact. This further implies that there be created for use in such unsanctioned wars a new and more definite code of maritime war with some distinct limitations of the existing doctrines of search, capture, and prize, blockade, continuous voyage, and contraband. The subject bristles with difficulties, as does the entire league project. Upon the practicability of the league depends both the feasibility and the advisability of this special conception of the freedom of the seas. In general it may be confidently

asserted that American public opinion is not prepared to sanction any self-denying ordinance regarding sea power, unless this emasculation is accompanied by correspondingly effective limitations upon the rail power and land power of the militaristic states of Europe.

In support of the foregoing comprehensive programme embodying "these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right," Mr. Wilson declared that all the Allied peoples were intimate partners. "We stand together until the end." He pledged America's willingness to fight until such arrangements and covenants are achieved.* In conclusion, he further stated that America did not presume to suggest to Germany any alteration or modification of her institutions, but that it was a necessary preliminary to any intelligent dealings with her to know for whom her spokesmen spoke, "whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination." †

While Mr. Wilson's statement as to the solidarity of the Entente Allies in their war aims is true, there is within this greater unity a far more perfect one formed by the identity of purpose in the peoples of the United States and the British Commonwealth. Their leaders have not only the same ends in view, but they have expressed themselves in almost identical words. This is not chiefly due to the fact that both have entered into the war for purely unselfish purposes, but proceeds predominantly from the virtual identity of the fundamental political ideals and principles that constitute the inalienable heritage

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[•] In his address of December 4 Mr. Wilson said: "The cause being just and holy, the settlement must be of like motive and quality. For this we can fight, but for nothing less noble or less worthy of our traditions. For this cause we entered the war, and for this cause will we battle until the last gun is fired."

[†] In his address of December 4 Mr. Wilson said: "We shall regard the war only as won when the German people say to us, through properly accredited representatives, that they are ready to agree to a settlement based upon justice and the reparation of the wrongs their rulers have done."

of all English-speaking peoples. As a former Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Huntington Wilson has said in advocacy of the permanent alliance of these kindred nations:

Cæsar classified the people of the North according to their resemblance or difference in "language, institutions, and laws." A better criterion has yet to be found. It is the leaven that moulds and the cement that holds to us our newer populations. It is this that gives us our national entity. The same bond is just as unfailing in the potentiality of its interplay between America as a whole and the British Empire as a whole. Better than any others can the English-speaking nations say to one another, "All the world is queer save thee and me—and thee's a little queer," which is as near the ideal relation as we are likely to get in international relations.

The volume of such voices is constantly swelling. In combination and in somewhat imperfect unison with those who favour a less definite co-operative arrangement or who prefer a more comprehensive international association they are drowning the relatively few that advocate a reversion to the self-centred isolation of the past or the adoption of a purely self-regarding policy of national aggrandisement.†

This English-speaking unity is also far more responsible than is direct imitation for the fact that the expedients adopted by America for carrying on the war resemble far more closely those of England than they do those of the

*A Permanent Alliance of the English-Speaking Peoples, published in the Philadelphia Public Ledger of November 12 and 13, 1917, and reprinted in pamphlet form by the American Rights League. See also the significant book by Mr. H. H. Powers, America among the Nations (New York:

Macmillan Co., 1917).

† For instance, Congressman George Huddleston, of Alabama, stated in December that the advice of Washington and Jefferson was burned in his heart and that he hoped "in finding peace we may keep ourselves clear of European entanglements and alliances, from competition in Old World systems of caste and avarice, and that we may hold to traditional American isolation and reserve" (Congressional Record, 56, p. 170). For some imperialistic projects in the Caribbean, see the Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, July, 1917, vol. vii., Nos. 1 and 2. For a vigorous criticism of these aims, see Moorfield Storey, "A Plea for Honesty," in The Yale Review for January, 1918.

other Allies or of the enemy. As human nature is fundamentally one, and as all institutions are but a reflection of human needs, given a certain situation, there is bound to be a marked similarity in the devices adopted. But their special form will depend upon the psychological peculiarities and the typical genius of each people. Hence it is not surprising that the United States has in very many important respects followed British precedents, such as the handling of the labour situation, the control of food supplies, the special taxation, and the nationalisation of railways during the war. America has not even been able to avoid, quite the contrary indeed, certain mistakes that hampered British action during the first months of the war. As there, so here, the administrative machinery was "over-

whelmed by emergency and clogged by routine."

During the autumn recess members of Congress were brought into close touch with their constituents, among whom considerable discontent was rife with the apparently slow pace at which the war preparations were proceeding. The American people are somewhat impatient for results and were anxious to see tangible returns for the more than twenty thousand million dollars that had been appropriated for war purposes. In addition, the military situation as a whole had assumed quite a different aspect as a result of the fall of the Kerensky Government and the Italian reverse. Thus, when Congress reconvened early in December, it was in a serious and resolute mood and intent upon a vigorous prosecution of the war. This determination was reinforced by the fact that some of the legislators had just returned from a tour of inspection in Europe and were able to give their fellow members convincing first-hand accounts of the situation and of the need for the exertion of America's full strength. Noteworthy were the speeches of Senator William S. Kenyon of Iowa, Mr. John F. Miller of Washington and Mr. Medill McCormick of Illinois. Senator Kenyon emphasized the danger of being too late and the necessity of sending to the western

front two million men, with one million in reserve. Among other valuable truths he said:

To make the world safe for democracy is only half. We must make the world safe for humanity. And in order to make the world safe for democracy we must do our part to see that the Anglo-Saxon race does not go down. . . . Germany is attempting to terrorise the world. She does not understand the spirit of the British or the American people, . . . Ships, ships, and more ships is the cry of the hour. . . . It is not enough to do our bit. We must do our best.*

In the course of an eloquent speech Mr. McCormick brought out the following realities:

This war, like other long-drawn conflicts, falls into chapters of events. Such a chapter came to an end when Russia collapsed and America declared war. Russia went out of the war in the spring of 1917, while America will not go into it in earnest until the spring of 1919. There is in war, as in peace, a distinction between forms and facts. Russia has not made peace, but she no longer fights. America has declared war, but she has not begun to fight. We must see now that if Germany is not yet victorious, neither are we winning the war.

As a result of this determined spirit, the Senate inaugurated several detailed investigations of the war preparations. In these proceedings there was a conspicuous absence of partisanship and of destructive criticism. In general, they revealed that there had been considerable avoidable delay due to lack of co-ordination, to red tape, and to a failure to appreciate the importance of the time factor. The advantage of "the flying start," due to the fact that America had been manufacturing munitions for the Allies for over two years prior to her own entrance into the war, was in a measure lost in the search for ideal weapons. Owing to an unfortunate lack of imagination, the War Department failed to bridge the space that separated America from the battlefield. The fact that the enemy

[·] Congressional Record, 56, pp. 786-8.

was not at the door made the urgency appear less real than it actually was. Most of the mistakes disclosed have been in a measure rectified and the military machine will in the future work more smoothly and expeditiously. But, in spite of the errors committed, it is, on the whole, quite remarkable that so much has been accomplished, especially when the absolutely unprepared condition of the United States nine months ago is considered. During this interval the land forces, including the reserve, have been increased from 9,324 officers to 110,835 and from 202,510 men to 1,428,650. There has been an even greater relative increase in the ordnance and aviation divisions.

While it is a palpable exaggeration to say that the ability of any state to make its military strength effective decreases directly in proportion to its distance from the field of battle, yet distance is a distinct handicap and especially so when the intervening space is a three thousand mile stretch of water whose farther border is infested by submarines. What would normally be a great handicap has been immeasurably increased by the marked scarcity of shipping. The Senate likewise investigated the progress of the shipbuilding campaign with the object of accelerating the output. The facts revealed showed that, apart from the original delay in this enterprise due to the personal controversy of the two men entrusted with its management, progress has been seriously retarded by the scarcity of workmen, by strikes, by competition for labour between the yards, by utterly inadequate housing facilities and by transportation difficulties. Briefly, the situation at the beginning of 1918 was that contracts have been let for 1,427 ships of 8,573,108 deadweight tons. The important question is how soon will this extensive programme be completed. In the expert judgment of Mr. Homer L. Ferguson, the probable output of merchant ships in the United States during the year 1918 will be only about three million tons. Chairman Hurley, of the Shipping Board, on the contrary, is much more optimistic and expects

an output of five million tons. If we look to the past and remember that prior to the war the greatest annual output of the American yards was 615,000 tons, either estimate would denote a tremendous stride in advance. But if we look at the need of the hour and at America's vast industrial resources the situation is distinctly disappointing. There is no reason to doubt the essential accuracy of Mr. Ferguson's statement that, if provision had been made betimes for adequate housing facilities, the shipyards in existence and under construction could turn out five million tons yearly and that "the country could, if put to it, add still other yards and produce 10,000,000 tons a year."

To some extent the rapidity of production in the ship yards depends upon the release of labour from non-essential industries. The war is slowly tightening its grip upon the industrial system. A constantly increasing proportion of the output is being devoted directly and indirectly to war purposes. "Gradually the war industries are encroaching upon other activities, attracting men, getting command of materials and obtaining a preference for such essentials as coal and railway service." The supply of non-essentials is being automatically curtailed; but production and consumption are only very gradually approaching the war

basis of Europe.

Reference has already been made to the fact that President Wilson has plainly declared that economic barriers will have to be erected against an obdurate Germany and that, unless the peace terms are satisfactory, she will not be allowed access to the raw materials required for her economic reconstruction. In addition, the United States Chamber of Commerce, which includes a very large proportion of the local commercial organisations of America, is submitting to the vote of its vast membership the question whether commercial relations with Germany shall be re-established unless her militaristic policy be abandoned and a Government responsible to the people be in control there. No matter what be the result of this referendum, the fact that

it is being taken is in itself of considerable significance. For, apart from governmental action and from organised boycott, it is quite evident that Germany's criminal responsibility for the war and her heinous conduct during its course have aroused so much resentment that German business will for a very considerable period labour under a severe handicap. There was told in the Senate the story of a member of the Illinois Legislature who noticed that he was carrying a pencil marked "Made in Germany." He cut off the marked part before he went to bed, but was not mentally at ease even then. So he arose during the night and threw the pencil out of the window.

The American people have determined to win the war, cost what it may. They are firmly convinced of the unalloyed righteousness of their cause, and when in this frame of mind they are not lenient towards those who oppose their will. Like all young and unsophisticated people, they have not many subtle shadings in their likes and dislikes. They are inclined to be wholehearted, whether it be in praise or in blame. German is rapidly becoming the synonym for all that is odious, and there is some danger of an indiscriminate condemnation and

rejection of everything that bears this name.

New York. January, 1918.

THREE DOCTRINES IN CONFLICT

IN the climax of the conflict in which the world is Involved men's minds have become susceptible as never before to the power of ideas. The guns are still speaking as in 1914, and they will go on speaking, ever more forcibly, till victory is achieved; since, in the great argument which Prussia provoked, no other form of decision avails. But side by side with the guns, and mixing its music with theirs, goes a running undercurrent of discussion, of questioning, of philosophizing. Men who never reasoned before are turning their minds to consider the cause for which their continued endurance is demanded. Women too, newly enfranchised or hoping for enfranchisement, newly bereaved or in daily anxiety of bereavement, are joining in the silent debate. As the whole framework of society has been violently wrenched and reshaped to meet the necessities of a war which affects every department of social existence, so men's minds too, under the stress of change, are being torn from the moorings of custom and carried forward to unknown destinations. New ideas are blowing round us in the storm-laden sky. Old ideas, forgotten since 1848 and earlier, are astir in their company. Europe is in a ferment, and in the universal uncertainty, in the increasing misery and suffering, no man can predict what forces, what leaders, what forms of society and government will emerge for her peoples.

At such a time it is necessary, not only to meet force with force on the battlefield, but to meet argument with argument. It was for that reason, no doubt, that the

Prime Minister, on behalf of the British Commonwealth, and President Wilson, on behalf of the United States, recently restated the war-aims of their peoples. But a restatement of war-aims does not meet the whole need of which men are conscious. It does not cut down to the roots of the debate. What questioning and critical spirits, in Britain and elsewhere, are demanding is something deeper and more searching than a statement of just terms of peace between the contending governments. They are asking for the title-deeds of the governments themselves. They are raising the fundamental questions of political and social philosophy. They desire to know by what right, kings, ministers, and generals command and soldiers and subjects obey, why the few are rich and the many poor, why some peoples bear rule and others are dependent, why, in the distribution of wealth and power both amongst individuals and nations, so much leaps to the eye which seems unequal, arbitrary, and to be justified only by the logic of force.

The following article embodies an attempt not to answer but to provide guidance towards the answer of such and similar questionings. To restate the outline of a political faith, and to contrast it with contending creeds, must necessarily involve an element of platitude. Yet nothing is more common, in times of crisis, than to find that, while the world's opinion is being swayed hither and thither by winds of strange doctrine, familiar and fundamental truths are overlooked. This must serve as an apology for what may seem trite or superfluous in the succeeding pages.

Three doctrines of society and government are fighting for mastery in the world of to-day. Two of them are contending for victory on the battlefield. All three are contending for victory over men's minds. The first is the principle of Prussianism; the second is the principle of Revolution; the third is the principle of the Commonwealth.

In the battle which has been joined between these

three antagonists compromise will be difficult, if not impossible: for the adherents of each are struggling for a victory complete, universal and decisive. Each aspires to win success not in one country but in all—to achieve the recognition of its unquestioned predominance throughout the civilized world: for the adherents of each, and indeed the hopes of mankind, are bent upon the attainment of a settlement founded, not on the shifting sands of compromise, but on the general acceptance, as the basis of the, new world order, of certain agreed principles regarding the organisation of society, the nature of government, and the conduct of international relations. It is this world-wide character of the debate and the urgency of the issues that hang upon it which justify the attempt to isolate the doctrines involved from the entanglements of surrounding circumstance and to examine them in the clear light of historical experience and ethical principle.

I

DRUSSIANISM, as we see it embodied in Central Europe to-day, is not a new phenomenon in history. In its cruder aspects it is as old as Egypt and Assyria. But it has never before been worked out with so much skill, persistence and courage or attracted to its banner such a host of able, heroic and disinterested servants. If we are to understand its full purport or the true force of its appeal, we must make an effort to see it through the eyes of those from whom, as the history of the last three and a half years proves, it has the power to call forth such an abundant reserve of sacrifice and endurance. We must learn to view it, not as a mere policy of military conquest and economic aggrandisement, inspired and directed by a caste of professional soldiers and their hereditary chief, but as a logical and consistent body of political, philosophical and religious doctrine.

Prussianism is a doctrine of authority. It is founded on a sense of the weakness and helplessness of man in his natural state. Man is not born free. He is born a slave—a slave to impulse and caprice, to bodily need, to the buffetings of an imperious environment. Isolated, ignorant, undisciplined, man, the latest-born heir of creation, is no radiant young prince, as some idealists see him, ready and fitted to enter into the rich inheritance of the ages, but a reed shivering in the wind of inward and outward circumstance.

Thus far Prussianism moves in agreement with all those, whether in ancient Greece or modern Britain and America, who have preached the need for a rule, a standard, a guiding authority, as the base of the whole social scheme. Where Prussianism diverges from the doctrine of the framers of the American Constitution and from the principles expressed in the institutions of the British Commonwealth is in the task which it sets before that authority to perform and in the nature and credentials of the authority itself.

What is that task? What, on the Prussian view, is the object of political and social organisation? Is it to secure that this shivering reed, this weak and trembling being called man, this plaything of nature, shall attain, through wise guidance, to the self-control without which freedom is a snare, and then through freedom to the powers and responsibilities which make up the full stature of manhood? That is not the Prussian answer. Prussianism has at once too little faith in the potentialities of human nature and too keen a sense of the practical urgencies of present-day life. "Freedom," it answers, "may indeed be the hallmark of complete being. It may indeed be desirable, in the abstract, for the children of men in all their relationships. As to that we will not be dogmatic. If the conditions of social existence were other than what they are, the experiment of training the race to the exercise of uncontrolled freedom might well be tried. But within the

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limits of human life as it is, and of the possibilities open to rulers and lawgivers, we dare not contemplate the opening of the dykes which hold in the dark waters of popular will and passion. The true objects of government and social organisation are to be sought in another sphere. We do not aim at training the natural man to be free. We aim at training him for the use of an authority higher and wiser than himself. We aim at creating material and spiritual conditions which shall turn his ignorance into knowledge, his weakness into serviceable strength, and his want of discipline into firm and confident obedience. We aim at making out of lonely and capricious units, each with its own private fancies and inclinations, with its infinitely various dispositions and capacities, of which in its own narrow field it is powerless to make good use, an army, steady, self-controlled, homogeneous, invincible, a fit instrument to achieve the highest purposes of the Creator. Thus we give to each man, not what the West calls freedom -for such freedom, as all history proves, only breeds weakness and anarchy-but something which we think worthier of that great word, the freedom that the angels know, the freedom which consists, not in individual initiative or decision or assent, not in the achievement of self-chosen purposes, but in the perfect service of a righteous and revered authority."

What is that authority? It is the authority of a Christian King, of a ruler who holds his power by Divine

Right.

The Divine Right of Kings is a phrase that has so long been unfamiliar to English lips that it is hard for us to realise that the belief is still in full vigour.* We who know Prussianism by its fruits in Belgium and elsewhere are

^{*} Prussian Conservatives hold that his divine election empowers the King to intercede between God and his people. On the occasion of William II's birthday on January 27 last, the Kreuz Zeitung, alluding to his prayers for his people, said: "Among the heathen and Jews the office of Priest was often associated with their King. Happy the Christian nation whose King voluntarily assumes the priestly office for his people."

accustomed to think of it as essentially irreligious. That such is too often its effect upon its agents the war has unhappily afforded testimony enough. But this is neither the whole truth nor indeed that part of it which it most behoves us to understand. It is a law of the world that no strong organisation, be it a nation or a band of robbers, can be purely evil; for evil through its own nature spreads weakness, suspicion and disunion. Were Prussianism purely evil it would have collapsed long ago. It could not have drawn on the reserves of strength which have enabled it to maintain an heroic unequal contest against hunger, hardship and superior numbers. Prussianism stands for more than the use of howitzers and cannon fodder. It is a creed held, with intense conviction, by men who have had the courage to apply it, logically and consistently, to every relationship of life. Its prophets and leaders, of whom Bismarck is the shining exemplar, have not only been unfeignedly devout in their personal lives, but have seen no disharmony but rather a close association between their religious beliefs and their political and social philosophy.

"No State," said Bismarck, "has a secure existence unless it has a religious foundation. For me the words, 'By the Grace of God,' which Christian rulers add to their name, is no empty phrase; I see in them a confession that the princes desire to wield the sceptre which God has given them according to the will of God on earth. If we withdraw this foundation we retain in a State nothing but an accidental aggregate of rights, a kind of bulwark against the war of all against all."

And again, speaking in 1848, when the dykes had for the moment broken down and Europe seemed about to be inundated with the waves of popular passion, he reminded his hearers, in words which have become historic as the lode-star of two generations of policy, that the Prussian cause rested "on authority created by God, an authority by the Grace of God" and had been "developed in organic connexion with the existing and constitutional legal status."

These famous words not only reveal the nature of the

Prussian authority—the King by the grace of God—but tell us something as to how that authority is in practice exercised and made effective. The King of Prussia is no arbitrary Oriental Sultan, no Temporal Pope, whose personal power is unlimited and personal opinion infallible: he acts, in accordance at once with the dictates of conscience and the "existing and constitutional legal status."

What is that status? It is a constitution granted by the King, and subject to revocation by him at pleasure, by which he limits his power and accords certain rights and responsibilities to chosen classes and individuals among his subjects.

This is not the place in which to describe the constitutional development of Prussia or to sketch the intricacies of the present system of legislation and administration. But their effect has been, in brief, to surround the monarch with a body of able, fearless and unbending retainers from among the landed gentry or Junker (squires) of the old Prussian provinces—a class at once fanatically loyal to their "all-highest War-lord" and fanatically healous for their own military traditions and constitutional privileges. It is upon the basis of their allegiance that the structure of the Prussian power has been raised. Had not the Great Elector, according to the true Prussian doctrine, crushed, tamed and subjected them, converting their wilful and fissiparous feudalism into the willing instrument of his royal purpose, the Prussian nobility would have languished in petty power and disunion like their compeers in Hanover, Mecklenburg, and South Germany, the victims of their own useless and impotent freedom. "The intimate union of Crown and people," wrote the King of Prussia a few weeks since, in reply to the birthday greetings of the Prussian Upper House, "which I received as a sacred heritage from my fathers, dates from the hard times by which Prussia was trained for its world-historical mission."

For the last two centuries the Prussian King and his

people—a military bodyguard of country squires—have pursued this mission together, and the relationship, at first military and personal, has been crystallised into legal and constitutional forms. Together they have added province upon province to the original Prussian domain-Silesia, Posen, Westphalia, the Lower Rhine, Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel have been directly incorporated. Alsace-Lorraine, conquered mainly by Prussian arms, was added to the German Empire when, in 1871, it was inaugurated under Prussian auspices. And now they have gone forward once more. Belgium, Poland, Courland and Lithuania lie within that unrelaxing grasp. Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey are dependent, as

South Germany has been dependent since 1871.

But the distinguishing feature of Prussianism is not its successful career of military conquest. Military conquest, atter all, is a matter of technical training, equipment and skill, of local superiority, sometimes of accident. The world has seen many examples of resounding military success, of seemingly invincible armies. Alexander and Napoleon both grew from smaller beginnings and stretched their arm farther over the known world than Prussia. What distinguishes the career of Prussia from that of Alexander and Napoleon is its capacity for absorbing its victims and converting them, within a generation, into agents for the further extension of its power. No military State in history has shown this capacity in so high a degree since the days of Rome. The Prussians are the Romans of the modern world. They are moving to worldmastery from similar small beginnings, by similar gradual stages, by a similar combination of force and civilising achievement, of legions and lawgiving, of skilful education and ruthless suppression. To give to the modern world, so restless and divided, so anxious for unhindered security, a Roman peace, guaranteed by the iron majesty of Roman laws and Roman arms, is the dream of Prussian idealism.

How has this great work of subjection and absorption

been accomplished? By the power of fear and by the

power of knowledge.

It has lately been remarked by an acute psychologist^{*} that social philosophers are apt to judge of mankind according to the nature of the system which they desire to provide for it and to see little in human nature save what accords with their initial design. Thus Hobbes, for instance, played on the single motive of fear, Burke relied on the force of use and wont, and Bentham read self-interest into every act of man. Prussianism, like Hobbes, sees chiefly in man a being responsive to fear.

To the true-born Prussian, living as he does in a perpetual minority, like the Spartan among his Helots, reliance on terrorism and the cultivation of a sense of arrogant contempt towards other peoples and classes has become a fixed habit. "Vox populi," said a Junker deputy, in a recent outburst,

" Vox populi, vox cattle."

"The population here," wrote Bismarck from Frankfurt in 1848, in the days when that city was almost as great a hotbed of revolutionary feeling as Petrograd is to-day, "would be a political volcano if revolutions were made with the mouth; so long as it requires blood and strength they will obey anyone who has the courage to command and, if necessary, to draw the sword; they would be dangerous only under cowardly Governments."

According to the spirit of these words Bismarck acted towards South Germany all his life, and so his successors have dealt with their present allies. "Frightfulness" is the spearhead of the Prussian attack. They have studied the motions of fear in all their manifestations, from the first faint symptoms of weakening, the first flickering of the eyelid, to the wild-eyed panic which sweeps away regiments and populations in ignominous rout.

Fear is the cement of the Prussian dominion. Her young people know it in the class-room, when the shadow of the State examination, on which their whole social status depends, darkens their adolescent years. Their

^{*} Graham Wallas. The Great Society, p. 147.

soldiers know it in the barracks and on the drill ground. The civilian knows it in his contact with the soldier and the public official; the South German in his contact with the Prussian, the ally in his contact with the German. The natives of the German colon.es know it well. So do the inhabitants of the occupied territories, and the neutral governments and peoples, and voyagers by sea, and dwellers in cities within reach of Prussia's strong arm. It is her recurring tactic in military and naval operations, in diplomacy, in internal policy, even in business, whereshe has taught her agents to conceal temporary weakness and embarrassment by spreading legends of inexhaustible reserves of money-power and invincible skill in salesmanship and manufacture. Prestige, discipline, demoralisation-prestige for herself, discipline for her servants, demoralisation for the rest. These in the Prussian conception are the harvest of fear.

But with the inculcation of fear has gone the inculcation of knowledge. "Culture" and terrorism have ranged the world together. First of all European States Prussia realised that knowledge is power: that to exercise dominion in the modern world a Government must not only train its whole manhood to arms, but set its whole people to school and mould their minds to its bent. "Culture" existed before Prussia made the conception her own; it meant, and still means, familiarity with the best products of human thought and feeling, refinement of taste, a wide outlook, an acquaintance with men and things. But culture in the Prussian sense is something less pleasing in its appeal and less universal in its range. Prussian culture is a State product: it is knowledge, State-organised and State-edited, employed to found or perpetuate a State tradition or to forward a State purpose. It is the armoury whence Prussia draws the weapons of knowledge or opinion with which to promote her designs.

Upon knowledge, thus cultivated and canalised, the strength of Prussia has depended and still depends to-day

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-upon the faithful and tireless docility of her servants and victims. It was not simply the skill of her diplomats and generals which enabled her to reap the fruits of her victory over the other German States in 1866, but the science, the swift efficiency, the monumental solidity of the system thereby revealed. She drew South Germany to her in that seven weeks' campaign and in the years that followed by the magic of intellectual achievement. She awed its statesmen; her glamour dazzled the middle class; she hypnotised the rising generation at school and in the army; she whetted the ambition and stimulated the desires of her merchants and manufacturers. So again it was not simply the physical courage of her soldiers, but the trained intelligence of Moltke and Roon, fertilised by the teachings of Clausewitz and a great school of thinkers upon the art of war, which won the victories of 1870. Nor is it any pre-eminence in natural capacity, any striking gifts of taste or insight or sensibility, which have given German scholarship its worldwide reputation. It is its patient, plodding, conscientious, systematic use of specialised knowledge, the well-devised alliance of Prussian organisation with the old South German spirit of research. By knowledge she won her position in the arts of production and in the markets of the world. And by knowledge her power has been maintained during three years of unexampled warfare and blockade-by the intelligent and welldirected industry of her workmen, by the technical skill of her chemists and engineers, her manufacturers and financiers, by the organising ability and deeply pondered experience of her General Staff, by the concentrated and disciplined labours of countless servants of the Prussian power who form the rank and file of her fighting forces at the front and in the rear.

Thus Prussia, having linked knowledge to power, and founded both in a disciplined loyalty to an authority which has been tested in action and so far not been found wanting, supported by allies, her equals in name but already

half absorbed into her system, bestrides Europe and the Near East and looks forward, tired but confident, straitened and suffering, but to all outward seeming victorious, towards a peace which will give her breathing space to plan the next step in her "world-historical mission."

II.

IN December, 1917, the German army lay far out in Russian territory. During over three years of campaigning it had won a series of resounding victories-Tannenberg, Gorlice, Warsaw, Tarnopol, Riga. It had overrun vast provinces, centres of industry and wealth, protected by important fortresses. It had broken up the whole defensive system of European Russia, inflicting immense losses on her armies. The German navy had just successfully attacked and occupied the key of the Eastern Baltic. Before the German generals the way to Petrograd lay open. Russia was powerless to resist. Her army was demoralised and in process of disorderly disbandment. Her railways, the arterial system on which her vast bulk depends for the elements of warmth and subsistence, for the possibility of life itself, were almost as disorganised as her army. The workmen in her towns were crying out for bread and peace. Her peasants were too busy pegging out claims of fresh land, and too distrustful of the paper roubles with which the enemy had helped to flood the country, either to attend to the work of production or to make available what produce they had. Famine and civil war, disease and licence stalked through the land with giant strides. In March there had been one Russia from Poland to the Pacific; now, whether there were six or sixty no man could tell. Republics sprang up in a night. Cities and districts proclaimed their independence. The realm of the Romanoffs, of Catherine, of Peter the Great, was no more. Russia had reeled back into the dark ages. She lay prostrate, sick

of a malady that had long been in her blood, which deprived her even of the power to minister to her own relief.

A turn of the wheel had put the reins of such organised power as still existed in her capital into the hands of a knot of resolute men, exiles lately returned to their native land. The populace asked for peace. They had joined in the demand themselves, and now they responded. They informed the enemy of their willingness, first to conclude an armistice and then to treat for peace. The armistice was concluded, and then, on a given day, the delegates of the Soldiers' and Workmen's Council, the temporary masters of Petrograd, were conveyed on a German train, dispatched to fetch them, to the headquarters of the German Eastern Army at Brest-Litovsk.

The fate of Russia was entrusted, in these negotiations, to a strangely assorted company. A peasant and a workman, a private soldier and a sailor came to take part in the discussions, shepherded by three or four revolutionary politicians. Staff officers accompanied them as technical experts, to advise their plebeian masters. One of these, General Skalon, overcome by the occasion of his mission, put an end to his life during the course of the discussions. Thus, in every circumstance of tragedy and discouragement, the representatives of the Russian Revolution entered the hall of session to open negotiations with the delegates of victorious Prussian power.

Then followed the strangest debate, surely, of which history bears record. It was not a debate, indeed, but a dialogue—a philosophical dialogue held, not, as of old, in porch or cloister, but in the open forum, with all mankind for audience. While the Prussian generals sat by waiting for the negotiations between victor and vanquished to pursue its orthodox traditional course, they saw their civilian colleague, who with an imprudent show of generosity had wandered beyond his beat, drawn into paths of metaphysical argument by men who, brooding in long years of exile, had trodden these tracks till they had become

more familiar than solid earth. Thus the spokesmen of the Revolution, with desolation behind them, but an audacity outsoaring Prussia's to sustain their spirit, were able, from this singular point of vantage, to make a listening world familiar with their whole thought and purpose.

Bolshevism, as the leaders of the Soviet preach and practise it, is not a new doctrine. In its emotional appeal it is as old as slavery, in its speculations and projects as old as industrialism. Nor is it the first time that it has seized power and essayed the task of government. Paris has seen and remembers not all but something of what Petrograd now endures. The preachings of Lenin and Trotsky are but a crude and contorted version of ideas which have been discussed, in part adopted and in part discarded, by students and statesmen in happier countries than Russia during the last three generations. Closely examined, what they have to set before us is not a system of life and government, well compacted, logical and consistent, as the metallic and uncompromising ring of their language might seem to imply, but a patchwork composition in which victims of all the oppressions of which the modern world is so full can find food for their own particular dream of liberation or revenge, for their elemental anger, their unthinking and childlike fanaticism. Democracy and militarism, socialism and syndicalism, pacifism and the class-war, nationalism and internationalism-these are disconnected and discordant ideals, yet all are equally proclaimed or implied in the Bolshevik programme. Government by the whole people, owning and controlling the machinery of production; government by a section of the people organised in councils composed of privileged groups of workers: peace with the foreign enemy, since the power of propaganda is greater than power of the sword; war against the domestic exploiter, since only through civil war can the working class come into its own: "self-determination," the right of secession and independent sovereignty for every national group, whatever the character of its

policy and allegiance; the knitting together of the peoples into a single society controlled by an international council. Here is no single ordered doctrine, like Prussianism, no clean-cut programme for the future of humanity, but a shrill reiterated clamour of irrational contradiction.

Yet Bolshevism, riddled though it is with inconsistency, has a unity of its own, and the inner force that comes from unity; and with that force it may yet make much history in Europe. Its unity is not intellectual—it is emotional. Its devotees do not think alike—they feel alike. It is the emotion expressed in the simple battle-cry which to-day, as when Marx penned it seventy years ago, can set the waves of passion surging, at moments of crisis and suffering, in any crowded concourse of wage-earners:

Workers of the world unite; you have a world to win and

nothing to lose but your chains.

It is the emotion which springs from a consciousness of wrongs daily and hourly endured, of a human birthright withheld, of gifts wasted and perverted in soulless drudgery, of the existence of a great world of power and beauty and happiness beyond the utmost reach of the individual, but just not beyond his ken. It is the revolution of the soul of man against the outcome of a century of industrialism.

No man can understand the appeal of the revolutionary movement till he has experienced or realised in imagination the degradation which the modern industrial system, with its false standard of values, its concentration on wealth and material production, its naïve detachment from ethical principle or civic obligation, has brought upon the masses who have served as the cannon fodder for its operations. "The worker in our modern world," says a writer whose lot is to live in the one country in Europe which is at once unspoiled by industrialism and relatively immune from the privations and compulsions of war,

The worker in our modern world is the subject of innumerable unapplied doctrines. The lordliest things are predicated for him, which do not affect in the least the relationship with him of those

who employ his labour. The ancient wisdom, as it is recounted to him on God's day, assures him of his immortality: that the divine signature is over all his being, that in some way he is co-related with the Eternal, that he is fashioned in a likeness to It. . . . So proud a tale is told of him, and when he wakens on the morrow after the day of God, he finds that none will pay him reverence. He, the destined comrade of Seraphim and Cherubim, is herded with other children of the King in fetid slum and murky alleys, where the devil hath his many marsions, where light and air, the great purifiers, are already dimmed and corrupted before they do him service. ... So great a disparity exists between spiritual theory and the realities of the social order that it might almost be said that spiritual theory has no effect at all on our civilization, and its inhuman contours seem softened at no point where we could say "Here the

Spirit has mastery. Here God possesses the world."

The imagination, following the worker in our industrial system, sees him labouring without security in his work, in despair, locked out, on strike, living in slums, rarely with enough food for health, bringing children into the world who suffer from malnutrition from their earliest years, a pauper when his days of strength are passed. He dies in charitable institutions. Though his labours are necessary, he is yet not integrated into the national economy. He has no share of his own in the wealth of the nation. He cannot claim work as a right from the holders of economic power, and this absolute dependence upon the autocrats of industry for a livelihood is the greatest evil of any, for it puts a spiritual curse on him and makes him in effect a slave. Instinctively he adopts a servile attitude to those who can sentence him and his children to poverty and hunger without trial or judgment by his peers. A hasty word, and he may be told to draw his pay and begone. The spiritual wrong done him by the social order is greater than the material ill, and that spiritual wrong is no less a wrong because generation after generation of workers have grown up and are habituated to it, and do not realize the oppression; because in childhood circumstance and the black art of education alike conspire to make the worker humble in heart and to take the crown and sceptre from his spirit, and his elders are already tamed and obsequious.*

Who will say that this description is exaggerated, as applied to the countries and classes where the ideals and temper of the Revolution make their strongest appeal? And who can forbear to wonder that, confined as they are

^{*} The National Being, by A. E. Dublin, 1916; pp. 66-68.

within such narrow and squalid limits, the workers, as a class, have preserved or developed such a boundless capacity for faith and hope and generous idealism? For the victims of a system so deadening in its daily incidence the very power to feel indignation is itself an achievement. The message of the Revolution, bearing with it the glow of passion, the sense of union and organisation, the vague expectation of decisive action and perpetual release, comes as a tonic and lifegiving force. To the historian, the economist and the party leader and organiser the successive revolutionary programmes which have marked its European course, from the days of St. Simon through Marx and Bakunin to the latest Maximalist inspiration—socialism, anarchism, communism, syndicalism, in their changes and variations—are serious criticisms and philosophies society and government. Not so to their followers. the vast majority they are accepted, not as doctrines consciously adopted, the fruit of intelligence and reflection, but as a religion, a revelation, a vision of the Kingdom. The Revolution, which substitutes economics for theology, and gilds the repellent theorems of the dismal science with an apocalyptic glow, is the workman's substitute for a Christianity which has seemed so powerless to supply him with sustenance either for body or spirit.

The emergence of the smouldering fires of the Revolution into activity in Europe is a natural result of three years of conflict in which the populations of the Continent have suffered as in the history of modern warfare only the peoples of the Confederacy have been called upon to endure. For the subjects of the Central Empires, locked in the prison-house of a slave State, revolution is, if they dare to take it, the shortest road to safety, comfort, and freedom. But forest fires know nothing of frontiers; and to the peoples of the Alliance, some of them, France, Italy, and the smaller nations, bearing an almost equal or even greater strain, the propaganda of the Revolution at this crisis of the war against Prussianism is an unwelcome distraction

and may even be a disaster: for it darkens counsel and divides and confuses the forces of freedom.

"Let us try never to forget," wrote a wise French Liberal * lately, "that Socialism is for Liberalism an ever doubtful ally. It has not the passion for liberty, it has not the passion for nationality, it has no passion, no instinct, save for the struggle against the bourgeois class. It has, at this moment, the instinct that whoever may be the victor, this war is preparing for it a very great future. It is impatient for the moment which will allow it to begin to gather its harvest, to store away at last the fruit of so much suffering. It is almost prepared to neglect, as a fact of secondary importance, whether it must do its harvesting under German guidance or under some other. Its thought is elsewhere. It is, moreover, made up of masses who have the habit of being dominated, and one domination more leaves it unamazed."

The same warning, never more necessary than to-day, runs like a refrain through the writings of the most prophetic of all nineteenth century idealists. "By dividing into fractions that which is in reality but one thing," wrote Mazzini in 1852, "by separating the social from the political question, a numerous section of French Socialists has powerfully contributed to bring about the present shameful position of affairs in France." And speaking of the revolutionary propaganda of that day and its distracting influence on idealistic endeavour, he wrote:

Man is not changed by whitewashing or gilding his habitation; a people cannot be regenerated by teaching them the worship of enjoyment; they cannot be taught a spirit of sacrifice by speaking to them of material rewards. . . . The Utopist may see afar from a hill the distant land which will give to society a virgin soul, a purer air; his duty is to point it out with a gesture and a word to his brothers; but he cannot take humanity in his arms ard carry it there in a single bound; even if this were in his power, humanity would not therefore have progressed.

And again, in words that strikingly recall recent history in Russia, he says of the French movement:

Aparchy entered its ranks. A man, gifted with a power of logic,

[•] M. Daniel Halévy in the New Republic, January 5, 1918.

disastrous because applied to the service of a false principle, and able to dominate weak minds by his incredible audacity and his clear and cutting rhetoric, came to throw the light of his torch upon this anarchy. . . . He refuted one system by another; he contradicted himself ten times over. He enthroned irony as queen of the world, and proclaimed the Void. It is through this Void that Louis Napoleon has entered. •

What Mazzini said of the effect of the influence of Proudhon on the career of Napoleonism in France may yet prove true of the influence of Trotsky on the career of Prussianism in

Europe.

For the revolutionary idea does more than break up the unity of the forces of freedom: it tends to realign them against one another, leaving the front unguarded against the common enemy. In the name of liberty and under the guise of friendship, it instinctively seeks out the failings to which liberalism in a crisis is ever prone, its distaste for authority, its repudiation of discipline, its tendency to mistake argument for action, its capacity for illusion and for ignoring unpleasant realities. True it presses its attack also against the legions of Prussia and her allies. But fear may well prove a firmer master than idealism, and Prussianism, with its supreme and perfected military administration, is better versed in the art of repression than the free and responsible governments of the West. While such equivocal forces are afield let the army of freedom beware!

The votaries of revolution, overleaping the present, claim the future for their own. Ignoring or discounting the war, they have already annexed the coming age. But the future is not with them. Masters alone in the arts of enthusiasm and destruction, the world will not turn to them to repair its ruin and desolation. Not through such ministers of wrath will salvation come. To steadier hands and wiser heads will fall the healing tasks of the new order.

^{*} Europe: Its Condition and Prospects. Collected Works VI. pp. 239, 250-1, 253.

III.

PRUSSIANISM and the Revolution are near akin. Both were cradled in violence and brought up on tales of conflict. Both have learned in the school of experience to regard all life as a war, now open, now concealed. Both aim at world-ascendancy and pursue that aim by terrorism. Both are unscrupulous in negotiation, daring and resolute in action, impenetrably self-centred in thought and purpose. Both acknowledge no authority, no principle of humanity or goodwill beyond the blind and driving law of their own being. Both are members of that tribe of devouring fanaticisms whose dreary and blood-stained doings fill so large and tragic a place in the recorded annals of mankind.

It was this psychological kinship, so real and perceptible beneath the striking contrast of their external credentials and appearance, which gave dramatic interest and unity to the dialogue at Brest. Here were the two great destructive agencies of our time met face to face in the persons of their chosen representatives: the one gross, solid, material, equipped with the full panoply of martial grandeur, the other with no visible legions to support it, but strong in the consciousness of a power, elusive, all-pervading, impalpable, an infection in the air, a fever in the blood, a terror lurking in the dark.

The spokesmen of the Revolution, for their part, did not fail to acknowledge the relationship. "When General Hoffmann pointed out," said M. Trotsky, on January 14, "that the Russian Government based its position on power, and that it makes use of force against all those whose opinions differ from its own, and that it stigmatises them as counter-revolutionaries and bourgeois, it should be observed that the Russian Government is based upon power. Throughout the whole of history no other govern-

ment has been known. So long as society consists of contending classes, the power of governments will be based on strength, and these governments will maintain their dominion by force. . . . What the governments of other countries object to in the actions of the Russian Government is the way in which it makes use of its power, and from this policy it does not allow itself to be deterred."

Here is the inner link between Prussianism and the Revolution. Here is the hidden root from which so much bitter fruit has sprung. Here, in a few sentences, is the complete philosophy of militarism. If this is the whole truth about society and government, then force is the only arbiter between contending parties and principles, and the big battalions, as so often, will engage philosophers after the event to justify the necessary, the inevitable, the "progressive" character of their achievement. Or can we find some more universal and more harmonious ideal? Can we build the house of our faith, of our political and social allegiance upon some firmer and sounder foundation? Is there some standard, some guiding principle, which we can set up with assurance against the crude and corrupting doctrine of force?

Such a principle exists. It is working in us and around us. It is transforming human life and its institutions. To understand its nature, to realize the gulf which divides it from the contending militarisms, to grasp the true force and quality of its achievement, we must stand aside for a moment from the heat and conflict of the present age and survey, as from a mountain top, the situation and record of man as a whole.

IV

MAN is a spiritual being. Seventy years, or little more, is the span of his physical life. This planet, which, save when he looks upward, bounds his vision, is the place where those years are spent. To enable him to live the best

life it can afford him is the object of political and social organization.

For unnumbered ages man has lived on the planet. They were ages of darkness and ignorance, and only dim traces of their record survive. Men and women were born, lived and died, endured cold and hunger, pain and danger, hunting and being hunted, dwelling almost as beasts among the beasts, knowing nothing of the planet save a few miles of hill or jungle, and nothing of man's being save what the passing occasion might call forth—now a stab of anger or curiosity, now a call to lead or to follow, some motion of fear or jealousy or revenge, a gleam of wonder, a glow of passion, a glory of friendship or motherhood. Man was the slave of nature, the plaything of circumstance. Life was compacted of custom and instinct. Knowledge was not yet, and Reason, for lack of material for her use, was sluggish and undeveloped.

Slowly man mastered the outer and the inner knowledge. He learnt to control his environment—to make fire, to grow food, to sail, to spin, to weave, to use metals. He learnt to control his inherited nature—to subdue fear and lust, greed and ambition, jealousy and revenge, to trust and to keep trust, to command with justice and obey with honour, to enlarge his circle of loyalty from family to kin, from kin to tribe, to spare, even to conciliate his enemy, to reverence the old and respect the young, to sweeten his intercourse with lasting affections, to dignify it by contact with the sanctities of memory and aspiration. Life was no longer a struggle of all against all. It had become, on its narrow but expanding stage, a sphere of common endeavour, of mutual service. Thus civilization began. Thus slowly and painfully, through the labours of an uncounted succession of humble men and women, was amassed the nucleus of that which is now in jeopardy, the social inheritance of mankind.

To preserve and increase this inheritance two things were needed, knowledge and institutions—knowledge as

the instrument of future progress and conquests, institutions to embody in a living tradition the conquests of the present. The cultivation of knowledge and the establishment of social institutions mark the development of civilization.

As the pressure of material need relaxed, knowledge, the child of wonder and reflection, grew. Wisdom and the arts were handed down and perfected from generation to generation, entrusted to poet and prophet and priest, to caste and guild, to schools of craftmanship and medicine, law and science, to the cloister and the university, to the republics of science and letters, to the company of teachers and students throughout the world. With truth for task-mistress they have laboured in honourable rivalry, not simply for hire or reward, but for the service of mankind. Thus knowledge could replace instinct, reason could dethrone passion, in the ordering of human affairs.

But if instinct and passion are the blind weapons of the Revolution, knowledge as we have seen, is the chief ally of Prussianism. Knowledge is not mistress in the house of life. She is but a handmaid, powerful of arm but unfitted for initiative. She is bound in humble service to fulfil the desires and purposes of others. What use men make of her depends in part upon their own individual and temporary desires, but in greater degree upon the character of the institutions which embody, at any time, the living

tradition and lasting purposes of civilization.

What are the common needs and concerns of men for which institutions have been devised? Two stand out above the rest—one economic, the other political. For his physical existence man needs material goods, food, clothing, shelter and domestic comfort. As a spiritual being man needs justice and liberty.

The history of social and political thought and endeavour is the record of man's attempt to create institutions appropriate for the fulfilling of these needs, to embody in a lasting and progressive tradition the dream of the perfect

state and the perfect economic system. Far indeed has the fulfilment lagged behind the quest of the ideal in either sphere. Exploitation and the class-struggle, slavery and serfdom, profit-seeking and inequality stain the one record; tyranny and warfare, the ambition of the strong, the submission and spoliation of the weak, mar the other; and the end is not yet. But steadily through the ages, in Greece and Palestine, in Rome, ancient and mediæval, in England, France and the New World, the purpose and ideal, first of politics, and then of industry also, have become clearer to the vision.

What is the nature of that ideal? If the close-knit institutions of Prussianism, as we have seen, leave men's souls starved and stunted, if the Revolution dissolves all institutions and plunges society back into barbarism, what doctrine, what principle of organisation can assure man order, harmony, and freedom, can satisfy at once the needs

of body and spirit?

The inspiration of all sound and enduring political and social construction is what has been called the principle of the Commonwealth. The name is convenient because it serves to distinguish, as habitual usage does not, institutions which promote the cause of human welfare and those, such as have been described in Prussia, which have a more sectional and sinister purpose. What, it will be asked, is a Commonwealth? A Commonwealth is a community, designed to meet the common needs of men, founded on the principle of the service of each for all. Is the Commonwealth to be identified with any particular type of government? Is it necessarily a democracy? Does the service of all necessarily imply the rule of all? "Easier a great deal it is," wrote a wise Elizabethan, "for men by law to be taught what they ought to do than instructed to judge as they should do of law: the one being a thing which belongeth generally unto all, the other such as none but the wiser and more judicious sort can perform."* Yet since,

^{*} Hooker. Ecclesiastical Polity, i, xvi, 2.

despite the contempt of Prussia and the cynicism of the Revolution, the spirit of man was framed for wisdom and Judgment, for responsibility, initiative and self-control, since a man without liberty is a being bereft, as the poet has said, of half his manhood, the perfect Commonwealth, the ideal towards which all political and social endeavour moves forward, is a society of free men and women, each at once ruling and being ruled, each consciously giving his service for the benefit of all.

The principle of the Commonwealth is the application to the field of government and social policy of the law of human brotherhood, of the duty of man to his neighbour, near and far. Like the opposing principle of militarism, it is as old as the need for conscious organisation, for the adoption of a policy in social affairs. In the earliest time, when men's duties and relationships were confined within a narrow personal circle, little effort was needed to enable him to discharge them. But from the day when man first felt the need for public right, for an impartial arbiter to stand between him and hot passion and bitter need, organisation has been the prop of social life and personal duty. Only through organisation, through citizenship and its related obligations, can man worthily play his part in a large-scale society. History has known organisations of every kind, designed with every sort of motivetyranny, ambition, cruelty, greed or fear. A Commonwealth is an organisation designed with the ruling motive of love and brotherhood. It seeks to embody, not only in phraseology and constitutional doctrine, but in the actual conduct of public affairs, so far as the frailty and imperfection of man admit, the spirit and ideals of religion. Whosoever will be great among you shall be your minister; and whosoever of you will be the chiefest shall be the servant of all.

The doctrine of the Commonwealth, expressed in these words, has been set forth and applied from age after age to the current problems of humanity, from Plato down to President Wilson. It embodies, succinctly and unanswer-

ably, the response of the soul of man to the twin challenge of Prussianism and Revolution. Yet there are criticisms which must be met. In theory men will argue, the principle of the Commonwealth holds the field. Religion and philosophy, conscience and idealism, proclaim it. Yet how weak is its influence, how paltry its achievements! Christianity has preached the doctrine of mutual service through twenty centuries, yet behold the shambles of to-day! Prussianism, as we have seen, pays lip service to the Christian State, and the Revolution, in its perorations, drops the language of conflict and makes its appeal to brotherhood. Yet, for present purposes, for effort in the world as it now is, both prefer systems of violence. Admirable and flawless in theory, is the principle of mutual service, men may ask, compatible in practice, here and now, with the nature of man as we see him and know him? Can we ask of the toiling masses, encrusted with ignorance and prejudice, with false traditions and blind animosities, weighed down by the load of daily care and suffering, that they should guide their lives by the light of so high and distant a beacon?

The answer to such doubters is to exhibit the principle of the Commonwealth in living operation and to recall the manifold evidence of its all-pervading vitality. If the instances which follow are drawn from the record of one only of its manifestations, the British, it is not for want of appreciation of what France and America and other members of the League of Freedom have achieved in their own field. For them it would be a presumption to speak. An ally may watch and wonder at an ally's confidence and endurance; but the secret springs of faith, the conditions of such heroic endeavour, are withdrawn from his gaze.

Consider, then, as regards the British Commonwealth, the indictment of Prussianism. "You claim," it says, "to be a Commonwealth, to unite beneath one law a quarter of the human race, to have achieved, as it were by accident, in a fit of absence of mind, as one of your writers

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has put it, without conscious purpose or the guidance of systematic knowledge, the realisation of our own cherished dream-a Roman peace diffused throughout five continents. Yet, whatever future the gods may reserve for Prussia, Britain and her Empire at least seem stricken with mortality. You talk of the law of mutual service. Is it graven, like the laws of Prussia, in the hearts and minds of your citizens! Have you laboured, we have laboured, to create a race worthy of your imperial purpose? Have you tamed the sectional instincts, uprooted the selfish desires, chastened the unruly wills of your scattered populations? We look out over your Empire and behold everywhere the dry rot of disunion, the seeds of disloyalty and decay; here a rebellion, there a conspiracy, here an ignorant denial of duty, there a direct withdrawal of aid, here a cry for secession, and there, at the very heart, voices preaching anarchy and sedition, rallying unchecked in their defence the ignorance you have foreborne to enlighten, the passions you have foreborne to subdue. With too easy a rein you have ridden them, your millions at home and overseas! Wealth you have given them and comfort and, by our leave, a long lease of peace. But in your anarchy and scepticism, your contempt for knowledge, your wilful blindness to stern realities, we see little trace of your proud doctrine of mutual service, nor is the lazy and good-humoured tolerance of British rule the true fulfilment of the law of Christ."

Truth is contained in this indictment. Yet were it the whole truth, the British Commonwealth would long since, in these testing years, have succumbed in the ordeal and gone the way of older dominions. If it survives intact, if it has grown in confidence and vitality, in the consciousness of its purpose and ideal, it is because, side by side with its failures, so much more visible and clamorous than the disappointments of Prussia, the spirit of mutual service is alive and vigorous among its nations, moving from strength to strength in the cause, not of the Commonwealth alone

but of humanity. The war indeed, if it has revealed shortcomings, has not found the British character or British institutions wanting. It has endorsed and confirmed them. In fact the Commonwealth has proved itself capable of achieving these very triumphs of unity and public service which Prussianism claimed as its monopoly, only to be exploited by its own tried and tested methods-triumphs moreover on Prussia's own chosen field of war. Six million men and more, untouched by the goad of compulsion, offered their lives to the cause of human freedom. Women awoke, as never before in history, to the duty of public service and to the consciousness of their individual gifts and powers. The nations of the Commonwealth near and far, tutored and untutored, poured out their contribution of human devotion and material treasure. Among the weaker races thousands unfitted for the combat went willingly to labour in a strange land. Untrained in the issues of international policy, unaccustomed to withstand the blandishments of foreign intrigue or to tolerate the suspense and privations, the curtailments of liberty, the summary and indiscriminate procedures of wartime, vast populations worked and waited, steadily and in good heart, neither impatient nor vindictive, holding fast to the ideal. Confirmed in its inner faith the Commonwealth has begun to strengthen its outward unity also. For the first time the common purpose of its peoples, at home and overseas, has been embodied in executive institutions. Men from five continents have come together to frame common decisions. East and West, under the stress of danger, found the unity underlying age-long difference and met for deliberation in equal partnership. While Prussianism holds down its conquests by slavery and oppression, while the Revolution has broken up a Continent into its primitive elements, across the mountains, in India, among populations twice as numerous and far more varied than the peoples of Russia, the spirit of responsibility is awakening and the charter of self-government has been

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proclaimed. In Ireland, too, where old wrongs still remain to be righted, Irishmen sitting in orderly convention are seeking to shape the destinies of their country in a spirit equally removed from ascendancy and revolution. If the record of the British Commonwealth under the stress of war is less resounding than the martial bulletins of Prussia, less stirring and fantastic than the sweeping edicts of the Revolution, if its plans and achievements are dressed in the sober tints of ordinary life, it is because the Commonwealth exists not to gratify a conqueror's ambition or to demonstrate or refute a dreamer's doctrine, but to enable its citizens to grow to the full stature of their moral being. Not by the triumphs of the battlefield and the forum will the Commonwealth seek to be justified, but by the character and the influence, the noble example and the inspiring memory of its men and women.

But the Bolshevist, too, has his indictment. We need not repeat it. Its substance stands on an earlier page: the fetid slum and the murky alley; the denial of light and air and health; the sunless outlook and the soulless labour; the back bowed down not by drudgery only but by servile fear; the mind shut out from the contemplation of knowledge and beauty; inequalities of wealth and power and circumstance darkening every aspect and relation of social

existence.

The indictment cannot be denied. For a century Mammon has bestridden, and still bestrides, the world. His standards, conflicting at every stage with the standards of the Commonwealth, have been embodied in law, in custom and in the social code. Yet here, too, change is on the march. In these islands men are unlearning the outworn shibboleth of "Business is Business" and seeking new and fruitful applications of the doctrine of the Commonwealth. The first and most necessary step, to enlarge the range of popular responsibility and control has already been taken. Amidst the unremitting stress of war, the electorate has been doubled and women called in to fill

their rightful place in the common life. Education, the key of the future, is at last being extended, if as yet but timidly. Labour has received a charter of its equality with the other agents of production and has been called, through its representative organizations, into partnership with management, to control the conduct of their common services. The burden of the State is being placed more and more upon the shoulders of those who best can bear it: the yield of the taxes on incomes and profits and on the inheritance of the rich amounted in 1916-17 to £400,000,000 or double the entire budget of 1914.

Yet these changes, startling as they would have seemed four years since, and coming on the heel of events which might well, as a hundred years ago, have clogged the wheels of progress, are but the symbol and presage of what is yet to come. For in these years of strain and darkness, of common anxiety and common danger, many inward barriers have been broken down and men have learnt to face the meaning and consequences of their faith. If the ideal of the Commonwealth is to be truly realised, if the free service of each for all is to be not merely a profession but a reality in the industrial field, men must turn their minds, as they are already turning them, to a wide reform and reordering of the conditions of life for the mass of the people. Shorter hours of labour, and an annual holiday on full pay for rest and travel; protection for all who work against the accident of unemployment; more control by the workman over the conditions of his occupation; buildings for him to work in designed not merely for machines but for men, planned for convenience and even for beauty; a home, not a brick box, to live in; a town, not a mean monotony of streets, to stir his civic pride; better schools and a longer education for his children, so that they may grow, body and mind, to the full stature of manhood; the absorption by the community, rather than by the capitalist, of the surplus profits of production; justice, informed and impartial, to support and enforce the claim of freedom

wherever it is denied or endangered; above all, an open gateway for everyone, young and old, into the realm of knowledge and beauty, and the recognition, not in laws only but in social customs and institutions, of the spiritual basis of the Commonwealth and the equality of all its citizens in the eyes of society as in the eyes of God—such are the conditions through which, for all who work, the spirit of public service will replace the spirit of private gain as the dominating motive of their toil.

Thus the principle of the Commonwealth, tested in action and moving along its own quiet and well-tried paths, is proving itself more militant than Prussianism and more revolutionary than the Revolution. Once more it is assailed by its enemies: once more, as in bygone days, the hope of the world depends upon its victory: once more it is rallying to its defence the hearts and minds of all who know what freedom means and inspiring in them the fortitude and perseverance needed, as aforetime, to hold and break the onset of militarism. And when it has overthrown the power of Prussianism and rid the world for ever from the menace of its dominion, it will have nothing to fear from its other enemy, the destructive forces of the Revolution. For the war has renewed men's faith in it: its purpose has been clarified and confirmed by the ordeal: and even in the dust and heat of the conflict it is beginning to build up the new order of civic freedom and international justice which will govern the coming age of peace.

> Yes, while on earth a thousand discords ring, Man's fitful uproar mingling with his toil, Still do thy sleepless ministers move on, Their glorious tasks in silence perfecting.

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Erratum: In the reference to the shading, Letts and Lithuanians should be transposed.

THE PEOPLES OF THE BALTIC PROVINCES AND LITHUANIA*

STONIA, Livonia and Courland constitute together Cthe so-called Baltic Provinces. The Governments of Kovno, Vitebsk, Vilna, Grodno, Minsk and Mohilev roughly correspond to what was known between 1569 and 1772 as Lithuania. The Baltic Provinces are the land of the Ests and the Letts, whilst bistoric Lithuania is that of the Lithuanians and the White Russians. But Estland. Lettland, ethnic Lithuania and White Russia are to be found on nationality maps alone; they do not coincide with any historic or administrative divisions. Their national character is determined by the language of the vast peasant masses; the political boundaries have been drawn by and between the races to which these peasant nations had been subject, the Poles, the Germans and the Great Russians, and at one time also the Swedes. The big landed estates in the Baltic Provinces remain to the present day in the hands of the Germans, throughout historic Lithuania in the hands of the Poles. In the Baltic Provinces the

^{*} Total population of the Baltic Provinces and the Lithuanian Governments, according to an estimate for 1915 drawn up by the Russian Central Statistical Commission:

Estonia	 	512,500	Vilna	***	***	2,083,200
Livonia	 	1,778,500	Vitebak		***	1,984,800
Courland	 	812,300	Minsk	***	***	3,070,900
Kovno	 ***	1,871,400	Mohilev	***		2,551,400
Grodno	 	2,094,300	Suvalki		***	718,000

Germans and the Jews form substantial minorities in the towns, in historic Lithuania the Jews form the larger part of the urban population.* There are considerable Polish settlements in the Lithuanian towns, and also Polish enclaves in the rural districts of the Governments of Vilna and Grodno. Great Russians live in scattered groups throughout the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania.

Of the four nationalities which form the vast majority of the population in the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania, the most northerly are the Ests. They inhabit the whole of Estonia (including the islands at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga) and the northern part of Livland, roughly to a line drawn west and south-east of the town of Walk. Also the town of Narva in the Government of Petrograd is predominantly Est and has recently been allowed by Russia to join the autonomous State of Estonia.

The Ests speak a Finnish language and are Lutherans.

In 1897 the population of Estonia was 413,000, of which 366,000 were Ests and only 16,000 Germans. The same census put the population of Livonia at 1,299,000, the number of Ests among them at 519,000. There were 64,000 Ests in the Government of Petrograd and 25,000 in the Government of Pskov. Their total number in Russia was given as 994,000. This figure would have probably to be increased by about 16 per cent. to bring it up to date.†

In the early Middle Ages the country to the south of what is now Est territory was also inhabited by Finnish tribes, the now extinct Cours and Livs, who have given their names to the two southern Baltic Provinces. But

#1 The birth rate among the Ests is low and the death rate comparatively high.

^{*} Considerable numbers of Jews have recently emigrated from Lithuania. A very large proportion of the Jewish emigrants from the western parts of the Government of Kovno have gone to South Africa. In small towns such as Shavle it would be hard to find a Jewish family which has not got some relatives in South Africa, and the names of Johannesburg or Cape Town are more familiar to them than Paris or Vienna.

by the twelfth century Lithuanian tribes had displaced them and occupied most of the Baltic shore from about the mouth of the River Salis to the Lower Vistula and its hinterland for some two hundred miles inland. They all spoke dialects of one common language which, though not Slav itself, approaches nearest to the Slav linguistic group. The most westerly Lithuanian tribes, the original Prussians, are now almost completely extinct—just a few hundred of them are left in East Prussia, in villages on the Kurisches Haff. They have perished in the struggle against the southern branch of the Teutonic Knights of the Cross, the founders and forerunners of the modern Prussian State.

Differences in historic development have divided the surviving Lithuanians into two separate nationalities, very closely allied in speech but differing in culture and religion -the Lutheran Letts and the predominantly Roman Catholic Lithuanians. Ever since the thirteenth century the Letts have remained under the immediate dominion of the northern branch of the Teutonic Knightly Order, a dominion which did not lose its reality even when after the Reformation the German Knights, who had divested themselves of their semi-ecclesiastical character, had to admit the suzerainty of Poland, Sweden or Russia. In the fourteenth century, when in the south the original Lithuanian Prussians were succumbing in the unequal contest against the German Knights and in the north the Letts had fallen under a similar dominion, the ancestors of the present-day Lithuanians had subdued vast stretches of Russian territory and ruled over a wide empire which exceeded in extent that which is now known as historic Lithuania. Yet even they did not feel sufficiently strong to fight single-handed against the German Knights who were invading their home country on the Baltic shore. With a view to more effective defence the Lithuanians formed, therefore, towards the end of the fourteenth century a dynastic union with Poland. This union made it possible for the combined forces of the two countries to

defeat the Teutonic Knights, to preserve the Lithuanians from German dominion, and to secure for Poland the land on the Lower Vistula—an access to the sea. But when in the course of the following centuries the Lithuanian landowning aristocracy and gentry merged into that of Poland, gave up their own language, and finally became estranged from their own people, here also the Lithuanian-speaking descendants of the original free Lithuanians found themselves in a position not very different from that of the Letts. They too were now subject to an alien dominion.

The Letts inhabit at the present day the four southern districts of Livland (Riga, Wolmar, Wenden and Walk), the whole of Courland, and the three north-western districts of the Government of Vitebsk, usually described as Lattgalia (Dvinsk, Ryeshitsa and Lyutsin).

The Letts in Courland and Livonia are Lutherans, in

Lattgalia predominantly Roman Catholics.

The census of 1897 put the total number of Letts in Russia at 1,436,000. Of these 511,000 inhabited Livonia,

524,000 Courland, and about 250,000 Lattgalia.

In recent Lettish publications the following figures are given for the distribution of the Letts, the population being calculated for 1912; but it should be observed that only the part of Livonia inhabited by Letts is taken into consideration:—

Letts Russians Jews Germans Others	 62,000	Per cent. 77.6 5.6 7.6 3.1 6.1	The Lettish parts of Livonia 852,000 79,000 51,000 85,000 68,000	Per cent. 75°0 7°0 4°5 7°5 6°6	Lattgalia 492,000 74,000 46,000 3,000 43,000	Per cent. 74-8 11-2 7.0 0-4 6-6	The Whole of Lettland 1,974,000 199,000 159,000 160,000	Per cent. 75.8 7.9 6.4 3.7 6.2
	812,000		1,135,000		658,000	1	2,605,000	

The total number of Letts in Lettland (i.e., Courland, Southern Livonia and Lattgalia) is thus estimated at 1,974,000; the total for the whole of Russia is given by the same sources as 2,300,000.

The figure as given for Courland seems reliable. It marks an increase of about 20 per cent. on that of 1897. The number of Letts in Livonia claimed in the Lettish statistics for 1912 exceeds by about 50 per cent. that admitted by the Russian census in 1897, and for Lattgalia it is double that of 1897. Since in Courland the Letts are indisputably the dominant race and the number of the second most numerous nationality, the Jews, hardly admits of statistical jugglery, both sides seem to have kept approximately to the truth. In the case of Livonia, where the question lies between the Ests and the Letts, it may be assumed that the unusually rapid increase of the Lett population marks an over-statement on their part. In Lattgalia, where the Russian officials in 1897 are likely to have tried to exaggerate the number of White Russians at the expense of the Letts, the unnatural increase of almost 100 per cent. is no doubt the result of an under-statement on the part of the Russian officials and an over-statement on the part of the Letts.

The Lithuanians inhabit the Government of Kovno, the northern and by far the larger part of the Government of Suvalki (the north-eastern corner of what used to be Russian Poland) and parts of the three north-western districts of the Government of Vilna (Svientsany, Vilna and Troki). They touch the Baltic Sea in the district of Polangen, which only in 1817 was separated from Lithuania and joined to Courland. Moreover, the north-eastern corner of East Prussia and also its eastern fringe are inhabited by Lithuanians (parts of the districts of Tilsit, Heidekrug, Memel and Gumbinnen). This is, of course, a very much smaller region than that occupied by historic Lithuania, which includes White Russia.

The Lithuanians inhabiting Russia are almost all Roman Catholics, those of East Prussia are Lutherans.

The census of 1897 put the number of Lithuanians in

Russia at 1,659,000, of which about a million inhabited the Government of Kovno, about 280,000 the Government of Vilna, and about 300,000 that of Suvalki. Their number in East Prussia was put by the German census of 1905 at about 100,000. Neither the Russian nor the German figures for the Lithuanians are reliable; and though it would be equally risky to accept wholesale any of the estimates made by the Lithuanians themselves, the official figures are most certainly under-estimates. The present number of Lithuanians in Russia and Germany may be put at about three millions. There are, moreover, about 250,000 Lithuanians resident in the United States, and there is a fair-sized Lithuanian settlement in the mining districts of Scotland; the exact number of the latter is not known.

The White Russians inhabit the larger part of the Governments of Vilna and Grodno and practically the whole of those of Minsk, Vitebsk and Mohilev. Their language is but a dialect of Russian and they themselves a branch of the Russian nation. But like the Lithuanians, the White Russians have lost their upper classes: they were merged in the Polish aristocracy and gentry and became estranged from their own people. The two Poles best known to other nations, the Polish national hero Kosciuszko and the poet Mickiewicz, were both of White Russian extraction. But had it not been for the centuries during which they remained under Lithuanian or Polish dominion, the White Russian peasantry would now no more rank as a separate branch of the Russian nation than do the Great Russian peasants of Vologda or Viatka, who speak their own variety of Great Russian. If a proper system of elementary education had been introduced by Russia when she regained these territories at the partitions of Poland, no one would now think of White Russian as a language. Only in recent years have attempts been made to develop a White Russian literary language. White Russian shades gradually through

dialects into Great Russian and Little Russian.* In fact it is impossible to draw a line between the White Russians and Little Russians where they meet in the Government of Grodno in the midst of the biggest forests and marshes of Europe. Villages and settlements are practically cut off from one another, live their own life and speak their own tongue. But any one who knows either Great Russian or Little Russian will easily understand every single form of White Russian.

By religion about four-fifths of the White Russians are Greek Orthodox, one-fifth, inhabiting the western parts of Vilna and Grodno, Roman Catholics. The Poles have for centuries conducted a Roman Catholic or Uniate propaganda among the White Russians, just as among the Little Russians, trying to alienate these two branches of the Russian nation from the Great Russians. To the present day practically all the Roman Catholic priests in the White Russian country are Poles or Polonised, and the vernacular part of the service is conducted in Polish, even though the peasants do not understand it. The alien character of the Church has probably contributed towards rendering very slight the influence of Christianity on the western White Russians, who, inhabiting the wildest and most inaccessible parts of Western Russia, have remained, in their customs, beliefs and thinking, probably the most pagan nation in Europe. One thing, however, has been achieved by the Poles-the Roman Catholic White Russian calls his alien religion "Polish," with a view to census abuses a most convenient confusion of ideas. Kinglake, having travelled about 1850 through what is now the kingdom of Bulgaria, described his journey without making a single allusion to the existence of the Bulgarian race—he had found only "Greeks." And yet it would be ludicrous to suggest that the Bulgarian peasant ever considered himself a Hellene; by "Greek" he meant merely his religion. Similarly a

In some western border districts the White Russian dialects bear also marks of Polish influence.

White Russian peasant, if he calls himself a "Pole," means to say that he is a Roman Catholic, not that he shares the nationality of his Polish landlord. How very little feeling for Poland, Polish traditions and Polish history there is even among the Roman Catholic White Russians on the very border of Poland can be gathered from the following fact.

A certain Federowski, a Polish gentleman, in four volumes of a truly monumental work, has collected all the White Russian folksongs, legends, stories, anecdotes, etc., which he heard during fifteen years (1877-1892) spent in the western districts of Grodno, mainly or wholly among the Roman Catholic White Russians. Among these many thousand tales there are only two which refer to the Polish national revolution of 1863, a point on which Federowski himself dwells with bitterness. Of these two stories one states merely that there was a war which was not a real war, but that plenty of people had been hanged and deported. The second runs as follows: "When the Czar abolished serfdom the landlords raised a revolt and started a rebellion so that the peasants should serve them as of old, but they did not succeed; they themselves went under, they lost their money, hiding it in the forests or losing it in the revolution, and they did not regain their hold over the peasants." Where class differences coincide with differences of nationality such misunderstandings can hardly be avoided.

The following table regarding the six Governments of historic Lithuania and the predominantly Lithuanian Government of Suvalki reproduces the results of the census of 1897, the only one which analyses the population by nationality:—

		Great Russians	White Russians	Little Russians	Lithu- anians	Jews	Poles	Total (in 1897)
Vilna	 ***	79,000	892,000	1,000	280,000	202,000	130,000	1,591,000
Grodno	 ***	74,000	705,000	363,000	3,000	279,000	162,000	1,603,000
Kovno	 ***	73,000	38,000	2,000	1,018,000	212,000	140,000	1,545,000
Minsk	 	84,000	1,633,000	10,000	_	343,000	65,000	1,148,000
Vitebsk	 	198,000	789,000	_	3,000	174,000	50,000	1,489,000
Mohilev	 ***	58,000	1,390,000	4,000	4,000	204,000	18,000	1,591,000
Suwalki	 	24,000	27,000	2,000	305,000	59,000	134,000	583,000

The Russian statistics no doubt understate the number of Poles in Lithuania just as they do also with regard to the Lithuanians. But even less acceptable are the methods used and the figures given in the quasi-scientific Polish statistical works. They usually start by asserting or by silently assuming that every Roman Catholic White Russian is in reality a Pole. In support of the fanciful estimates which they obtain by these and other methods they frequently quote two authorities which at first sight no one would expect to favour Polish claims-a calculation made in 1909 under the authority of M. Stolypin and census returns compiled in 1916 by the Germans for some parts of Lithuania. But M. Stolypin had a definite purpose in view when drafting his memorandum; he wished to prevent the establishment of Zemstvos in Lithuania and, in order to restrain the Russian Nationalists and Centralist Liberals, painted to them the Polish "danger" in the blackest colours possible. He therefore accepted for once the Polish contention about the Roman Catholic White Russians. The German officials, on the other hand, like Kinglake, were misled by the confusion which exists in the minds of the Roman Catholic White Russians between a religion and a nationality. But even on these returns the Poles constituted hardly more than 25 per cent. of the total population of the Governments of Grodno and Vilna. To reach more favourable results these figures require further treatment. Thus one Polish author claims that the Poles form 55 per cent. of what he describes as the total population of the larger part of the Government of Vilna. The numbers analysed by him are 478,753, whereas in reality the Government of Vilna had in 1897 a population of almost 1,600,000 and in 1915 of over 2,000,000! As a matter of fact the German statistics quoted by that author refer merely to the northwestern districts of the Government of Vilna, where the percentage of the Poles is highest. A writer who would quote the statistics of Quebec as illustrating the "total

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population " of " the larger part " of Canada would put himself out of court with his readers without distinction of

creed, race or politics.

If we put the percentage of Poles in the three Governments of Vilna, Grodno and Kovno at an average of about 15 per cent., we shall have conceded to them the most which can be conceded with justice, and perhaps even more than that.

There are no important mining districts or industrial centres either in the Baltic Provinces or in Lithuania. The country lives almost entirely on the produce of its agriculture and its forests, and whatever industry exists is based chiefly on the raw materials grown at home. The only large town in the Baltic Provinces is Riga, with a population of about 500,000; the next largest is the port of Libau, with over 100,000; in Lithuania there is Vilna, with about 200,000 inhabitants.

The Ests and Letts, the Lithuanians and White Russians are almost entirely peasant nations, and the land is the pivot of their life and thinking. To keep the land they have and to acquire more land is the desire deepest rooted in their hearts. And their national interests coincide with this peasant passion for the land; for the big landed estates in their countries are owned mainly by aliens, Germans and Poles.

The history of the Ests and Letts has been an endless struggle against the German Baltic Barons. Nowhere in Europe has serfdom been as ruthless as that imposed by the German conquerors in the Baltic Provinces, a fact admitted even by German historians. Only at times did outside interference succeed in lightening a little the burden of the serf population, as, for instance, in the seventeenth century in Livonia during the enlightened rule of the Swedish King, Gustavus Adolphus. But when towards the end of the eighteenth century Catherine II tried to improve the condition of the peasants

in the Baltic Provinces, she met with the determined opposition of the Barons and failed. "The nobility," writes Dr. Seraphim, a fervent German patriot, in his Baltische Geschichte (1908), "consisted largely of retired officers in whom camp life had developed that contempt for other men which the difference of nationality had by itself implanted in them. . . . They resented the demands of the Empress as an unjustified and ruinous intrusion in their private affairs." When in the reign of Alexander I. the German Barons found it necessary to admit a change in the legal position of their peasants, and abolished serfdom in the Baltic Provinces, they declared the entire land their private property; whereas everywhere else in Eastern Europe, on the abolition of serfdom, part of the land was assigned to the peasants. Moreover, all kinds of feudal privileges were retained, and in the parts now under German occupation they survive to the present day (they were not abolished by Ukase until 1916). Politically the German Barons were until about 1880 all-powerful in the Baltic Provinces. From among them came most of the German officials who filled the highest posts in the Russian Army and civil service—the Osten-Sackens, the Keyserlings, the Uexkülls, etc.—and these used the hold they had over the Russian Government for strengthening still further their power in the Baltic Provinces. The Landtags by which these provinces were administered were exclusively in the hands of the noble landowners; in Courland the Landtag was elected by about 500 voters! In the Baltic Provinces the revolution of 1905 was a social and national war of the Est and Lett peasants against the German landlords, who, on the collapse of the revolution, directed the penal expeditions in these provinces, having first constituted themselves into a "voluntary constabulary."

The following extract from folksongs, reproduced from M. E. Doumergue's excellent book on the Letts (in French)

may serve to illustrate the feelings of the Lett peasants towards their German masters:—

- "The work for the master is hell, is hell, Nothing is lacking except the cauldron. Lords, Governors, buy therefore a cauldron!"
- "All the castles are on the hills, Our house is in the plain, It stands in the plain, In a morass of tears."
- "O German, child of hell,
 Some day thou wilt be a beggar,
 And my own brothers will give thee
 A piece of bread."

In the course of the nineteenth century the Est and Lett peasantry succeeded in redeeming from the German Barons about half the land of their country. The other half is still divided into 462 big landed estates in Estland, 804 in Livland, and 648 in Courland. The biggest of the "noble entails," Dondangen, covers no less than 250 square miles.

There is hardly another country in Europe where the peasantry is as highly educated as in the Baltic Provinces; there are practically no illiterates either among the Letts or the Ests; and there is for the same reason hardly another peasantry which resents the rule of landlords more violently than they. The average Est or Lett is by nature and training a revolutionary, and at the present day they supply the Bolsheviks with the most intelligent and best trained and best disciplined regiments. But more than anything else in politics the Letts and Ests are anti-Germans for reasons both social and national.

The hostility between the Lithuanian and White Russian peasants on the one hand and the Polish landlords on the other is slightly less violent than that which subsists in the Baltic Provinces. Yet it remains the dominating

Peoples of the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania feature in the political life of the whole of historic Lithuania.

The Lithuanian national movement has grown up in spite of the most decided hostility on the part of the Polish land-owning gentry and the Polish Roman Catholic clergy. Like the renaissance of every submerged nationality, it started in the first place as an educational movement. But the land-owning classes had looked askance even at any Polish attempts to educate their peasantry for fear that this might increase its power of resistance to their dominion. Still less were they inclined to favour a movement which by giving their peasants the consciousness of a separate nationality was bound to render still more violent the conflict between the two classes.

The Roman Catholic religion, common to Poles and Lithuanians, might be expected to form a bond of union between them. Yet, as a matter of fact, it is just in the common Churches that the bitterest feud has broken out. The Polish clergy has systematically tried to exclude the Lithuanian language from the churches, declaring it to be "pagan." In many places the Polish Nationalists have organised bands of rowdies to prevent the singing of Lithuanian hymns: and the Lithuanian Nationalists have retaliated. During the years preceding the war free fights in churches in the Lithuanian districts became an everyday occurrence, and in many cases led to bloodshed.* Finally the Lithuanians found it necessary to organise an "Association for Guarding the Rights of the Lithuanian Language in the Church." The bitterness of the struggle is felt practically in every district by the devotedly Roman Catholic Lithuanian peasantry. Even the Lithuanian clergy, unlike the Roman Catholic "Polish" clergy among the White Russians, take up the cause of their nation in a truly self-sacrificing spirit. Kalvarija

[•] E.g., at Karlwarja, Government of Suvalki, in the autumn of 1906; at Biniakonie; at Bierzyniki, where the Poles were excommunicated for trying to prevent the Lithuanians from singing in their own language, September 12, 1904, etc.

The powerful agrarian movement which under the influence of the Russian Revolution is now sweeping the whole of Eastern Europe is coupled in Lithuania with the national contrast between Polish landlords on the one hand and Lithuanian and White Russian peasants on the other. The Polish national interest in Lithuania rests predominantly, and in most parts of the country entirely, on the big manor houses and the hold which these possess on the country. The Poles themselves frequently measure their status possidendi in Lithuania by the millions of acres owned by their nobles. Every manor house is, moreover, a small Polish centre, the officials on the estate and many from among its servants and immediate dependents being Poles. The one thing, therefore, which the Polish Nationalists could never admit in Lithuania would be a thoroughgoing agrarian reform, which is the first point in the national programmes of the Lithuanians and White Russians. Polish dominion over any part of Lithuania or White Russia would mean the dominion of the land-owning class, the last thing which a peasant population bent on acquiring the land would ever accept, to say nothing of desiring.

The following incident characterises the attitude of the White Russians towards the Poles. In April, 1917, a White Russian Peasant Congress at Minsk declared against autonomy for White Russia and in favour of a direct union with Russia. "The attitude of the Congress, which consisted exclusively of White Russian peasants," says the report in a Polish newspaper, "is shown by the fact that one of the speakers was not allowed to speak in White Russian, and that the adherents of autonomy were interrupted by cries of 'We don't want autonomy,' 'Autonomy has been invented by the pany (Polish lords) in order that they may master us and not give us the land,' etc." "The unnatural hatred of the White Russian peasants to the idea of White Russian autonomy and of their own national movement," the article goes on to say, "springs from the deep dislike which they feel for Polish

policy represented by big landowners and the fear that in an autonomous White Russia the Government might pass into the hands of the Polish reactionary elements."

During recent months the parts of Lithuania behind the Russian front have been the scene of a most violent peasant revolt, and numerous manors have been sacked and burnt down. The peasants are taking their revenge for centuries of serfdom and oppression. Meantime west of the line, under German occupation, the Lithuanian and White Russian peasants are gnashing their teeth at the thought that because of the presence of German troops they cannot deal with the agrarian problem. In the Polish Press voices are raised openly admitting that, should these provinces be evacuated now, they would be threatened by an immediate peasant revolution.

It has been recently said by a Polish politician that "the Baltic Germans themselves are afraid of remaining face to face with the Letts, and look for support from outside," and that for this reason "in Courland, now under German occupation, there has appeared among the German upper classes a leaning towards incorporation into Poland." It seems quite likely that, threatened by a peasant rising, the Polish land-owning gentry both in Lithuania and Poland and the German Barons in the Baltic Provinces feel a kind of comradeship for each other which surmounts national feuds; but it is evident that, since the German power and the German armies are real, whilst the Polish power and the numerous Polish armies are so far merely vapourings of heated imagination, the land-owning classes in Eastern Europe will not find it difficult to choose their protectors against the Bolshevik revolution which rages behind the Russian front and knocks at their own doors. The peasant in revolt, who desires to seize the land, provides at present the one great anti-German force throughout the Baltic Provinces and historic Lithuania, and is the potential ally of anyone who fights Germany.

PALESTINE AND JEWISH NATIONALISM *

MONG all the surprises of the war there is perhaps Anone more striking than the emergence of Zionism, the Jewish national movement, from comparative obscurity into the sunshine of popular acclamation and international sanction. Four years ago Zionism lay outside the orbit of the student of political affairs. It had, indeed, solid achievements to its credit. It had created a worldwide organisation, numbering some quarter of a million of Jews of every possible political allegiance and every possible shade of belief. The regeneration of Palestine by means of Jewish agricultural and urban settlements had made considerable progress, despite the manifold obstacles imposed-rather passively than actively-by Turkish rule, and there had been a marked growth of Iewish national sentiment in these settlements, which found expression in 1913 in a revolt against an attempt to oust Hebrew in favour of German as the language of instruction in some schools controlled by a German-Jewish organisation opposed to Zionism. When war broke out Zionists were busy with a scheme for a Hebrew University in Jerusalem, which would have beenand will be-a rallying point of Hebrew scholarship and idealism and a powerful means of restoring to Hebraism its rightful place in the life of the civilised world. These phenomena pointed to the steady if not rapid or easy development of a self-conscious and self-dependent national

centre of Jewry and of Judaism in Palestine. But there was nothing to attract the attention of the statesman to what Zionism had done and what its achievements foreshadowed. Though various Governments had on occasion expressed sympathy with the aims of Zionism, and the British Government in particular had made the Zionist Movement an offer (which proved abortive) of a territory in East Africa as the home of a Jewish settlement with some measure of autonomy, Zionism was not, and had no apparent prospect of becoming, a factor to be reckoned

with in international politics.

Now, almost suddenly, all that is changed. Thanks to the breadth and sincerity of British statesmanship, to the inherent justice of its own aims, and to the ability with which those aims have been presented, Zionism has received the official approval of the British Governmentan approval which, in the circumstances in which it was given, makes the realisation of the objects of Zionism one of the avowed war-aims of the Allied Powers. The way in which the Government's declaration of support . has been received shows that substantially it speaks the mind of the whole British nation, and indeed of the whole Commonwealth. And while, no doubt, for many people the declaration obtained its special significance by virtue of its coincidence in time with the victorious advance of British troops in Palestine, it is none the less true that the permanent occupation of Palestine by Great Britain is in no sense made a condition of the support to be accorded by Great Britain and her Allies to Zionism. Mr. Lloyd George, in his statement of British war-aims on January 5th, did not stipulate for a British Palestine, but laid it down that the "separate national conditions" of Palestine must be recognised: and this statement, taken in conjunction with the Government's earlier declaration, means that, in whatever way the political future of Palestine may be determined by the peace settlement, Great Britain will insist on explicit recognition of the right of the Jewish

people to establish there its "national home." This position accords both with the general spirit of Allied waraims and with the requirements of Zionism, which, while it imperatively needs a just, stable, and progressive government in Palestine, and knows how such a government is most likely to be obtained, would obviously be travelling beyond its proper sphere if it attempted to insist on the transference of Palestine to the control of one or more specified Power or Powers.

Be that as it may, the Zionist question has definitely attained political importance of the first rank, and the time is ripe for an attempt to understand what Zionism is, what it has done, and what it aims at creating. What is precisely the place of Palestine in the Jewish scheme of things? What have Jews done in practice to substantiate the claim that they can build a "national home" for themselves in Palestine, and ought to be given facilities for doing so? What political conditions must be created as regards Palestine if Jewish hopes are to be realised? And what are likely to be the consequences, both immediate and more remote, of the establishment of a Jewish "national home" in Palestine? These are among the questions that call for an answer.

I. WHAT PALESTINE MEANS TO THE JEW.

THE Jewish love of Palestine is a thing unique in its kind, and its particular quality requires elucidation if the meaning of Jewish nationalism and the significance of the Jewish return to Palestine are to be understood at all.

Love of his country is a natural instinct of the normal man, an instinct capable of calling forth the utmost endeavour and sacrifice of which he is capable. Nor does the attachment necessarily cease when a man leaves his own country for another. Not only does the emigrant What Palestine Means to the Jew

himself retain the sentiment, but he may transmit it to his children and his children's children, so that it persists through generations of men who have never set foot in "the old country." But this sentiment does not live and grow in the hearts of the absent except on the prop of some concrete connection. Contact is maintained through friends and relations who remain behind; the sentiment, the spiritual fact, finds concrete expression and nourishment in the interchange of letters, of newspapers, of personal visits. At the very least, there is the living recollection of some ancestor who once lived himself in "the old country," and whose portrait, perhaps, is treasured as a family relic. When every concrete connection of this kind-trivial in itself, but important because it is the material basis of something spiritual has vanished, the sentiment can scarcely survive, and sooner or later the descendants of those who left "the old country" become merged heart and soul in the life of the new.

With the Jews and Palestine the case is very different. It is not, perhaps, so different as might appear at first sight: for, though the number of Jews who have had any concrete personal connection with Palestine during the last fifteen centuries or more must have been an insignificant minority, yet throughout that period, whenever there have been Jews in Palestine, the collection of funds for their maintenance has been recognised as an integral feature in the life of every traditional Jewish community elsewhere. But the existence of a link of this kind is an effect, not a cause, of the Jewish love of Palestine. There seems to be no reason in the nature of things why a Jew in Russia should contribute money for the support of Jews in Jerusalem whom he does not know, and with whom he has no personal contact of even the most indirect kind. The fact is that the link between the Jew and Palestine is a national link in the most absolute sensein the sense of being entirely independent of any sort of personal connection. The individual Jew may live

his life outside Palestine, and his tradition gives him a scheme of values and a code of religious, ethical and social practice which make his life distinctively Jewish. He may have no idea that there will be any concrete restoration of Jewish national life in Palestine before the Messiah comes to fulfil the promise of the Return. But deep down in the roots of his being, bound up with the very sense of his Jewishness, there is the conviction that until the Return takes place his nation is in exile, because, however satisfactorily he and millions of other Jews may adjust themselves to their different environments, the life of his nation cannot be properly lived except in Palestine. This it is that explains why for so many centuries the Jewish love of Palestine has found its most characteristic expressions not in political effort for the recovery of the country, and not even in pilgrimages (though these have not been wanting), but in constant prayer for the restoration of the Temple as the symbol of the restoration of the full Jewish life; in the elaboration and study of religious rites which cannot be performed outside Palestine; above all, in the attitude of mind expressed in the Rabbinic saying that the Divine Presence is itself in exile, and will be restored to its home only with the restoration of Israel. The feeling underlying all these phenomena, and others of the same kind, is not one of personal dissatisfaction, of individual home-sickness or longing for something that the individual has lost, but one of national incompleteness.

The Jewish love of Palestine, then, as it has persisted through centuries of estrangement between the people and the land, is peculiar in its selflessness and its spiritual quality. And that fact has given rise to misunderstanding among men whose conceptions of the relation between the spiritual and the material and between nationality and religion are derived from the theory and practice of modern Europe, and not least among those Jews who have adopted the European standpoint as a matter of course in the process of assimilation to their environment. From that

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standpoint the Jewish love of Palestine comes naturally and almost inevitably to be regarded as something purely religious, as a feeling which has for its object not a particular piece of territory on the eastern side of the Mediterranean, but simply a "spiritual Zion." Palestine, it is supposed, has become for the Jews merely an abstraction, merely a symbol for the realisation of their religious and ethical ideals: the Return, so long and earnestly hoped and prayed for, does not mean a physical restoration to the physical land, but merely symbolises the establishment of the Kingdom of God and the empire of righteousness. Christianity has helped to give currency to this notion by its practice of using the concrete terms of Jewish history in a spiritual sense of its own. But nothing could in fact be more opposed to the whole spirit and tendency of Jewish teaching. Judaism knows nothing of a "new Ierusalem" which exists only in Heaven. Judaism spiritualises the material, but for Judaism to spiritualise is not to dematerialise. The material remains material: but it derives a spiritual value by virtue of its being regarded as the necessary basis of an idea. Body is body and spirit is spirit, but in life the two are necessarily interdependent, and if it is the spirit that gives meaning to the body, it is the body that gives to the spirit the possibility of expression and activity. Throughout the whole range of Jewish ideas there runs this conception of a relation between body and spirit which is such that, while the spiritual is supreme, the material has a necessary part to play, and would lose its power of playing that part if it were transmuted into something merely abstract or symbolical.

What Palestine means to the Jew can be understood only in the light of this Jewish attitude to the problem of body and spirit. In the course of centuries of exile Palestine has become spiritualised—but spiritualised in the Jewish sense. It has not become, and never can become, an abstraction or a symbol. It is the actual, physical land that matters, though its geographical position and its

physical features are absolutely unknown to millions of those who pray for it. If once the masses of Jews were to abandon their belief in the future restoration to Palestine in favour of a belief in a "spiritual Zion," to be realised in the world to come, the principle of Jewish cohesion would be gone, and the Jews would soon cease to exist as a distinct human group. But, on the other hand, if the spiritual ideal which is associated with Palestine in the mind of the Iew were removed-if his love of Palestine became simply the desire for a country with so much milk and honey, so much natural wealth, so many harbours, so much scenic beauty-then Jewish nationalism would equally be a dead thing and "the Jewish people" an empty phrase. It is the combination of the material and the spiritual element, each indispensable to the other, that gives its specific quality to the Palestine-sense of the Jewish people. It is this alone that explains the extraordinary persistence of the feeling of exile in a people which has ceased to be a nation in the ordinary sense, has built up prosperous communities in all parts of the world, and has provided itself with a way of life which is capable of adjustment to the most widely differing environments. That feeling of exile is, as was said above, a feeling of national incompleteness: an instinctive recognition of the fact that in the national life the elements of body and spirit are not developing side by side and co-operating as they must do for its full self-realisation, because the material basis—the national land—is lacking, and whatever spiritual development takes place without it can be nothing more than a semblance of life.

It is instructive in this connection to contrast the position of Palestine in the life of the Jewish people with that of Greece in the life of the ancient Greeks. Probably the Greeks were much more alive than the Hebrews to the physical beauty of their country, and loved their country for its own sake in a way of which ancient Hebrew literature shows little if any trace. But their national consciousness

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was independent of the particular piece of territory which they called Hellas. Their sense of the difference between themselves and other human groups had its roots mainly in two things-in difference of language and in difference of political institutions. And they were able to carry their language and their City State with them to other countries. They could be as Greek in Italy as in Hellas; they could create a great centre of Hellenism in Egypt. The Hebrews, on the other hand, when they left Palestine ceased to speak Hebrew, and adopted for every-day purposes the language of the land in which they settled; and they regarded the communal organisations which they built up as nothing more than temporary expedients. It could never occur to them that their own distinctive form of national life might be lived in its completeness as well outside as in Palestine. They took Palestine with them in their hearts: it remained an essential element in their national consciousness. Their physical land and their spiritual ideas were inseparable, and " to sing the song of the Lord in a strange land " was an impossibility.

In the light of what has been said it will be clear that the modern Jewish aspiration for a return to Palestine is not simply—is not fundamentally—a desire to change political conditions for the benefit of a particular nation. It is first and foremost a natural expression of his Judaism on the part of the modern Jew. It is as true to-day as it ever was that the ideas of the Jewish God, the Jewish way of life, the Jewish people and Palestine are inextricably bound together, are in fact but different facets of one central principle which is the principium individuationis of the Jewish people. None the less, modern Jewish nationalism is, like the nationalism of other peoples, an attempt at self-preservation. Its differentia is that in the Jewish people the idea of self-preservation is more consciously bound up with the sense of universal human values and ideals. And for that reason it may claim with some justice that its realisation will be fraught with consequences

of peculiar importance to humanity at large. If every nation, by virtue of feeling itself a nation-no matter what may be the elements of its national consciousness—is regarded as having an indefeasible right to the opportunity of self-development, and if the general concession of this opportunity will enrich human life, then surely humanity should reap a peculiarly rich harvest through the free development of a nation whose national consciousness has become bound up with its sense of universal spiritual values. In a very real sense the Jewish nationalist may claim that "Palestine for the Jews" means "Palestine for the world," not because he wants Palestine to be anything but distinctively Jewish, but because he feels that the more distinctively and truly Jewish it is, the greater will be its influence on the world in the direction of establishing a truer understanding of the right relation between body and spirit, between the individual nation and the divine idea of human brotherhood.

But if modern Jewish nationalism, standing as it does in the closest relation to the fundamentals of Jewish thought, regards itself as charged in some degree with the fulfilment of the universal purpose which works through Jewish history, it remains none the less true that there is a gulf fixed between the restoration seen in the Prophetic visions and the restoration for which Jewish nationalists are working here and now. That complete fulfilment to which the Prophets looked forward is and must remain a distant ideal, and one to which human effort can stand only in the relation of blind groping, not in that of conscious and well-calculated endeavour. It is in its very nature catastrophic, a sudden and complete reversal of things as we know them. To work for its realisation would be like working to bring about a volcanic upheaval. Zionism is concerned with matters of human calculation and effort, with things that are, humanly speaking, attainable by a gradual evolution. there is of course no contradiction here, though there is a difference. Zionism has suffered at times from being Recent Jewish Work in Palestine

thought (and perhaps from being in fact) anti-Messianic, and at other times from indulging in visions too Messianic in their brightness. Its own inner development and the events of recent years have given it equilibrium and the possibility of understanding itself as a typically Jewish union of body and spirit—at once a concrete, practical attempt to re-establish a Jewish national settlement in Palestine, and an idea which derives from the Prophets and can have its ultimate fulfilment only in the fulfilment of their vision.

II. RECENT JEWISH WORK IN PALESTINE

IN actual practice ideas do not work themselves out by I their own motion, and their realisation is not brought about solely or even mainly by the efforts of those whom they consciously inspire. Human beings generally need the pressure of some material need to rouse them to action for a cause, and every human movement can be interpreted with some degree of truth as a reaction to material stimuli. In the case of the Jewish national movement it would be absurd to ignore the material pressure which led numbers of Jews to emigrate to Palestine in the "eighties" of last century; but it would be equally absurd to represent it as having created the national sentiment to which in fact it only gave an incentive to action. The conscious Jewish nationalism of modern times—as distinct from the nationalism which is implied and taken for granted in the whole Jewish scheme of things-began as a reaction not against persecution or anti-Semitic prejudice, but against the tendency to assimilation which set in as an inevitable result of the political and social emancipation of the Jews in Western Europe. As far back as 1862 a German Jew, Moses Hess, published a book called Rom und Jerusalem, in which he subjected to a scathing analysis the prevalent assimilationist conception of the position of Judaism in the

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modern world—that conception which is conveniently summed up in the phrase "Englishman (Frenchman, German, etc.) of the Jewish persuasion "-demonstrated the essentially national character of Judaism, and forecasted the re-establishment of a national Jewish commonwealth in Palestine under French auspices. A little later a Russian Hebrew writer, Perez Smolenskin (1842-1885), again consciously attacking the assimilationist tendency, urged the importance of Palestine, along with the Jewish Law (Torah) and the Hebrew language, as a vital factor in Judaism. Nor were there wanting practical efforts towards the resettlement of Palestine. To say nothing of the schemes of Sir Moses Montefiore in the middle of the last century, in 1870 the Alliance Israélite Universelle founded an Agricultural School (called Mikveh Israel, "The Gathering (or Hope) of Israel ") near Jaffa. This step was taken on the suggestion of Hirsch Kalischer, a Rabbi of Posen, by whose writings Moses Hess had been influenced, and who himself took part in the foundation of a Jewish agricultural settlement near the Lake of Tiberias. A few years later some Jews of Jerusalem established a small agricultural settlement called Petach Tikvah ("The Gate of Hope") on the Audia, which is now the largest and richest of the forty or more Jewish "colonies" in Palestine.

But it was unquestionably the terrible outbreak of persecution and massacre in Russia, in 1880-81, which finally gave direction to the nationalist aspirations that were floating in the air of Jewish life. While the great tide of Jewish emigration from Russia set towards America, some of the more idealistic, including a number of University students, turned to Palestine, hoping not only to win a better life for themselves, but to set their people on the way to national redemption. These early settlers founded agricultural "colonies" in Galilee, in Judea and in Samaria, and braved with extraordinary stubbornness the manifold difficulties with which their undertaking was beset—difficulties which were enhanced by their lack of

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means, of experience and of knowledge of the country. They could not have survived at all if not for help from without. This help was provided in the first place by societies of "Lovers of Zion" (Chovevé Zion) which sprang up in Russia, and later in other countries, for the propagation of the national idea and the support of the Palestinian "colonies"; afterwards, and in larger measure, by Baron Edmond de Rothschild, of Paris. Thanks to this assistance the colonisation movement survived the ills of infancy, and, though it achieved no results commensurate with the hopes of its early sponsors, gained at least the possibility of development when circumstances should become favourable

It lies outside the purpose of this article to trace the history of Palestinian colonisation in detail.* Suffice it to say that by 1895 some twenty "colonies" were established in various parts of the country, and the idea which underlay their work, the idea of the "Lovers of Zion," was surely if slowly gaining ground in the Jewry of the Dispersion. Then an event occurred which gave a temporary set-back to colonisation work, and seemed likely to divert Jewish national effort for good and all into other channels. Dr. Theodor Herzl, a Viennese Jew living in Paris, published a brochure called Der Judenstaat, in which he asserted that the Jewish problem could be solved only on the lines of the recognition of the Jews as a nation and the provision of a territory in which large masses of Jews could live under conditions of autonomy, and outlined a scheme for the acquisition of a territory under the necessary international guarantees and the transference to it of as many as possible of those Jews who were not contented in their present surroundings. Herzl received his immediate impulse from the ugly manifestation of French anti-Semitism in the Dreyfus affair: and that fact explains both the strength and the weakness of his scheme. Jewish national effort may be stimulated by anti-Semitism; but an attempt to

^{*} For a detailed account see Palestine: The Rebirth of an Ancient People, by A. M. Hyamson (Sidgwick & Jackson, 1917).

base Jewish nationalism entirely on anti-Semitism ("the pressure from without makes us one people," says Herzl) is doomed to failure, because nationalism is a positive and not a negative thing. On the other hand, Herzl, looking at the Jewish problem from the external rather than from the internal point of view, was able to grasp the need for a big organisation and for work on a large scale. there not been a genuine Jewish national movement-of however modest dimensions-in existence, Herzl might have wasted himself in endeavouring to carry out a purely "political" scheme which ignored the real character of the Jewish people and the really vital elements of Jewish nationalism. As it was, there came about ultimately a fusion between Herzl and the "Lovers of Zion." It was the Russian "Lovers of Zion" who came in largest numbers to the first Zionist Congress, which he called together at Basle in 1897; and though they were on the whole too ready to yield to the glamour of his large political ideas, and to believe him capable of making bricks without straw, they at least secured the tying down of the Zionist programme to Palestine-a point which Herzl's brochure had left in doubt. This notwithstanding, the new Zionist movement was for a time unsympathetic to "petty colonisation," which did not accord with Herzl's notion of getting a charter and purchasing the country outright. But as time went on the true instinct of Jewish nationalism asserted itself. During Herzl's lifetime the movement took several important steps in the direction of Palestinian work, and after his death (1904) the diplomatic activity in which he had excelled sank for a time into the background, and the development of the settlement in Palestine became the chief care of the movement. The net results of Herzl's work—and they were invaluable—were the publicity given to Zionism, and the creation of an organisation which, when the time came, would be able to assert the claims of the Jewish people.

That organisation possessed, at the time when the war

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broke out, not only the support of some quarter of a million Iews, and the active sympathy of many more, but also a concrete basis for its claims in the Jewish Yishub, or settlement in Palestine. The number of agricultural "colonies" had grown to upwards of forty, with a population of perhaps 12,000, engaged in the cultivation of vines, oranges, almonds, and cereals. Marsh lands had been drained and made habitable and fruitful. Afforestation had been begun on a small scale. The Jewish population in the principal towns had grown by leaps and bounds, and garden suburbs of European type had been built by Jewish energy and capital. A proper system of credit had been introduced into Palestine by the Zionist Bank, the Anglo-Palestine Company. Farm-schools and an Agricultural Experiment Station had been established. Experiments had been made in co-operative colonisation and in co-operative workmen's settlements. The nucleus had been formed of a class of agricultural labourers who were at the same time small The Jewish "colonies," left very much to themselves by the Turkish authorities so long as they paid their taxes, had dealt successfully with the problems of local government, administration of justice, and defence. A beginning had been made of the organisation of the "colonies" for common purposes by means of a Council consisting of representatives of each. At the same time, the Yishub had become more and more conscious of its national character and significance. Hebrew had replaced other languages as the mother-tongue of the younger generation. Hebrew schools of all kinds, including a music school and a school of Arts and Crafts, were in existence, and the first steps had been taken towards the foundation of a Hebrew University. In a word, there was scarcely a phase of national activity—excluding foreign affairs—in which the Jewish people, through this small advance-guard in Palestine, had not adventured. Everything was on a small scale, much was merely inchoate or experimental. But a national life was there in miniature.

The importance of this achievement in colonisation is not, of course, to be measured by its size. What it has done is to place beyond doubt the will and the ability of the Jewish people to regenerate Palestine and itself in and through Palestine. And as a consequence it has given to the claims of Zionism a solid basis such as they could not have obtained by any amount of organisation and activity, whether propagandist or political, outside Palestine. The Yishub, small in size but large in potentiality, is the great political asset of Zionism. Without it the sentimental and historic claims of the Jewish people might have been disregarded, as they have been before; with it, they have become irresistible.

The potential value of the Jewish colonisation of Palestine -its value as an indication of what the Jews, and they alone, can make of Palestine-is enhanced by the fact that it has been carried out hitherto in spite of difficulties created not only by the absence of any State organisation behind it, but by the shortcomings of Turkish government. It must indeed be said, in fairness to the Turk, that from the Jewish national point of view his rule has had its good as well as its bad side. Talaat Pasha, in a recent interview, made much of the fact that anti-Semitism was unknown in Turkey, and that the Jewish "colonies" in Palestine had been allowed freedom in local administration and in the use of the Hebrew language for educational and general purposes. He had a right to take credit for this tolerance, which, if it resulted rather from passivity than from active goodwill on the side of the rulers, was none the less of great value to the ruled. It may well be that if during the last thirty years Palestine had been in the hands of an efficient and centralised government, Jewish colonisation might have progressed more rapidly on the material side, though the settlers might have been much less easily able to learn the rudiments of self-government and to retain and strengthen their specific national consciousness. But there is a heavy account on the debit side. Not only has Jewish

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colonisation been hampered by burdensome taxes, restrictions on the sale of land, and the neglect of the Government to provide those material facilities without which a country cannot be developed on modern lines; but the absence of security has kept out of the country much Jewish energy and capital which would otherwise have flowed into it, to the benefit both of the Jewish national movement, of Palestine, and of Turkey as the overlord of Palestine. The Turkish revolution of 1908, which Zionists welcomed as the dawn of a new era of freedom and opportunity, turned out in fact to be the precursor of a policy of Turkification which was even more fatal to Jewish national effort on a large scale than the laxity of Abdul Hamid's régime; and since the war broke out much has happened to destroy whatever lingering belief Zionists may have retained in the possibility of achieving their object under Ottoman suzerainty. It is clear, therefore, that Zionism imperatively needs a substantial change—whether or not accompanied by a formal change—in the political position of Palestine if the work of a generation is not to be practically wasted, and if the Jewish people is not to be doomed once more to fall back on hopes and prayers.

III. POLITICAL CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR A JEWISH PALESTINE

THERE is room for divergence of opinion as to the precise settlement of the political problem of Palestine which would best accord with the legitimate demands of Zionism as well as with the wider interests that are necessarily involved. But so far as the Zionist side of the question is concerned, one or two propositions may be laid down with certainty. In the first place, the relation between the Jewish people and Palestine must be recognised as the relation between a nation and its national homeland. This recognition is provided by the British Government's

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declaration of November 2, 1917, while the peculiar relationship of the Jews to Palestine is specifically mentioned in the programmes of war aims formulated both by the British Labour Party and by the international Labour Movements. Secondly, while Zionism cannot of course renounce all claim to ultimate political independence if the system of small States is to continue—its fundamental postulate being that the Jewish people is to have the opportunity of complete and unfettered self-expression-political independence for the Jews of Palestine would be a mere phrase at the present time and in the immediate future, and at the start some other agency must secure to the Jewish people adequate facilities for building up its national home in Palestine on the foundations already laid, by establishing and maintaining law and order in the country, by making proper provision for its defence against aggression from without, and by lending sympathy and active support to Jewish colonising work in the broadest sense. Thirdly, and as a consequence, the government of Palestine in the immediate future must be entrusted to a single Power, and not to a condominium or an international commission. There is much loose talk about the "internationalisation" of Palestine, which, however well meant, is likely to do more harm than good. For experience shows that when a country is controlled by two or more Powers each of them is likely to care more about pushing its own interests than about the welfare of the country; and, however ardently one may hope for and believe in the growth of a better spirit in international relations, only a rash optimism could expect progress in that direction to be other than slow and gradual. Equally bad would it be, from the Zionist point of view, if the Powers contented themselves with declaring Palestine neutral. A purely negative policy of that kind would not give the Jewish people the help that it needs if the promise of the Allies is to be made effective. "Internationalisation," then, in any sense which can be attached to the term at present, is to be avoided. This is

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not, of course, to say that international consent is not desirable. Nothing could better accord with the interests of the Jewish people and of Palestine than the universal recognition of the Jewish national claim, and the creation of such conditions as would secure Palestine against becoming again a bone of international contention. And that end might be secured if whatever Power undertook the control of Palestine did so as the mandatory of the Powers in general. But the possibility of a solution on those lines depends on the question whether something in the shape of a real League of Nations is going to emerge from the present war. If that aspiration is realised, it will be eminently fitting for one of the Powers to act for the League as sovereign of Palestine during the period that must elapse before the Jewish nation can grow to full maturity.

The governing authority, whatever it be, would, as Zionists frankly recognise, have responsibilities and obligations to others beside the Jews. Palestine is at present, as it has been for centuries, peopled mainly by Arabs. According to the figures available before the war, the Jewish population numbers roughly 125,000 in a total of about 700,000. Moreover, sacred though it is to the Jews, Palestine holds within its borders shrines sacred to Christians and Mohammedans also, and the Iews have no desire to intrude in any way upon the Holy Places of those religions. They only claim to be allowed to be neighbours: and, in the historic phrase uttered by Pope Benedict XV. to the Zionist ambassador, their hope and belief is that they will be "good neighbours." They recognise too that Palestine has been and may be again a pawn in the game of international rivalry: and though they earnestly desire to be allowed to work out their own national destiny in peace, they do not wish to interfere with the claims, or to be involved in the jealousies, of any of the Powers. The present situation is too uncertain and too full of difficulty for Zionists to debate the question whether Palestine will

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ever become a predominantly Jewish country, or, still more, a self-governing Jewish Commonwealth. Many years must pass before such issues will arise in practical shape. Yet it may not be an unfitting conclusion to this article to project our gaze forward into a period when Jewish enterprise and Jewish industry have had time to leave their mark upon the life and institutions of the country. What follows then must be read, not as a claim or a programme, but as embodying the natural aspirations of a nation long exiled from its home.

IV. FUNCTIONS AND INFLUENCE OF A JEWISH PALESTINE

WHAT a revived Hebrew nation in Palestine may mean to humanity in the future may conveniently be considered under two heads-first, the direct influence on the world's history of the development of Hebrew national life in Palestine itself; secondly, the indirect influence which the Hebrew national centre will exert through the Jewish communities in other parts of the world. For, however rapidly and successfully the Jewish settlement in Palestine may grow under more favourable conditions than have prevailed hitherto, for many generations at least, if not for all time, the numerical majority of the Jewish people will remain outside Palestine, and the Jewries of the Dispersion cannot be left out of account in any forecast of the part which the Jewish people may play in centuries to come. Such a forecast must naturally be speculative; but if certainty is unattainable in a matter of this kind, some developments may be regarded at least as probable.

Jewish effort in the past generation has already reclaimed parts of Palestine which had been swamp or desert for centuries. With increasing Jewish immigration and improved facilities, this work of reclamation should proceed apace, until at last the potentialities of the country are realised to the full. What those potentialities are is still a

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matter of some doubt: in particular, it is doubtful whether Palestine has the natural resources that are necessary for the building up of industries on a large scale. But there is no doubt whatever that the agricultural productivity of the country can be vastly increased; and it is equally certain that with proper harbours and railways it can become as of old a great highway of communication between the Mediterranean and the East. Palestine has, then, an economic future; and in making the most of its economic possibilities the Jews will not merely lay a secure foundation for their own national life, but will enrich the world by the addition of one more to the number of productive territories.

This economic development will be fruitful of benefit to the Arab inhabitants of Palestine and the neighbouring lands. The Palestinian Arabs have already gained considerably as a result of Jewish colonisation work, with its modern intensive methods of agriculture, its scientific appliances, its western ideas of hygiene and business methods. There is every reason to hope that future Jewish development in Palestine will react favourably on the economic condition and the culture not only of the Arabs in Palestine, but of the Arab kingdom of the Hedjaz. The Arabs are apt to be regarded as a backward race, constitutionally incapable of joining in the onward march of modern civilisation. It is difficult to believe that charge of a nation with such an illustrious record of civilising work in the past. But for centuries the Arab has not had a chance. The rule of the Turk, though sympathetic to him from the religious point of view, is politically oppressive, and makes for stagnation rather than for progress. the European he has too little kinship of ideas and temperament to be capable of learning from him what the West ought to teach the East. But there is a very real kinship between Jew and Arab—a kinship not merely of blood, not merely of language, not merely of religion (for Islam owes more to Judaism than even Christianity), but of joint work

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in the diffusion of knowledge. It was the Arab and the Jew who brought scholarship and medicine into Europe at the beginning of the Middle Ages. Jewish philosophers and scientists got their knowledge of Greek thought from the Arabs, and brought that knowledge with them into Europe. The Jews thus owe the Arabs a debt which they should be eager and able to repay when their genius has free scope in a national life of their own and the Arabs are their closest neighbours. Coming to the Arabs not as strangers from an entirely different world, but as kinsmen who have gained a rich experience during ages of separation, they will help the Arabs by their influence and example to adapt themselves to modern conditions, and, side by side, the two races will realise their national possibilities.

In its co-operation with the Arabs the Hebrew nation of the future will be fulfilling a part, but only a part, of the function which should properly fall to it of acting as mediator between East and West. For Palestine will not merely become a highway of commerce in the material sense: it will be a meeting-place of ideas and civilisations. Politically it may have to be a kind of buffer-State; spiritually it will be the converse. Instead of serving as a barrier, which is the function of the buffer-State, it will hold open the door between East and West, and will help each to a better understanding of the other. Nor will it simply act as a transmitter of ideas: it will make its own positive contribution to the problem of harmonising the divergent conceptions of East and West. For centuries the Jews have been intermediaries in the sphere of ideas as in that of commerce: that was the natural métier of a people intellectually gifted, but lacking a solid basis of its own, and doomed always to wander from continent to continent in search of a resting-place. A restored Jewish nation in Palestine will aspire to something higher than that. It will be creative, not merely imitative; it will be, spiritually if not economically, a manufacturing and not merely a trading nation. And its creative work will express a spirit Functions and Influence of a Jewish Palestine

subtly compounded of elements from East and West-the eastern passion for righteousness, for ideas, for God, combined with western initiative and appreciation of the possibilities of man's command over nature. A Hebrew University in Palestine, re-interpreting the ideas of the Prophets in terms adapted to the modern world, might draw students from distant East and distant West alike, and send them back to their homes with an outlook not merely widened by intercourse with men of the most widely different types, but deepened by contact with those spiritual truths of which Israel is still the guardian, and at present the mute guardian. In international politics, again, which will become more and more concerned with the relations between East and West, a Jewish Palestine might fulfil an important function as the seat of a Court of Arbitration. Both sentiment and geography point to Palestine as of all countries the best suited for this purpose; while the ideal of international brotherhood is so woven into the very fabric of Jewish national sentiment that concrete association with the cause of international peace would be one of the most natural manifestations of the Jewish spirit. A Court of Arbitration at Jerusalem would not be an exotic; it would be a real expression of Hebrew national life, and its moral force would be enhanced for that reason.

Both spiritually and politically, then, a Jewish Palestine may do much towards establishing that world-harmony, that accommodation and fusion of different conceptions, without which mere international settlements can be of no avail. And in such a task Jewish nationalism would be working in close accord with the ideals of the British Commonwealth. For it is one of the primary functions of the Commonwealth, stretching as it does across the Old World and the New, to bridge the age-long gulf between East and West, to create and develop a sense of human brotherhood and civic fellowship between their peoples.

Lastly, and not least important, the Hebrew nation in Palestine should justify itself by contributing something of

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value to the solution of social problems. modern Europe, under conditions of assimilation in which the essential character and ideals of the Jew tend to be submerged, the Jewish passion for social justice has shown itself time and again in individuals. Jews have been prominent wherever there has been a fight for liberty and equality within the State. In a Jewish Palestine this fundamental and ineradicable quality of the Jew would have free play; and its fruits would be the more valuable in that it would be able to express itself in constructive work. Circumstances have too often driven the Jew in modern Europe into the revolutionary camp. But he is not by nature a revolutionary. He has a strong sense of social solidarity and a deep-seated regard for human life as a thing of value in itself; and his individualism is tempered by an instinctive reverence for law and a habit of defining moral obligations with legal precision. A people with these characteristics should be capable of building a social fabric possessing the elements both of stability and of progress, and of adjusting aright the claims of the individual and of the community. Moreover, the conditions in Palestine are favourable to a new experiment in social evolution. On the one hand, the very atmosphere of Palestine at once recalls to the Jew the social ideals of the Prophets. On the other hand, he can start his work there with the aid of all the science and experience of modern Europe, and yet without the need for that constant struggle against the dead weight of outworn prejudices and institutions which nullifies so much of the energy of the reformers in a country of long-established economic and social traditions. The Jews in Palestine will have no relics of feudalism to fight against. The political equality of men and women, towards which the nations of Europe struggle so slowly and painfully, is already an accomplished fact in the small Jewish settlements in Palestine. Democratic government and co-operative institutions are matters of course. The Hebrew nation has the advantage of Functions and Influence of a Jewish Palestine

beginning at a point which it has taken Europe centuries to reach, and of being able to experiment with the minimum of risk and of friction. Herzl, in his prophetic sketch of the restored Jewish community, described it as Altneuland (Old-New Land), and the name will prove an apt one. Before long the characteristic spirit of the nation will express itself in social reform as in art and literature, and it will give as well as take in that interplay of ideas through which values created by one nation become the property of all. It may even be that from the Judea of the future there will go forth to the world another great wave of religious and moral inspiration, to break, not wholly in vain, on the rock of materialism. At least, a world which has done homage to the Jewish Prophets of the past will not think the worse of the Jew if his national ambition takes the form of aspiring to produce successors of the Prophets in time to come.

Meanwhile, the Jewish communities of the Dispersion will have felt the beneficial effects of the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine both in their inner life and in their relations with their neighbours. There has been much misapprehension, partly genuine and partly affected, about the effect of the restoration of Jewish national life on the political and social status of the Jewish communities outside Palestine. Some fear, or profess to fear, that when the Jewish nation has once more a political existence of its own Jews will no longer be allowed to exercise the rights of citizenship in non-Jewish lands, or even that they may be compelled to leave those lands for their own. It was no doubt to allay such apprehensions that the British Government's endorsement of Zionism was accompanied by a proviso safeguarding the "rights and political status" of the Jewish communities in countries other than Palestine. This proviso is valuable as placing on record the British Government's recognition of the fact that there is no inherent incompatibility between the realisation of Zionist aims and the continued enjoyment by

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Jews of social and political equality in Great Britain or any other country. It does not, and in the nature of things could not, afford any guarantee, because no Government could bind its successors, still less the Governments of other countries, as to the course to be adopted in circumstances which have not yet arisen. But no such guarantee is necessary. Only prejudice or loose thinking could set up the contention that the constitution of a Jewish nation in Palestine-even if it had full State sovereignty-would necessitate a change of political allegiance on the part of any single Jew who belonged by citizenship to another State; and if the apprehension of loss of equal rights does not rest on that contention, it rests on nothing. For, when once it is recognised that a Jew born in England, and exercising the rights of citizenship according to the law of England, can owe no political allegiance to a Jewish State in Palestine unless he goes to live in that State and becomes its subject by process of naturalisation, it becomes obvious that the creation of a Jewish State no more affects the political position of that particular Jew than would the creation of a Hottentot State. It may, indeed, be contended that the existence of a Jewish State, or even of a Jewish national home, would lend a handle to those anti-Semites who wish to rid their own countries of Jews, but cannot make out a plausible case for expulsion, or for such restrictive legislation as would force Jews to emigrate, so long as the Jew has no place of his own to which he can go. But there is a simple answer to that argument. If the nations which have granted equal rights to Jews are capable of retrogressing so far as to substitute a policy of persecution for one of toleration, it would be absurd on the part of the Jews to expect to find in their own homelessness a shield against the evil which threatens them. Experience in Russia (under the old régime) and elsewhere proves that a country which for one reason or another is predisposed towards an anti-Semitic policy is not deterred from carrying it out by the consideration that the Jews have no country Functions and Influence of a Jewish Palestine

of their own. If, then, it be assumed that other States will in future model their treatment of the Jews on Czarist Russia, what ground is there for supposing that it will make any difference whether there is or is not a Jewish national home? The fact is that the Jews, as a scattered people, must always depend on the liberality and enlightenment of the States in which they live (or at any rate of those States which are too strong to fear punishment or reprisals at the hands of a Jewish State if one exists); and if the civilised world is going to relapse into chauvinistic intolerance, the outlook for the Jews is so bad that they would be well advised to secure at least a corner of the earth where they can hope to be beyond the reach of anti-Semitism. But there is no reason so to despair of human progress, at any rate within a year of the Russian Revolution.

To obtain an idea of what is really likely to be the effect of the realisation of Zionist aims on the position of the Jewries of the Dispersion, it is necessary to realise first of all what sort of relation will exist between those Jewries and the national home in Palestine. That there must be some sort of relation goes without saying: otherwise the term "Jewish" must become a misnomer as applied either to the community in Palestine or to the communities outside Palestine, or to all alike. To assume that there will still be a Jewish people, with a national home in Palestine and settlements outside Palestine, is to assume that spiritual continuity with the Judaism of the past and the present will be maintained both in Palestine and outside it. And it is precisely for this maintenance of spiritual continuity that the national home will be of greatest value to the people as a whole. Its chief function, regarded purely from the point of view of the Jewish people, will be-to use a phrase made famous by Achad ha-Am, the "master of those who know" in Jewish nationalism—that of a "spiritual centre." Embodying in its own life what is best and most characteristic in the Hebraic outlook, the national home will be to the scattered Jewish communities a pattern on which they

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can model themselves in their attempt to realise Judaism in their own lives. Politically and economically the Hebrew nation in Palestine will move along lines determined by its own needs and circumstances, and the path which it takes will have no direct bearing on the position and the problems of extra-Palestinian Jewry. But in the realm of the spirit, in ideas, in religion, in ethics, it will exert a profound influence on the Jews of the world. They will turn to it perforce for a truer understanding of what Judaism essentially is, and of how far traditional Judaism requires adaptation, and how it can be adapted, to modern conditions; they will look to it in large measure for their preachers and their teachers; its scholars will help them to a deeper insight into their national past, its poets will give them a new vision of their national future; they will send their sons and daughters to its schools and universities, to come back with a quickened Jewish consciousness and a healthy pride of race. By virtue of a conscious individuality of outlook which will give their language, their history, and their customs a value in their own eyes and in those of their neighbours, they will gain a new sense of dignity and of self-respect, and will meet their fellow-citizens on equal terms, knowing that in the commerce of ideas they can give as well as receive. So the Jewish communities of the world, each adapting itself to the political and economic conditions of its environment, will yet remain united by a spiritual bond, and will transmit to the world whatever of value the national centre has to give.

Nor will this renewal of national spirit in the Jew benefit his race alone: it will also benefit all those with whom they live. Keen-sighted statesmen and thinkers in most countries where there is a large Jewish population have favoured the Zionist movement because they have recognised that Zionism, whilst making its disciples better Jews, makes them also better citizens of the State to which they belong. It is no accident that the leader of American Zionism should have stood in the van of the social reform movement

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in the United States and should have won his way by his untiring devotion to public service to a seat on the Bench of the Supreme Court. It may indeed be hoped that, when the promise of Zionism is fulfilled and its harvest is gathered in, many time-honoured prejudices against the Jew will be at last destroyed. For his fellow-citizens will be no longer tempted to regard him as a homeless man, a man who has lost his national birthright, and therefore in some vague sense inferior to themselves, incapable of service as wholehearted as their own to the State of his adoption, at the worst a parasite in the body politic. Not least among the fruits of the renascence of Jewish nationality will be a fuller sense of civic equality and human brother-hood between Jew and Gentile throughout the world.

A few words may be said, in conclusion, as to one particular effect which the realisation of the Zionist ideal ought naturally to have on the development of political thought and practice. Of all the questions which the present war has brought to the forefront of men's minds there is none more important and more insistently demanding solution than that of the relation of the conceptions of State and Nationality. Throughout the nineteenth century the prevailing idea in Europe was that State and Nationality should be co-terminous; each nation, however small and however unfitted for self-government, should have the complete machinery and independence of a sovereign State. It was a period, therefore, of the creation of petty States and-what is worse for the cause of peace—of irredentist movements. And if the conception of the nation-state is to retain its predominance in political thinking, there will assuredly be no end of irredentism and no end of war. The only hope lies in the general acceptance of the opposite conception, according to which the ideal arrangement is that of a number of nations grouped together for the conduct of the affairs which concern them all in common, but maintaining each its own individuality in language and culture, and endowed with a sufficient measure

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of internal autonomy. The British Commonwealth comes nearer than any political organism of the present or the past to realising this ideal. The new Russia may perhaps in course of time approximate to it. But the day is yet far distant when the world as a whole will be organised on the basis of large groups of nations in free association for State purposes, and any new force which will strengthen the tendency in that direction, theoretically or practically, should be welcomed by those who hope for real progress in international relations. Now in so far as the lewish people develops along the lines here foreshadowed-and they are lines which it must follow if it remains true to itself—it will be a force making in that direction. For the existence of Jewish communities all over the world, keenly conscious of their national distinctiveness, spiritually attached to their own national home, yet sharing politically and economically the struggles and the fortunes of the peoples among whom they live, will be an object-lesson in the true distinction and the right relation between State and Nationality. It will strengthen the hands of all those who are thinking and working for the great cause of removing the international rivalries and animosities which have now plunged the world in chaos. The Jewish nation, alike at its centre and at its circumference, will help to show mankind that a nation's life is best lived, not in isolation and conflict, but in community and co-operation; that nationality is essentially a thing of the spirit, not bound up with and fettered by political machinery, but working freely in the hearts and minds of men, and expressing itself in the effort of different human groups to approach the same summit by different roads, each striving upwards along the path marked out for it by its own character and spirit.

THE UNITED KINGDOM

THE FOURTH WINTER

The Restatement of War Aims

THE last three months, relatively uneventful on the I various fronts, have been, partly for that very reason, a trying and difficult period at home. The year ended leaving us, to outward seeming, still as far, if not farther from victory than at the end of 1916; and, in taking stock of the situation, men had time during the lull to realise the full effects of the Russian collapse and the necessary delay which must occur before the force of the United States could be brought adequately into play. For the moment, and for some time to come, the stress of the war must fall chiefly upon the British Commonwealth among the Allies, and among the peoples of the Commonwealth chiefly upon the people of this island. The British people are in the habit of facing facts: they realise the price which may have to be paid, and they well understand the cause in which the continued sacrifice will be demanded. They are neither weary nor discouraged, but it is in a sober, resolute and patient, rather than a sanguine spirit that they greeted the New Year and look forward to its incalculable vicissitudes. The full strength of the Allied position, especially in the economic sphere, is still not fully understood; nor is it realised how little the defection of Russia relieves the anxieties of the Central Powers in regard to the supply of

the materials of which they stand most in need. Ignorance, indeed, in this and other matters, is the greatest enemy with which the country has to contend in its attitude towards the war. But, whatever the estimates, whether their temper be hopeful or subdued, men have made up their minds that sooner or later, with the strength of the Alliance and the public opinion of the world behind it, the cause of right and liberty will prevail.

So far as the opinion of the country as a whole can be tested it remains firmly behind the Government, supported, as it still is, by the House of Commons. Only one contested election has taken place during the quarter-at Prestwich, near Manchester. As on so many previous occasions since the pacifists abandoned in despair the policy of putting forward Parliamentary candidates, it was not fought on the war but on subsidiary issues. The Coalition Candidate, an officer fighting in Palestine, was elected by a three-to-one majority against Mr. May, Secretary of the Co-operative Parliamentary Representation Committee, who came forward on a rather vague programme, as a "consumers'" candidate, armed, oddly enough, with a letter of commendation from M. Albert Thomas. Mr. May's signal defeat is of some interest, since he is not only one of the leading spirits in that wing of the Co-operative movement which (as recorded in the last issue of THE ROUND TABLE) is anxious to promote closer association with the political Labour Party, but he had actually signed a joint statement with the Labour Party and Trade Union Congress leaders warmly endorsing President Wilson's war-aims statement of January 8 and laying rather undue stress on those relatively minor points on which it exhibited variations of policy or phrasing from the statement made a few days before by the Prime Minister on behalf of all nations and parties in the British Commonwealth. In so far, then, as the election was fought on political issues arising out of the war, Mr. May's rejection may be regarded as indicating

that the electors of this unquestionably democratic constituency accept the Government's foreign policy as the national policy and do not favour the method of sectional

diplomacy.

Discussions about the future settlement have indeed been much in the public mind during the past quarter, and must therefore find a place in this record. On November 29, during the absence of the Prime Minister at an Allied War Council in Paris, at a moment when the Russian defection and the Italian defeat were fresh in the mind of all Europe, Lord Lansdowne wrote a letter to the Press which excited much discussion at home and in allied and enemy countries. Emanating from the man who had been Foreign Secretary in the Cabinet which originated the Entente Cordiale and changed the orientation of British foreign policy into the direction which it has since followed, his words were naturally everywhere felt to carry unusual weight. Writing in guarded and deliberately ambiguous terms, he expressed the opinion that the difficulties in the way of an early peace were not insurmountable and that if satisfactory assurances were given to Germany on five specific points "an immense stimulus would probably be given to the peace party in Germany." The five points in question were all of them familiar: indeed, he himself admitted that authority could be found for most of them in Ministerial speeches. They summarised with fair precision the general feeling existing in the country against a vindictive or penal treatment of Germany after the war and as to the desirability of "an international pact" between the Powers to prevent future wars. But on the nature of the new order which was thus to be safeguarded, and on the importance of basing it on a stable foundation of responsible government among all the contracting Powers, the letter was significantly silent, except for a sentence stating that "some of our original desiderata have become unattainable." It was therefore not clear to the reader, either at home or abroad, what grounds Lord Lansdowne had for expecting that a renewed

or more formal statement of his positive proposals would improve the prospects of a satisfactory peace; and, on the negative evidence, the letter was widely and not unnaturally interpreted, especially in Germany, as concealing a manœuvre of surrender. This impression was removed, or, at least, substantially modified, by Lord Lansdowne in a letter of explanation and, two months later, in a public speech; but meanwhile, as became clear in the subsequent attitude of Berlin, the harm had been done, and the impression left on the minds of the enemy Governments and General Staff who regard the obstinate idealism of Great Britain as the most formidable impediment in their path, will not easily be effaced. It is not reasonable to expect that Berlin and Vienna, or even Washington, Paris and Rome, should know how little the opinions and outlook of a veteran Conservative peer correspond with the real forces that are now alive and astir in the mind of the people.

On December 7 one of the sanest and most clear-headed of the Labour members, Mr. J. H. Thomas, made a much more helpful contribution to the discussion. After dealing briefly, in retrospect, with the way in which the country, and especially the working class, had responded to the call of a war for which it was both materially and intellectually unprepared, he laid stress on the real issue at stake—"whether a free people fighting for freedom was prepared to make the sacrifice necessary to defeat an autocracy which was attacking their freedom and that of others." He stated that "there had been too many ambiguities about what we were fighting for," and asked that the issues of the war

should be "reduced to simple language."

There is no doubt that the ambiguity thus referred to existed in many quarters. It was due to several causes. First and foremost must be placed the effect upon the popular mind of the publication of the secret treaties with Russia and Italy, with their arbitrary and cynical arrangements for "partitions" and "compensations," and their scant consideration for the wishes or welfare of the inhabi-

tants of the territories concerned. It is true that in his Glasgow speech last June, delivered before the treaties were published or expected to be published, the Prime Minister, speaking on behalf of the Government, had answered the question of the Russian Provisional Government and the implied question of Washington by definitely renouncing the British conquests and pledging the only one of the Entente Powers which was actually in possession of territory dealt with in the secret treaties to abide by the decision of the Peace Conference as to its disposal. But in the months that had since elapsed his words and their implied reference had been overlooked and the publication of the treaties offered an opportunity for misrepresentation of which advantage was naturally taken by enemy agents and their dupes. Mr. Thomas was therefore quite right in urging that a fuller and more effective statement was required. Public opinion in the fourth year of a war which has revolutionised our thinking is happily far more alive to questions of foreign policy and international relations than it was when the British Government acquiesced in the treaties in question; yet it must remain a mystery how, even under conditions as they were in 1915, the Government of the day should have allowed its Foreign Secretary to set his hand to such pacts. It would be idle to deny that their publication has come as a shock to the great mass of highminded and patriotic opinion which constitutes the real driving force of the nation. We should indeed be the hypocrites that our enemies consider us to be if the arrangements thus made in our name left our complacency undisturbed.

There is another cause of uneasiness and dissatisfaction upon which a plain word must be said. Much of the "propaganda" carried on under Government auspices is not only unworthy of its professed cause but a source of direct and unmistakable injury to it. Occasional lapses of geography and good taste in Ministers may be passed over. Harmful abroad, they are taken at their true worth

at home. But the disheartening effect caused by the effusions of paid writers and speakers trained in the school of pre-war party warfare cannot be so easily discounted. The establishment last autumn of a National War Aims Committee, to be supported out of public funds, with Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Bonar Law and Mr. Barnes as presidents, was a wise and much needed step; but it is as significant as it is unfortunate that the Labour Party should recently have decided to remove their representative from the Committee as a protest against the nature and tone of its publications. Nothing perhaps illustrates so clearly the gulf which separates the shallow and listless electorate of 1914 from the serious, responsible, and determined public opinion of to-day, whether in khaki or mufti, than the disgust which is excited by the survival and even the recrudescence of the old methods and temper of political controversy. Those who wish to carry the nation with them to-day and in the future must be prepared to face a newly awakened spirit of criticism and inquiry. If they will meet argument with argument and knowledge with knowledge, they will find the British people, impatient of clap-trap and catchwords from any quarter, ready and eager to pay their tribute to sincerity and public spirit, to genuine experience and plain common sense. The recent appointment of Lord Beaverbrook, a Canadian millionaire, otherwise little known to the public, to a very responsible position as Minister in charge of Propaganda and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, cannot help exciting the reflection that this obvious lesson has not yet been learnt by those in authority. There is a good deal to be said for appointing to such a post someone who is in touch with one of the Dominions, but care should have been taken to make sure that the person selected possessed the general confidence of the people of the Dominion in question.

No such criticism applies to the statements, made in response to the appeal of Mr. Thomas and others, by

Ministers and ex-Ministers themselves. On December 11 Mr. Asquith, who was Premier when the secret treaties were made, once more associated himself with President Wilson's point of view and made a significant reference to the desirability of a "clean peace." On December 19 Mr. Arthur Henderson, as Secretary of the Labour Party, circulated the Party's Memorandum on War Aims (already referred to in THE ROUND TABLE) as finally revised and passed by the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress and the Executive of the Labour Party. The proposals therein embodied differed not at all in principle and relatively little in detail from those of the Government spokesmen. On December 19 Lord Robert Cecil, speaking in the House of Commons, stated that he regarded "the idea of the League of Nations" "as the only thing really worth struggling for in connexion with international affairs." On December 20 the Prime Minister, reviewing the general situation, took occasion to restate his Glasgow declaration. On January 5, speaking at a conference of Trade Unionists, he went further and made the detailed statements of British war aims with which the world is now familiar.

Such difference as exists between various sections of opinion about war aims is concerned rather with tactics than with principles. The Labour Party, in the person of its leader, Mr. Henderson, has committed itself to the view that much is to be achieved by making moral appeals to the enemy peoples over the head of their Governments. In pursuance of this policy, he and his colleague Mr. Bowerman, the representative of the Trade Union Congress, have issued several manifestoes to the world, some of them couched for the occasion in language embodying continental rather than British modes of thought. No one can question the sincerity and earnestness of the promoters of this new and extra-constitutional diplomacy, and it is greatly to be hoped that it may influence the German people. But their efforts are inevitably handicapped, as men like Mr. Vander-

velde could doubtless tell them, by their ignorance of the psychological factors involved and their want of familiarity with the political and constitutional situation in the Central Empires. It must be remembered also that Mr. Henderson and Mr. Bowerman speak on behalf of only a section of the community, although this fact is apt to be obscured by the inevitable ambiguity of words like "labour," "democracy," and "people," and by the importance which the more highly organised Trade Unions have assumed during the war in the life of the State. An impossible situation would be created if the leaders of any single part of the community were to address to enemy peoples manifestoes which substantially conflicted with the opinions and wishes of the Government, which alone can represent the country as a whole.

The Representation of the People Act

The seventh session of the Parliament elected in December, 1910, closed on February 6 and the eighth (and presumably the last) opened on February 12. The chief fruit of the session was the passing of the Franchise Bill or, as it will be known to history, the fourth Reform Act: but a good deal of other important legislation was carried through. By the Corn Production Act, which became law in the summer, minimum prices were fixed for wheat and oats for six years and the Board of Agriculture was armed with powers to enforce proper cultivation. At the same time a minimum wage of 25s. (inclusive of allowances) was guaranteed to agricultural workmen and Wages Boards were set up to enforce it. Two Military Service Acts were passed in the session. The first, enacted in the spring, empowered the military authorities to call up for examination three classes of men hitherto excepted-home service Territorials, men discharged owing to disablement or ill-health, and men previously rejected on any ground.

The second, known as the Man-power Bill, became law at the end of the session and will be referred to later. Acts were also passed creating an Air Ministry, with a Secretary of State at its head, and a Ministry of Reconstruction to deal with post-war problems. By the Non-Ferrous Metal Industry Act powers were taken to supervise and, if necessary, eliminate undesirable influences in the control of a "key" industry. In its passage through the House of Commons, this measure was keenly criticised by the enemies of State interference with private trading and numerous safeguards were introduced to alleviate their fears.

By the Reform Act the electorate is increased from about eight to almost sixteen and a half millions, of whom some six millions will be women, the ratio of increase being very similar to that brought about by each of the three previous Acts. One in three of the population of these islands will now be qualified to vote and, judged by the width of the franchise, the United Kingdom will become one of the most advanced democracies in the world. The last stages of its passage were complicated by a dispute between the two Houses on the subject of Proportional Representation and the Alternative Vote. The House of Commons on five separate occasions manifested its hostility to Proportional Representation, but the persistence of the Lords was rewarded by the adoption of a compromise making possible its trial in not more than a hundred constituencies. The Alternative Vote, on the other hand, which was carried several times in the Commons, mainly by Liberal and Labour as against Conservative votes, was rejected by the Lords and eventually dropped. As the Labour Party are preparing to put up four hundred candidates at the next election, there will probably be many three-cornered contests, and it is not impossible that the next Government may represent a minority of the electorate.

The detailed provisions of the Act which abolish numerous long-standing abuses and will undoubtedly transform

the electoral system and traditions of the country are best set forth in the following summary:—*

I. FRANCHISES

Men .- Qualifications for a vote :- Twenty-one years of age, and

six months' residence or occupation of business premises.

Women.—Qualifications for a vote:—Thirty years of age, and either a local government elector or the wife of one. (The qualification for the local government franchise is six months' ownership or tenancy of land or premises. Lodgers in furnished rooms are not qualified.)

University.—The qualification for this franchise is the attainment by a man or woman within the above-age limits of a definite standard, which in England and Wales is the taking of a degree. A woman is also qualified to vote for a university which does not admit women to degrees if she has fulfilled the conditions for the admission of a

man to a degree.

War Service.—Naval and military voters to be registered for the constituencies for which they would have been qualified but for their service. This provision applies to (1) sailors and soldiers on full pay, and (2) merchant seamen, pilots, and fishermen, and persons engaged on Red Cross work or other work of national importance abroad or afloat. Male voters who have served in the war will be qualified at the age of 19 years.

Dual Voting .- No person to vote at a General Election for more

than two constituencies.

Disqualifications.—Conscientious objectors to be disqualified during the war and for five years afterwards, unless they satisfy the Central Tribunal that they have fulfilled certain conditions, such as employment in work of national importance. Only British subjects to be qualified. The receipt of poor relief to be no longer a disqualification.

2. REGISTRATION

Registers of Electors.—Two to be prepared in every year—one in

the spring and one in the autumn.

Registration Areas and Officers.—Each Parliamentary borough and county to be a registration area, with the town clerk of the borough and the clerk of the county council respectively as registration officer.

Appeals.—If from a decision of a registration officer, to lie to the County Court. A further appeal on any point of law to lie to the Court of Appeal, whose decision is to be final.

* The Times, February 7, 1918.



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Registration Expenses.—Half to be paid out of local rates and half by the State.

3. METHOD OF ELECTIONS

Proportional Representation.—To be applied to university constituencies returning two or more members; eleven seats affected. Commissioners to prepare a scheme for the election of 100 town and country members in Great Britain by "P.R.," to take effect if approved by resolution of both Houses.

General Election.-All polls to be held on one day. Nomination

day to be the same in all constituencies.

Absent Voters.—Separate lists to be prepared. Ballot papers to be sent to absent voters, marked by them, and returned with a

declaration of identity.

Voting by Proxy.—To be permitted in the case of naval and military voters in distant areas, and merchant seamen, pilots, and fishermen at sea.

4. Costs of Elections

Candidates' Deposits.—Fixed at £150. To be forfeited if the number of votes polled by a candidate does not exceed one-eighth of the total number polled. To be returned in any other case.

Returning Officers' Expenses .- To be paid by the Treasury.

Scale of Election Expenses. Maximum to be 7d. for each elector

in a county constituency and 5d. in a borough.

Unauthorised Expenses.—No person, unless authorised by the election agent of a candidate, to incur any expenses by holding meetings or issuing advertisements or circulars to promote the election of any candidate.

5. REDISTRIBUTION

Basis.—One member for every 70,000 of population in Great Britain; one for every 43,000 in Ireland (by separate Bill).

London Boroughs .- 62 members, a gain of three.

Other Boroughs.—258 members (33 more). Forty-four old boroughs extinguished; 31 new boroughs created, including 13 (returning 18 members) in Greater London and eight in Lancashire.

Counties .- 372 members (five less). Changes chiefly in boundaries

of divisions.

Universities .- 15 members (six more). Representation extended

to the new universities.

Membership of House.—England, 492 (31 more); Wales 36 (two more); Scotland, 74 (two more); Ireland, 105 (two more). Total, 707.

Man-Power

On January 14 the Minister of National Service, Sir Auckland Geddes, introduced a Military Service Bill, embodying the Government's latest proposals with regard to recruiting and man-power. He spoke with a reorganised and well-equipped Department behind him and his speech revealed a comprehensive grasp and a breadth of outlook which compared almost painfully with the treatment of the subject in the earlier stages of the war, when different interests were competing for recruits without any central guidance and direction.

"The man-power problem," he reminded the House in words that attracted much attention, "is the central problem of the war. It means everything—ships, armies, munitions, food, light, heat, coal—everything. . . . What we require is a sane, carefully considered, carefully balanced programme, steadfastly pursued. We must avoid being led away by the thought of Continental Powers, to whom their army is their all-in-all. We are an island, not a Continental nation. Ultimately it is on the control of the seas by us for our Allies that all depends. Since August, 1914, we have trodden some strange paths and they have brought us little profit for the treading. . . . Let us keep our sense of perspective and remember that at sea we must be supreme, in the air we must win supremacy, and on land we must do the best to fill the gap that Russia has made, until America can take her place, and all the while we have to keep our vital industries going. Industries not vital to the war may have to suffer. It is a pity, but what is the alternative?"

He went on to state that, wholly excluding Russia and Roumania, the Allies had a substantial superiority both in fighting and in ration strength over the armies of the Central Powers. "Nothing," he declared, "but a psychological catastrophe in our own or an Allied country, such as that which has befallen Russia, can save the Central Powers."

He estimated that the secession of Russia had added to the potential enemy strength on the Western Front, including Italy, "possibly as many as 1,600,000 men, without taking into consideration the reserves which would

otherwise have been required in service on the Russian Front." He then passed to the "British" contribution to the Allied forces. Its total, he said, amounted to 7,500,000 men as compared with 850,000 in the Navy, Army and Territorial Force at the outbreak of war. Out of this total, 60'4 per cent. was contributed by England, 8'3 per cent. by Scotland, 3'7 per cent. by Wales, 2'3 per cent. by Ireland, 12 per cent. by the Dominions, and the remaining 15'3 per cent. by India and various African and other Dependencies.

The proposal which he had to bring forward involved the immediate raising of some 420-450,000 men from amongst those now in civil life. Those numbers must be regarded as a minimum and might later have to be exceeded; but they would be to some extent balanced by the return of discharged soldiers to civil life. Three possibilities had been considered by the Government and, for the present, rejected: to lower the military age below 18, to raise it above 43, and to apply compulsory service to Ireland. The only remaining course was to make available for military service a very large number of the young men now engaged in "essential industries" and to take all steps necessary to maintain those industries after the young men had been withdrawn.

In pursuance of this policy, which chiefly affects the engineering industry, the Government has become involved in a somewhat tangled conflict (which at the moment of writing is still proceeding) between the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, by far the largest Trade Union catering for skilled engineers, and the other Trade Unions, skilled and unskilled, interested in the engineering and allied trades.

The Government was a party to agreements arrived at in May, 1917, providing that, until the original schedule of protected occupations was revised, "dilutees fit for general service should be called up before skilled men or apprentices." The object of this provision, which was not limited

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to members of the A.S.E., was to secure that the services of the skilled men should be given to the nation in the way in which they were most useful. It was apparently made clear at the time that the policy was not intended to apply to all "dilutees." but only to those under 32 years of age. As Mr. Henderson, who was then acting on behalf of the Government, stated on May 10, "The Prime Minister may have said some strange things—we all do; but he has not said that every man of 40 with his big family shall be taken before men of 19 or 20 years of age." But the adoption of the agreements had the unfortunate result of placing the A.S.E., as the chief skilled union, in what appeared both to its own younger members and to other workmen as a position of privileged superiority. Moreover, the interpretation of the agreements could hardly fail to cause friction, since conflicting meanings can be given to the term "dilutee." It was always understood that the agreements might be abrogated under changed circumstances, and the present proposal is to deal with the position shop by shop, by means of the local "dilution officers" of the Ministry of Munitions who are in touch with the Unions and the firms affected. Committees presided over by independent chairmen have been set up to deal with complaints arising out of the enlistments made in this way.

Difficulties have arisen as to the procedure to be adopted in the negotiations between the Government and the A.S.E., but these will probably be surmounted. Behind them looms the larger difficulty arising out of the attitude of many of the younger men, which has been aggravated by food and housing difficulties in "munition" centres and by a certain amount of revolutionary agitation. The case of Government, backed up as it is by the other Unions and by public opinion, is so strong that it is not to be anticipated that serious difficulty will arise in the application of Sir Auckland Geddes's policy, embodied, as it now is, in an Act which passed through Parliament practically unopposed.

Food and Shipping

"The war is a death grapple of nations rather than of armies," remarked the President of the Board of Agriculture in a recent speech, "and the struggle will be decided in the prosaic region of the human belly." The region in question has afforded considerable material for public discussion and criticism during the last quarter. The submarine menace, although checked, still remains extremely serious: in one week of December, for instance, three million pounds of bacon and four million pounds of cheese were sunk. The margin is being cut finer and finer, and the anxiously awaited moment when the launchings will begin, not in occasional weeks but regularly, to exceed the sinkings is still in the future. As was to be expected, the effect of the growing shortage of shipping upon the food supply has been increasingly felt during the past quarter, and it has been accentuated by the withdrawal, for the relief of France, Italy and Greece, of considerable supplies which would otherwise have been available for the people of this country.

Under these circumstances, the position of the Food Controller and his Department has been far from enviable. The problem of controlling supplies and eliminating profiteering in the food trade has been overcome with success by the policy of fixing prices at every stage, although in some cases, where the producer has not been amenable to pressure, it has resulted here, as in Germany, in tending to dry up the source of supply. But the problem of the fair distribution of the supplies thus controlled has proved far more difficult to solve, and has eventually necessitated the adoption of a system of rationing for a number of essential commodities, to begin in the last week of February. Tea, margarine, meat, cheese and milk have all been seriously short at various times and places, and queues outside the shops

dealing in these articles have become a familiar sight. That they have been mainly composed of the poorest class of the population, which lives from hand to mouth and does not deal regularly at any shop, may explain but does not alleviate the hardship of the situation, and much indignation has been caused by the contrast thereby afforded between rich and poor. Steps were taken before Christmas to deal with the difficulty by giving the local authorities power to commandeer and redistribute supplies of the commodities in question within their areas. Meanwhile the rationing plan that has been adopted is based generally upon the system of registered orders, which the Labour War Emergency Committee has the credit of being the first to suggest. For the rest, the Ministry of Food has thrown a large part of its responsibility on the local Food Committees, some 2,000 in number, who are assisted by twelve District Food Commissioners. The work of the Committees, as might be expected, has been very unevenly performed; some of them, Birmingham in particular, have shown great initiative and resource; others have been unequal to their work or dominated by the shopkeeping interest. The establishment of communal kitchens has not kept pace with expectations, and, like so much else, has been hampered by inter-departmental difficulties. The Ministry has, however, taken the wise step of arranging to keep in systematic touch with public opinion by the establishment of a Consumers' Council, presided over by Mr. Clynes, a Labour member who is Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry.

Taken as a whole it must be said that the food shortage has caused much inconvenience, and some hardship, but as yet little actual privation. "Far fewer families in the British Isles," said a careful writer recently, "failed to get, not only a full but even an extravagant Christmas dinner in 1917 than in 1913." Lord Rhondda has even ventured to speak of the "great improvement in the health of the people," accompanying the reduction in the food values

consumed, and to quote the vital statistics in his support. But it is too early yet to draw such confident conclusions, and it is the next few months when the shortage of meat, especially, will be serious, which will be the decisive and critical time.

The Irish Convention

While the people of Great Britain are thus preoccupied with problems arising directly from the necessities of the war, public opinion in Ireland is chiefly concerned with the attempt to obtain a substantial measure of agreement among Irishmen as to their future constitutional position. The privacy in which the Convention has carried on its work has been loyally respected. The general public in this country have awaited its issue without impatience, convinced of the earnestness and sincerity of its members, and recognising that a task so delicate and difficult and so vitally important for the future harmony and strength of the whole Commonwealth could not be hastily rushed through.

On December 21 Sir Horace Plunkett, the Chairman of the Committee, at a meeting of the Irish Agricultural Organisation at Dublin, referred to the Convention in language which suggested that the end of its deliberations was not very far off.

"All I will say about the Convention is this. There has been in that body no unnecessary delay. Any delay that has been caused is to be explained by one consideration only, and that is that every member of that body is determined to do his utmost to arrive at a settlement which can come under the definition of a substantial agreement. Everybody knows that the Irish question was never a simple political problem, and all political problems are far more complicated and difficult at this stage in the world's history than, I suppose, they have ever been before.

"We are making progress. We have agreed on many things. There are some things on which we have not agreed. I cannot tell you yet that we will be able to produce a unanimous report, but I

can tell you that at the end of our deliberations we shall leave the Irish question better than we found it, because we shall be agreed on many things, and those who have to complete the task which we may have left unfinished will find that they have a much simpler work to do than we had."

He then alluded specially to the "problem of the completion of land purchase." "As far as my judgment goes, the work that has been done by the Sub-committee of the Convention upon that problem is very likely to produce a solution that the country will approve."

"I will ask you," he concluded, "to have patience with the Convention, and not to believe everything that you hear about it. It is perfectly true that we have often been on the rocks, and probably shall be on the rocks again, but there are tugs always lying by ready to pull us off. We shall get off somehow, and I myself am very hopeful of the ultimate result."

This statement was clearly meant as a warning to the public not to be unduly disappointed and disheartened if the Convention should fail in its primary purpose of securing "substantial agreement" on the main constitutional question. A month later (January 21) the sudden resignation of Sir Edward Carson from the War Cabinet revealed that a crisis was at hand. In his letter to the Prime Minister he said that he had never differed from his colleagues as to the conduct of the war, and that his only motive in resigning was to free the hands of the Cabinet on the one side and himself on the other in dealing with whatever situation might arise in Ireland as the result of the Convention. Finally, on January 24, in response to a letter from the Prime Minister stating that "before a decision was come to by the Convention on certain issues under discussion he and his colleagues in the Cabinet would be happy to confer with leading members representing different sections of the Convention should they desire to follow such a course," certain members were selected to meet the Prime Minister and his colleagues, and the Convention was adjourned.

It is clear, therefore, at the moment of writing, that "substantial agreement" on the main issue has not yet been attained in the Convention and that a final effort to attain it is being made. That it will succeed is the anxious hope not only of the vast majority of the people of the British Commonwealth—alike in the United Kingdom and in the Dominions—but also of the Allies, and especially the United States.

London. February, 1918.

CANADA

I. THE GENERAL ELECTION

THE General Election resulted in a decisive majority for the Union Government. At most the Opposition under Sir Wilfrid Laurier will have 90 seats in the new Parliament. It is believed that when the votes of the soldiers are counted the Government will have a majority of 55 or 60. It is doubtful if more than one Liberal candidate will secure election in the four Western Provinces. Out of the 82 seats in Ontario all but seven or eight will be held by the Administration. In New Brunswick seven out of eleven and in Nova Scotia six out of sixteen constituencies will elect Unionists. In Quebec, however, only three Unionists were returned, while the four constituencies of Prince Edward Island elected Oppositionists.

The two French Ministers were defeated, but all the English-speaking members of the Government were returned. Those who contested seats in the English Provinces had large majorities. In North Toronto Sir George Foster had a majority of 14,607. Fewer than 3,000 votes were polled by his Liberal opponent, who, however, declared for conscription as strongly as the Minister. Sir Edward Kemp, in East Toronto, had 7,600 majority; Major-General Mewburn, in East Hamilton, over 3,000; Hon. N. W. Rowell, in Durham, nearly 5,000; Sir Thomas White, in Leeds, over 2,000; Hon. J. D. Reid, in Grenville, over 2,000; Hon. T. W. Crothers, in West Elgin, 1,000; Hon. Hugh Guthrie, in South

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Wellington, 4,500; Hon. T. A. Crerar, in Marquette, Manitoba, 6,000; Hon. Arthur Meighen, in Portage la Prairie, Manitoba, over 3,000; Hon. J. A. Calder, in Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan, nearly 5,000; Hon. Arthur Sifton, in Medicine Hat, Alberta, over 3,000; and Sir Robert Borden, in Kings, Nova Scotia, over 900. The Unionist majorities in Toronto and York aggregated Centre Winnipeg gave a Unionist majority 56,000. of 13,340 and South Winnipeg of 12, 821. Regina gave a Unionist majority of 5,000, and there were Unionist majorities in Calgary, Vancouver and Victoria of 4,000. On the other hand, the Liberal majorities in Quebec were as large as the Unionist majorities in the English Provinces. In Quebec East, which Sir Wilfrid Laurier has represented for 40 years, he had a majority of 6,000, while in Champlain the Liberal majority was 7,300; in Hochelaga, 9,000; in Maissoneuve, where Hon. Rodolphe Lemieux was the candidate, 5,200; in Richmond and Wolfe, 4,795; in St. John and Iberville, 4,500; and in St. Denis, 8,400. It must also be remembered that in seventeen constituencies in the Province of Ouebec the Liberal candidates were not opposed.

In all save five or six of the constituencies carried by the Opposition French and German voters were influential, if they did not constitute a majority of the electorate. If the female relatives of soldiers had not been enfranchised it is doubtful if a single Unionist would have been elected in the French Province. For the first time since Confederation French and English in Quebec divided according to racial affinity. It is not suggested that the English-speaking voters of Quebec were an absolute unit in support of the Government, but in a far greater degree than ever before they answered to the appeal which was so influential in the other Provinces. During the last two or three weeks of the contest Unionist candidates in the English Provinces denounced Quebec as hostile to the war, slack in recruiting, careless of the honour of Canada, and of doubtful loyalty

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to the Army, the Empire and the Allies. It was argued that if Sir Wilfrid Laurier succeeded in the election the Military Service Act would be repealed and the Army abandoned. Public feeling was inflamed by the failure of the Prime Minister to secure a hearing at Kitchener, which is the German stronghold in Ontario, and by the organised disturbances at Unionist meetings in Quebec. It is true that no French Unionist candidate could hold a public meeting. Even Hon. C. J. Doherty, Hon. C. C. Ballantyne and Sir Herbert Ames found it difficult to hold meetings in Montreal. The French Province was almost closed against the candidates of the Government, and inevitably there was anger and resentment throughout English-speaking Canada. There was, however, little if any disturbance at Liberal meetings, while Sir Wilfrid Laurier himself was treated with courtesy and respect. He never spoke to greater audiences than those which assembled to hear him at Winnipeg, Regina, Calgary and Vancouver. There were, too, manifestations of personal sympathy for the veteran Liberal leader which excited grave apprehension among Unionists. In all his speeches he opposed conscription, but declared that the necessary reinforcements could be secured under the voluntary system, and that if he succeeded in the election Canada would continue in the war with undiminished vigour and energy. But apparently the country did not believe that there could be any satisfactory revival of voluntary recruiting. Nor could the people be persuaded that a Government depending upon elements opposed to conscription and called to office as a protest against conscription would or could adopt and enforce the policy defeated in a general election if the judgment were reversed in a referendum. They felt that the creation of a Laurier Government would inevitably mean a weakening in the military effort of Canada. It is certain that all the elements hostile to the war supported the Opposition and that the attitude of Quebec Nationalists was wholly repugnant to the

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English-speaking population. No doubt there were extreme utterances by Unionist newspapers and Unionist candidates, but Sir Robert Borden himself refrained from any appeal to racial prejudices and refused, as he has done throughout all his public life, to have any personal quarrel with Quebec, although he has failed so signally to secure its sympathy or support. There is, therefore, no personal reason why the Prime Minister should not yet receive the confidence of Quebec. He has "titles manifold" to the consideration and respect of its people. Nor should co-operation in the future be difficult if, as Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Sir Lomer Gouin have declared, Quebec is willing to submit to the will of the country as expressed in the General Election. As to what is the will of the country Quebec can have no illusion. Even if no women had been enfranchised and no aliens disfranchised conscription would have been sanctioned and the Union Government sustained. No country ever registered its decision in more serious or more resolute temper. The election was not so much a contest between parties as a dedication of Canada to the men in the trenches, to the cause of the Empire, of freedom, and of civilisation. The words, perhaps, fall glibly from the tongue. They may have the flavour of rhetoric. But if ever a country spoke in the language of service and sacrifice Canada so spoke on December 17, and there is among the masses of the Canadian people a solemn pride that they were not altogether unworthy of those who have fallen and those who are fighting in a cause as righteous as any for which men have contended since time began.

Women were very active in the electoral contest. Many women spoke for Unionist candidates and a few for the Opposition. All over the Dominion the women voters were thoroughly organised. At least 80 per cent. of the women entitled to the franchise were registered. Few of these votes were not cast. Generally the women created their own organisation, canvassed the voters, and saw that

the votes were polled. Of the 400,000 or 500,000 women enrolled at least 70 per cent. gave their ballots to Unionist candidates. The Protestant clergy were also very active. They spoke from many platforms and, contrary to the general custom in Canada, made direct appeals from the pulpit in behalf of the Government. As active were the leaders in the universities and in the professions, many of whom had never before appeared in a political contest. Few representative newspapers in the English Provinces gave their support to the Opposition. Toronto has six daily newspapers and all fought the battle of the Unionists. It would seem almost inconceivable to any student of Canadian political history that the Globe could oppose the official leaders of the Liberal party; for the Globe was the father of the party and for more than sixty years had been its most aggressive and powerful advocate. But no other journal was more steady in its advocacy of the draft or in its support of Unionist candidates in Ontario, of whom sixty-eight out of eighty-two had belonged to the Conservative party. In Hamilton, Kingston, Ottawa, and Brantford no daily newspaper adhered to the Opposition. In the whole province the London Advertiser was the only important or influential daily journal which supported Liberal candidates, while even the Advertiser was willing to have a hundred thousand men raised by conscription. In Nova Scotia and New Brunswick the chief Liberal journals also allied themselves with the Government, while in the West the Edmonton Bulletin stood almost alone among Liberal newspapers in its support of the Opposition. The three dailies of Winnipeg, the two dailies of Regina, two of the three Calgary newspapers and all the daily press of Vancouver and Victoria were vigorous advocates of the draft and the coalition. In Quebec the Montreal Daily Star and the Montreal Gazette gave energetic support to the Government, while L'Evênement alone among French journals, despite the strength and fervour of local feeling for Sir Wilfrid Laurier, main-

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tained its lifelong association with the Conservative party, fought the Liberal leader and the Nationalists, and at least did not oppose conscription. Practically Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who three or four months ago still had the zealous and united support of the powerful Liberal press of Canada, had to fight his battle in the English Provinces without newspaper support, with the Provincial leaders of the Liberal party either in the Union Cabinet or supporting it, and with his party organisation shattered by wholesale defections. But the Liberal leader faced all these adverse circumstances and influences with steady courage and had but few words of reproach for those who had fallen away from his standard. It was a vain fight, but the veteran warrior bore himself gallantly in the field of his defeat. Since polling day he has maintained a complete silence. It is believed that he will continue to lead the Opposition, but whether or not he will still oppose conscription is not disclosed.

Since the election there has been much violent writing in the French newspapers, and a Liberal member of the Quebec Legislature has given notice of a resolution in favour of the withdrawal of Quebec from Confederation. But even Mr. Bourassa regards separation as impracticable and unnecessary, while La Presse, the most widely circulated of French journals in Canada, uses moderate and conciliatory language, and urges submission to the Military

Service Act. It says:

This is not the time when we should discuss the merits of the law. Each one of us will understand that the wisest way out is to conform to the law which the authorities judge to be best for the country. The sacrifice is a great one, of course, for families as well as individuals, but a courageous and worthy submission to the law of the land always brings its own reward. Let our men especially avoid being guided by the fear of persecution, as a sentiment of having accomplished a duty, painful though it may be, yet assigned to us by the leaders of the nation should be an encouragement to go ahead.

On the other hand, Le Journal, the French Liberal

organ of Montreal, joins with Mr. Bourassa in insisting that no French Canadian shall enter the Government. declares that a French Minister in such a Cabinet could only misrepresent Quebec. It goes beyond Le Devoir in advocating a boycott of the merchants and manufacturers of Ontario. La Croix fears that, now Sir Robert Borden has "the brutal force to do so," he will put his war programme into execution. It suggests that Quebec should exact separation from Upper Canada, enter into an alliance with the Atlantic Provinces, raise up a constitutional wall against Ontario, and thus escape from political association with immigrants "from the slums of London" and those who "from the other side of the Ottawa seek to destroy us like the hideous serpent which, after being warmed into life, raises its head against its benefactor." L'Action Catholique, of Quebec, while demanding equal authority for French-Canadians in the Confederation, opposes any movement for separation as impracticable and inimical to the true interests of Quebec. Mr. Bourassa himself declares that the situation is not desperate. He thinks the most turbulent elements of the Unionist party would drive the Government to measures of reprisals against Quebec, but is confident that Sir Robert Borden and his more responsible associates will resist rash and extreme counsels. He believes it is false to argue that the Government's majority is equivalent to a referendum in favour of conscription, but suggests that Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his lieutenants, in declaring throughout the country that Canada was in the war to the end, "left no issue to those Canadians who think it more patriotic to save Canada from ruin and suicide than to bleed it white without profit to the Allies."

Mr. Bourassa thinks that the Liberals who deserted Sir Wilfrid will be faithful to the coalition while the war lasts, after which the parties will be broken up again. He contends that all the concessions that Liberals have made to Imperialism, militarism and jingoism have done them no

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good and that "in the conflict between Imperialism and Nationalism the place of the French-Canadian is made, no matter what politicians of any party may say or want." As he looks at the future "the alignment of political forces will be on two principal questions: the settlement of our accounts with England and the readjustment of our own economic equilibrium." He thinks the ideal political destiny for Canada is independence, but he would accept "Empire partnership." He is careful to add that this must not be "such a partnership as the Imperialists favour." He looks for a socialist and anti-militarist Government in England after the war and a free discussion of the affairs of the Empire, with a reaction in Canada in which a leading part will be taken by the English-speaking Provinces.

In the meantime not much is said in English-speaking Canada to increase irritation in Quebec. It is confidently expected that the Government will deal fairly with the French Province, that the Military Service Act will be enforced in Quebec as elsewhere, and that such responsible statesmen as Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Sir Lomer Govin will not encourage any agitation for secession. There is no disposition in the Government to persecute Quebec or subject its people to any treatment different from that which will be applied to the other Provinces. It can be reduced only by its own action to an inferior status in the Confederation. There is, however, a feeling in the English Provinces against new concessions to any racial or religious element which no Government could resist. Before THE ROUND TABLE appears again the situation will be more clearly revealed. There will be a degree of darkness until Sir Wilfrid Laurier speaks or Parliament assembles. Canada will be grateful and all the reserve of affection for the Liberal leader which lies in the hearts of the Canadian people will flower with fresh luxuriance if he will exhibit the resolute patriotism and fine magnanimity which have characterised the course and conduct of Mr. Asquith since he laid down the authority and responsi-

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bility of office. There are signs that the Unionist party will develop a permanent character and that early action will be taken to create an active Unionist organisation in the Province of Quebec.

II. THE CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES AND THE WAR

ANADA holds an honourable position in regard to higher education. Of her population of 8,000,000 there were before the war 14,000 students in attendance at the score of universities and colleges of the Dominion, in most of which women are registered on equal terms with men. Though the enrolment in some of these institutions is small, the leading universities with great professional faculties rank among the largest and best equipped in the Empire. Not the least hopeful promise for the future is to be discerned in the rapid and healthful growth of the recent provincial universities of Western Canada. The people of these Provinces have begun to take pride in their own institutions; and, though for some years to come parents who graduated in the East will continue to send their sons and daughters to their old university, the real needs of the West will soon be provided for at home. Already the Legislatures have made a good beginning in the financial aid that they have given to their own creations; but Canada has still a long way to go both in the East and the West before the universities are equipped as are those of the United States by reason of the liberality and foresight of its legislators.

The students of the Canadian colleges are drawn from all circles of the people and from all sections of the provinces; but, as in Scotland, the majority come from homes of modest comfort in the towns, villages, and countryside, and require to earn sufficient to put themselves through, or to supplement their allowance, though the rapid growth of wealth in the cities has been reflected in

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the larger numbers of undergraduates who are supported entirely by their parents. The universities are thoroughly representative of Canadian opinion, especially that of the energetic, solid, honest old stock, but in the West also that of the best immigration which has come in recent years from Europe or from the United States. Convictions which take strong hold of the students will soon react upon the country as a potent if silent influence. It was, therefore, of the utmost importance that from the earliest moment the meaning of the war was clearly set before, and quickly grasped by, the youth of the universities. Presented with clearness and earnestness the Allies' case made its appeal to their generous natures; and through them, as they came to a decision, it confronted their parents as a vital issue; and they, in their turn, have undoubtedly been influential in creating a right sentiment throughout the country. The effect of this academic awakening will undoubtedly be felt in the present political crisis; for the enlistment of the choicest of our students who come from the best homes in the Dominion will have moulded opinion in their neighbourhood, and will have determined many to exercise their vote in such a way as to enable the Dominion to continue in this struggle and to render effective the sacrifice which her youth have so nobly made. The universities have fulfilled their function worthily in this period, and have justified all that was confidently claimed for them throughout the years of peace, as being creators of character and sources of ideals for service on behalf of the public by whom they are supported. Never have divergent standards of education been so thoroughly tested as in the present war, on the one side the Teutonic view as to what the State must demand from the individual, and, on the other, the Anglo-Saxon and French conception that the primary aim in education is the formation to high purpose of what is universal and truly human in each person. Our type has stood the test well. It has produced intelligent people who can grasp

quickly for themselves and take action upon the essential facts in a great crisis. Instead of education producing irresolution in those who have been trained to see both sides of a question, it has purified the eyes of the heart and given sight to the will. No section of the community has contributed a larger share of their best than the universities. The initial response of the students, their behaviour in the unprecedented horrors of actual warfare, their record as officers and the distinctions that have been won on the field, are a renewed testimony to the value of higher education as serving to give intelligent direction to the common human virtues of courage and self-sacrifice. One result of our experience is that our voluntary recruiting has made a disproportionately large draft upon the young men of the universities, more of whom might to the future advantage of the country have been kept until they were twenty years of age and had completed a portion of their academic training, so that on their return they might more easily resume their studies and the sooner be prepared for their civil duties. An interruption between the school and the university tends to become permanent. A careful system of official drafting, wisely using the splendid readiness of our youth to do their duty wherever they may be asked to serve, would have provided the country with better service both in the present and in the future.

In order to form a just estimate of the work done in the war by the universities and colleges of the Dominion it must be borne in mind that the long established institutions of the East have rolls of graduates from which large numbers have enlisted; but the Western universities are of quite recent origin, except Manitoba, whose oldest graduates are now beyond the active military age. Out of the 180 graduates of Saskatchewan, for example, one of the newest universities, 76 have already enlisted. It is difficult to obtain complete information, but it may be safely affirmed that by August, 1917, 12,000 members of the universities, 366

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including graduates, members of the staffs, former students and undergraduates, had been on active service. Of these some 400 are members of the staffs and 6,000 are on the undergraduate register. There are nearly 800 names on the Rolls of the Fallen. What this means may be inferred from the estimate that of the 14,000 in attendance in all the Canadian universities before the war not more than 10,000 were men. As the war has proceeded the attendance upon the faculties has fallen so rapidly that several universities report that at the end of last session few physically fit men were left except those under age in the first year. As might be expected there is a marked difference between the faculties. Applied Science has suffered most. In one of the Eastern universities, for example, the attendance in this faculty in 1916-17 was smaller by 75 per cent. than at the opening of the war. In the same university the registration of men students in Arts fell by 65 per cent. The faculty of Medicine maintains a higher average, because after the first winter the military authorities were unwilling to recruit as combatants students from the last two years; and, as the war has lengthened and in view of the urgent need that will arise if it is protracted, even less pressure is now being put upon the earlier years to enlist. So great has been the demand for medical officers that several universities held summer sessions in 1916 and 1917 in order that from the graduating years a supply of trained men for active service might be made available as soon as was consistent with efficiency.

One inconvenient result for the universities arising out of these activities is that they have found themselves involved in financial difficulties. In some instances the income from fees has been reduced by 50 per cent. with but a small corresponding reduction in the cost of maintenance, because the reduction in staff was relatively not great and the working expenses as made up of wages, materials for the upkeep of buildings, fuel and laboratory supplies have advanced greatly in price. Governing bodies, there-

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fore, have realised that the very wholeheartedness of their patriotic effort has presented them with urgent and serious financial problems. Probably no other institutions in the

country have paid so dearly for their patriotism.

To enlarge somewhat more fully upon these activities. At the beginning of the war the Canadian Officers' Training Corps was organised in most of the universities under the leadership of members of the staffs who either had former military experience or who in August and September began to prepare themselves for instructing students as soon as possible after the opening of the session. Large numbers of undergraduates soon joined the corps and began to train on the university grounds without uniforms or rifles. Enlistment in the C.O.T.C. was quite voluntary, but the gravity of the situation and the extraordinary import of the issue were soon grasped by the students. Allowances as to academic standing were made to those who joined and performed the duties with success, except in the professional faculties in which the standards were maintained, though the required attendance was slightly lessened in some cases. By the spring of 1915 many from the C.O.T.C. had either enlisted or were in special training corps. The military authorities showed willingness to co-operate, and soldiers of wide experience advised that, as far as possible, the universities should be made sources of supply for officers, as the intelligence of their members could as a rule be thus used to the best advantage. This policy has resulted in the transfer of many officers from the C.O.T.C. to the Canadian units and also in a steady stream of efficient men who have been sent to take commissions in the British armies.

It soon became evident that the C.O.T.C. could not meet all the military requirements. Some students either did not wish or were not qualified for commissions at once, and would do their best work first in the ranks. To provide for these men an agreeable companionship two opportunities were offered, first in the East and later in the West. A

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university company was established to reinforce the famous Princess Patricia Regiment, the members being drawn from many of the universities and recruited on the McGill grounds at Montreal. Six such companies in all have been formed containing besides university men others who wished to be associated with them. The record of these companies has heightened the already fine reputation of one of the best-known Canadian regiments. Later, in the West, the 196th Western Regiment has been established to afford similar opportunities within a more uniform circle.

Infantry did not make a powerful appeal to many. Artillery became rapidly a more popular branch of the service, and batteries were formed within the universities, which were sent across as units or have served as permanent depots from which drafts are constantly made as they are ready. Other branches such as the cyclists, signallers and the flying corps have received their quota of students.

Most important services have been rendered by many members of the universities' staffs in the military schools of instruction—infantry, musketry, signalling. Accustomed to teaching, they have been able to apply to military affairs the aptitude which they have acquired by experience, and many who were unable to go on active service have fulfilled their patriotic duty in this way.

Through the faculties of Medicine the universities have played a large part, not only in training officers for units at the front, but in maintaining ambulances and hospitals manned by university teachers and graduates. Well managed though the Canadian hospitals have been on the whole during the war, the university hospitals have held a unique position, because their personnel was chosen with a special purpose, and consisting of fellow-graduates trained in the same methods of hospital practice and with the best scientific equipment, their staffs have been animated by a common loyalty to their university, and have been no less faithful to their country, for which they have made heavy personal sacrifices. Six Canadian university

hospitals have been sent away. Of these three are large General Hospitals officered from the teaching staffs and graduates of McGill, Toronto and Queen's, and now stationed respectively at Boulogne, Salonica and Etaples. Stationary hospitals similarly officered have been sent by Dalhousie, Laval and the Western (London, Ont.) Universities and are scationed in France. The Medical College of Manitoba University has raised a Casualty Clearing Station and a Field Ambulance. These hospitals are maintained by the Dominion Government on the same basis as all other hospitals, but over and above this they have all been equipped and are handsomely supported by their friends and the graduates of the respective universities with extra supplies for the patients, instruments, scientific apparatus, motor-trucks and ambulances. Strong committees of ladies, working either independently or in conjunction with the Red Cross, keep the supplies up to the requirements.

On the field of this war medicine and surgery have won great victories through the many scientific investigators who are serving at the front. The laboratory has been carried to the armies. In it the war against death and disease is being waged amidst the welter of bloodshed; its victories will be proclaimed when the din of battle has ceased and their beneficent results will gladden generations to come. At home also the laboratory has done its part, supplying sera and anti-toxins for typhoid, meningitis, tetanus, the manufacture of which has been conducted on a large scale in the Hygiene Laboratory of the University of Toronto.

Wounded or incapacitated soldiers are now returning in great numbers, and most of those who are still invalided are cared for in hospitals under the direction of the Dominion Hospitals Commission. In the case of those at Kingston, Queen's Medical Faculty has become responsible for their oversight in a building which the university has set apart for this purpose.

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Experiments of a new and interesting character in the way of the re-education of returned soldiers are being conducted also under the auspices of the Dominion Hospitals Commission at the University of Toronto. Psychological and medical experts give special treatment to soldiers who have lost their powers of speech or the control over their limbs. For each case apparatus is devised where necessary, and an individual instructor is assigned. Already gratifying results have been obtained, and more may be expected when the work which has been done in England and France has been studied by our specialists. Psychology and physiology combine in this work of restoration to provide a new chance and create a new hope in life for many a poor man who has thought himself nothing but a wreck cast upon the pity of a world that forgets all too soon.

The amount of work done in the other laboratories of Canada has been relatively much less than in England because so much less responsibility rests upon our Government for the conduct of the various phases of the war, and no advisory scientific committee for military or naval purposes has been created in Canada as was the case in Britain. Possibly more might have been attempted, but the research and experiment conducted in the Canadian laboratories for the Imperial authorities and for the manufacturers of munitions have been sufficient to show that in these laboratories the Dominion possesses potential resources which may be turned to great advantage in the future.

An occasional voice was raised in favour of closing the universities, but it was irresponsible and found little or no echo. University buildings, however, have been handed over to the military authorities for all sorts of purposes, for military instruction, as residences for military units, as hospitals; in fact, the universities have held themselves in readiness to inconvenience themselves and reduce their wants to the lowest possible requirements in order to put

their space at the disposal of the military authorities. But the structure of laboratories and classrooms is such that the uses to which they can be put are few. Of the housings within the universities not the least interesting is that of the Royal Flying Corps. Large numbers of young Canadians have taken commissions in the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps, in which they have done excellent work. This country offers an excellent field for this kind of recruiting, and in the winter of 1916-17 a cadet school of instruction, with further training facilities and mechanical equipment, was opened in Toronto by the Home authorities, and it bids fair to supply many officers for a branch for which the Canadian

seems to have peculiar aptitude.

An unexpected but most welcome opportunity for the university man who has returned wounded and is unable to resume active service at the fighting line or is on long leave has been presented by reason of the entrance of the United States into the war. Repeating the experience of Canada and endeavouring to profit by what we have learned, their universities are coming to us for officers who may give their students practical training made effective by what they have gone through in real warfare. They hope to get from our officers not only instruction adapted to the new conditions brought about in this war, but also an enthusiasm which will be created in the mind of the undergraduate, naturally a hero-worshipper, by his intercourse with a college man who has won the right to honour. The widespread and urgent needs of the army of the United States leave few officers for purposes of instruction in the universities, which, therefore, have turned to Canada for help. Our military authorities have co-operated most heartily with the universities in releasing for this duty such returned officers as the universities may recommend as being suitable for this work. Already Yale, Columbia, and other American institutions have been supplied; but not nearly all the requests can be met,

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as the number of returned officers who after a short leave are unable to resume their duties at the front and are well enough to have the necessary qualifications is smaller than might be expected. Those, however, who have gone are rendering most valuable service in strengthening between the two countries bonds of friendship which we hope will become indissoluble through our united sacrifices for the preservation of similar ideals of civilisation.

In another respect the United States has made wise use of its universities. Two Boards have been appointed by Congress to disseminate right views of the war among the people and to educate them as to the progress of events. One is entitled the Committee on Public Information and the other the National Board for Historical Service. These committees are composed for the most part of members of the universities, who in this way are enabled to use their special gifts for the direct service of their country. In Canada no such effort has been organised by the Government, but patriotic leagues have been formed to provide speakers for recruiting purposes, who by explaining the meaning of the war to as wide circles as possible have stimulated enlistment and created interest in patriotic funds. This work has been very successful. In it members of the universities have taken a large part, and, in addition, the universities themselves have arranged courses of lectures on the historical, political, military, and economic aspects of the war which have been heard by large audiences in many centres.

The present war has given science a new prestige in the eyes of the man in the street. He sees that the instruments and explosives of modern artillery are the products of science, that the aeroplane and submarine are the creations of scientific genius. The terrible effectiveness of modern warfare as measured by its wreckage of human life and of the fruits of civilisation is to be laid to the account of science, though not the spirit which called

these instruments into exercise. But by an almost insane paradox science has also snatched the wounded from the jaws of death with unprecedented skill and has warded off the disease which aforetime was as deadly as the bullet. Science itself puts its triumphs at the disposal equally of the man of war or of peace, of him who will use them for the destruction or for the restoration of mankind. It may be expected, therefore, that the military man, even in those countries which will never be "militaristic," will henceforth be a defender of the scientific institutions of his nation, and will advocate the laboratory as a defence

against aggression.

Already the world is looking to the days of peace. When the war is won the devastated world will appeal both to the pity and to the energy of the survivors. If science has revolutionised war it will also revolutionise the arts of peace, and recover wealth for the impoverished. The economic waste must be repaired by a more rigid application of science to industry. This conviction has laid hold upon the leaders of the peoples who are now at war. Britain has called her scientists and her most capable and far-seeing men of business to serve upon committees and in bureaus for giving a lead to the industrial and commercial life of the new era, and fruitful results may be anticipated from the precision, thoroughness, imagination, and powers of organisation of these men. This movement has reached Canada, and the Dominion has its Advisory Council on Scientific and Industrial Research, which owes its existence in large measure to the fact that Sir George Foster took counsel with some of the scientific men in the universities, and, acting on their knowledge and associating with them more experienced industrial leaders, has provided for Canada an organisation similar to what exists in Britain. Co-operation with the universities will be essential for its success, and that co-operation has already begun. Recognising that the first step in progress is to secure well-trained investigators, the Council has established a series of

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research fellowships which are to be held at the universities under the direction of the heads of laboratories. Definite problems will be undertaken not only in the bureaus that may be established, but we may suppose also in the existing university laboratories. The Council may thus become a means of co-ordinating and economising the existing

scientific opportunities of the country.

In view of this demonstration of the utility of Applied Science it will doubtless be less difficult to persuade the people that universities, which are directly and indirectly of such enormous potential value to the industrial and economic development of the country, should receive more generous financial support. And, of course, the rapid increase in the expenditure of a modern university is due to the equipment and maintenance of laboratories, especially those of Applied Science. Physical, electrical, and mechanical apparatus is very expensive. In the path of progress lie strewn costly instruments which are soon out of date. New plant involves large outlay; renewals cost heavily; even the supplying of the library with the current scientific periodicals of the world is no small item of expense. In science up-to-dateness is essential for development. This fact must be grasped by the intelligent people, for the future will face them with more insistent demands than ever from the universities. But the years of war have crippled the resources of the universities. Rigid economy has been enforced; expenses have been reduced to a minimum; stocks have run very low. It has been a sufficiently serious task to keep the universities going; impossible to provide equipment which would be adequate apart from war conditions. The scrupulous economy of these war years may leave the universities with a new problem. If these minimum war requirements are taken by the public as a possible standard of efficiency, the latter state of the universities will be much worse than the former. They will need the support of their friends to justify them, when, as is inevitable, the

expenditures will rise rapidly after the war if even the former standards are to be recovered. But those standards must be surpassed if what has been said above about the application of science to industry should come to pass. There will be insistent demands for the enlargement of the departments for the purposes of research. Appeals will be made for the establishment of new departments as the industries come to see that the laboratories can be made to serve them, and electrical and chemical developments will grow apace. National self-sufficiency likewise will react upon education, and we shall be expected not to remain in dependence upon the intellectual hospitality of other countries for the training of our experts in the sciences and the arts.

An inevitable result of the war will be that we shall have in the next generation an insufficient supply of our own men to do the work of science for the country. The universities have given so prodigally of their best that we shall suffer a lack of highly equipped men. This loss is irreparable. But will not this loss be compensated for by the enduring possession that will be ours in the rebirth of idealism through the sacrifice of so much of the best? It is as creators of intellectual and moral idealism that universities fulfil their supreme purpose. The average man may be persuaded to approve the expenditure of vast sums on their scientific equipment because he has come to see that science prepares the road for material progress. But such as he can never in this spirit be the true supporters of a great university. The universities perform their noblest function and are of most enduring value to the community as the inspirers of idealism in youth, and in becoming homes for those who will keep brightly burning in the nation the zeal for knowledge and for the pursuit of truth, and who are on the alert to discover in their students those to whom they may in confidence commit the sacred torch. Idealism gives new life to universities; by its revival they have been rejuvenated through the

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centuries. This war, again, has called forth heroic idealism in the youth who saw the truth in the conflict and have been obedient to it even unto death; and in this magnificent inspiration the universities of Canada will renew their strength.

III. EARL GREY IN CANADA

THERE was general mourning throughout Canada over the death of Lord Grey. It was as though one greatly cherished had been taken out of our own household. Few Canadian newspapers or periodicals failed to deplore his loss and bear tribute to his character. In all these utterances there were evidences of genuine affection. His great services to Canada were freely extolled, but there was something more personal and intimate than cold gratitude for faithful discharge of public duty. One feels that no other Governor-General of Canada so expressed the impulses and characteristics of the Canadian people. He had their natural optimism, their confident courage, their evangelical ardour, and their eager devotion to reforming and regenerative movements. It was felt that he understood the attitude of Canada towards the Mother Country, the aspiration for a full measure of self-government and the conception of an equal citizenship throughout the Empire. There was a feeling also that he was a democrat by instinct. When he had been a few years in Canada we forgot that he belonged to any class or group. He was neither weighted by aristocratic training and connections, nor regarded by Canadians as separated by any social caste from complete identification with their interests, their environment, and their outlook.

Earl Grey succeeded Lord Minto as Governor-General of Canada. He landed at Halifax on December 10, 1904, where he was met by Sir Wilfrid Laurier and other members of the Canadian Cabinet. On December 13 he reached

Ottawa, where he was destined to remain for a longer period than any of his predecessors in the office of Governor-General. At Halifax, as at Ottawa, he was the object of official demonstrations, and in various public addresses he established a sympathetic relation with the Canadian people which was never afterwards disturbed. Twice his term of office was extended, once in recognition of his exceptional personal popularity and intimate identification with Canadian affairs and once in order to convenience the Duke of Connaught, who succeeded him. On October 11, 1911, Earl Grey sailed from Quebec. The retiring Governor-General was the central figure of many public demonstrations during the last weeks of his residence in Canada. To the end his personal popularity was unabated. He spoke with more freedom than had any previous occupant of Government House. His ardent temperament was not easily restrained by the limitations which surround the office of Governor-General. There was positive teaching in some of his addresses on the relations between Canada and the Empire, on the regulation of the liquor traffic, and on proportional representation. He was suspected of undue interest in the agitation to induce the Government to organise a Canadian navy or co-operate with the Imperial authorities in naval defence. He was denounced by the extreme nationalists of Quebec as conspiring to involve Canada in untimely Imperial projects. But such isolated criticism and attack made no impression upon the masses of the people. Even Quebec would not be excited. Indeed, it is doubtful if any other Governor-General since Confederation was more warmly regarded by the French people. They had a curious insight into his eager temperament, with perhaps an instinctive feeling that he was too frank for subterfuge and too open for intrigue.

This feeling was strengthened by the close friendship which existed between himself and Sir Wilfrid Laurier. There was some friction between the Liberal leader and

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Lord Minto over the slow action of Canada when war broke out in South Africa. It is true that there was no long breach nor any actual estrangement, but the country suspected an undercurrent of conflict between the Governor-General and his advisers. But between Earl Grey and the Liberal Prime Minister there was unbroken attachment and complete mutual confidence. A Governor-General who maintains such relations with the Prime Minister can even afford "indiscretions." Between Earl Grey and Sir Wilfrid Laurier, however, there was something far more intimate than an official relationship. The Prime Minister was never reluctant to assume responsibility for the utterances of the Governor-General. Possibly there was some feeling that a greater freedom of utterance for the King's representative was desirable. Ever since Confederation we had confined the Governor-General to vapid compliment and solemn platitude. In rashly disturbing this ancient tradition it was found that a generation had appeared in which its absolute observance was not required. This is not, perhaps, the time or place to speculate about the office of Governor-General. One feels that the position is unlikely to remain exactly what it has been in the past. One feels, too, that there must be a freer admission of Dominion representatives to the great Crown offices throughout the Empire and to responsible ambassadorial appointments. But that is for peace and the future.

Intimate as were the relations between Lord Grey and Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the Governor-General never gave offence to the Parliamentary Opposition. He had the warm personal regard of Mr. Borden and they co-operated heartily so far as co-operation was permissible or desirable. During the contest over continental reciprocity, in which the Liberal Government was defeated, his attitude never came under suspicion. If, as is now believed, he could not think that undesirable consequences would follow a ratification of the fiscal agreement with the United States,

he scrupulously held his opinion in reserve, even in conversation with those with whom he had the closest personal intercourse. No doubt this was only as it should have been, but the fact suggests that he was incapable of any indiscretion that would involve the Governor-General

in conflict with either political party.

Perhaps the most delicate undertaking to which Earl Grey committed himself was the acquisition of the Plains of Abraham for public purposes. He was influential among those who persuaded the Government to acquire the historic battlefield, and he conceived the memorable historical and military celebration at Quebec to signalise its reservation as a national park and playground. The chief features of the celebration were a series of historical tableaux, going back to the discovery of New France, reviving incidents in the French régime, illustrating events surrounding the British occupation, and marking outstanding epochs in Confederation, and with these a naval and military display of national and Imperial significance. The fêtes were peculiarly distinguished by the presence of the Prince of Wales, so soon to ascend the Throne, and by the remarkable popular enthusiasm which Lord Roberts excited. In attendance also were direct descendants of Wolfe and Montcalm, cherishing in happy amity the glories of their ancestors and rejoicing in all evidences of concord and co-operation between French and English in the Confederation. By his gracious bearing throughout the ceremonies the Prince of Wales left with Canadians of both races a legacy of pleasant memories for which alone the celebration had enduring value. But the event was also effective in stimulating a firmer Canadian and Imperial patriotism. For Lord Grey the whole celebration was a personal triumph since undoubtedly at the outset there was apprehension of misunderstanding and a revival of race feeling.

During his term of office Earl Grey made many official journeys throughout the country. He visited every con-

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siderable settlement in the Western Provinces, and was not less well acquainted with New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island. One of his most notable expeditions had Hudson Bay as its object. In that journey he was accompanied by a special correspondent of the London Times who now sits in the Imperal Parliament. It cannot be doubted that the Governor-General's report encouraged the Government to proceed with the construction of the Hudson Bay Railway. He visited Newfoundland; but if he cherished any hope of reconciling the Island to union with Canada, there is reason to think he was convinced that the problem belonged to the future. He was often in New York and occasionally at Washington. Before American audiences some of his most vibrant and impressive addresses were delivered. Between Mr. Roosevelt and himself there was complete sympathy and understanding. Unquestionably he gave Mr. Bryce strong and effective support in finally adjusting various outstanding questions between Canada and the United States which for long years had been prolific causes of irritation and dispute; while of even greater value was the creation of joint machinery to prevent such disputes in the future. Earl Grey was a frequent speaker before Canadian clubs. He was active in many benevolent and patriotic movements. He powerfully assisted Lady Grey in providing cottage hospitals in remote frontier settlements. Here, perhaps, it may be said that no woman who ever dispensed the hospitality of Government House is more honoured throughout Canada than Lady Grey. Never aggressive or showy, she became the object of a wealth of affection rooted in simple respect for her genuine and wholesome qualities. And it was among women that this regard was most freely and most strongly expressed. The Cadet Corps in the Public Schools commanded Earl Grey's special interest. He concerned himself with various Canadian sports and braved inevitable criticism in order to give his patronage to the Woodbine Race meeting at

Toronto. It was said, indeed, that he was the most loyal Canadian in Canada and had at least as much knowledge as any Canadian of its soil, climate, industries, resources and people. This was the secret of his popularity. Imperialist though he was, he understood alike the most cherished aspirations and the dearest prejudices of the Canadian people and strove with no small success to harmonise national feeling with the sentiment of Imperial patriotism. If Canada was something to Earl Grey, he was much to Canada. The end came far too soon, but, as Matthew Arnold said of his friend,

—We retain
The memory of a man unspoiled.

Canada. January, 1918.

AUSTRALIA

I. THE GREAT STRIKE

THE last Australian article included a short account I of the great strike which commenced in Sydney on August 2, 1917. As it was still proceeding at the time of writing, any attempt at a complete analysis of its causes and implications had to be deferred. The course of events may be briefly recalled in order to make clearer what follows. The strike began with the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and other ironworkers in the Government tramway and railway workshops in Sydney, ostensibly through the introduction by the Railway Commissioners of a card system of recording processes of work with a view to reducing them to terms of cost. Negotiations were brought to an abrupt end by a 24-hours' "ultimatum" from the men. A few days later the majority of the men in the railway and tramway departments came out, and during the next fortnight one union after another declared a sympathy strike, until most of the important industries were practically at a standstill. Railwaymen, wharf labourers, coal miners, seamen and firemen, gas workers, slaughtermen and butchers, and many minor unions entirely ceased work, while practically all others refused to handle goods declared "black," as having been previously handled by non-union labour or as being destined for Government use. Even transports and other war services came under the ban. Another evidence of the disturbed

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conditions was the large daily procession of strikers through the city. The public were greatly inconvenienced by very severe restriction of all services and supplies. The stoppage of industries with an inter-State sphere of action, together with existing unrest throughout the Commonwealth and the extension of the "black" doctrine, caused the strike to spread to all States. The Federal authorities, however, left the State Governments unfettered to grapple with the situation.

The Government of New South Wales showed great firmness and capacity in dealing with the strike during the ten weeks of its duration. The men demanded the withdrawal of the card system before resumption of work and immediate inquiry into all their grievances. The Government insisted upon an immediate return to work, promising that after three months an inquiry into the working of the card system would be held, and that if the report were unfavourable it would be abandoned. This being rejected, they treated the strike as an organised rebellion, both in its defiance of constitutional authority and its callous neglect of the pressing needs of war-time. A Volunteer Service bureau was set up in Sydney, at which were enrolled several thousands of men, mainly from the country districts, who were provided with camping grounds in various parts of the city. These volunteers, with the aid of the faithful remnant of the employees, maintained a limited and gradually improving railway and tramway service. Other industries in more or less degree were provided for. Even a limited coal supply was furnished by the efforts of amateur coal miners, Parliament having passed an emergency Act permitting the use of such labour. This prompt and determined action, supported by exceedingly strong public feeling and increasing distress among the families of the workers, forced the Unions Defence Committee to accept the Government's terms. The original strikers returned to work, and after some further negotiation the miners, wharf labourers, and

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finally the seamen also resumed. But when volunteers desired to remain in the work they had undertaken they were kept on, and consequently many of the strikers found

themselves still out of their job.

The Government and the general public look upon the grievance against the card system as a mere excuse, covering a deliberate attempt on the part of the Labour leaders to bring about an industrial defeat of a Government over which they had failed to gain a victory at the polls. It is held that the industrial and political leaders of the Labour movement had long been awaiting an opportunity for an upheaval, and that this petty dispute seemed to them to provide the convenient occasion. It is very difficult to determine exactly the part played by the card system. The Government, like employers generally, were convinced of the existence of a policy of "slowing down" systematically pursued by the men, as well as of a good deal of loafing, and were determined to check it. To the rank and file, on the other hand, the card system appeared not the means for checking "slowing down," but a step towards the general introduction by employers of a pernicious system of "speeding up," facilitated by the presence of war conditions. Ignorant and exaggerated talk about the introduction of Taylorism from America, through the card system as a first instalment, was widely believed, though the Labour Press and many of the leaders must have known perfectly well that similar card systems were already in use in many industries in Australia and elsewhere without injury to the workers. There is, however, little doubt that psychological conditions were favourable to the reception of suspicion by the men. The attitude of the workers towards the social system leads them to attach to particular measures of the employers a significance which is out of all proportion to their actual content if they are considered by themselves. It must be confessed that some of the hostility to the card system was caused by frequent references on the part of the Railway Com-

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missioners to the excellences of railway administration in America; and there were complaints concerning the management of the men in the workshops. The existence of alarms and even of grievances may, however, have furnished the occasion rather than the cause of the strike. Undoubtedly some of the leaders of the men were spoiling for a fight. They believed they could wipe out their political defeat by industrial action through a strike. Yet it seems to be certain that the Unions Defence Committee did not wish the strike to spread indefinitely, and it was due to weak rather than over-bold leadership that the area of dispute was so greatly extended. There were contradictory indications. In some cases strikes were called by leaders without a ballot in defiance of union rules. On the other hand, the general body of railwaymen, the wharf labourers, and the slaughtermen came out against the advice of the Committee. The spread of the strike was due, in fact, much more to the industrial and political solidarity of the rank and file than to energetic leadership. Only a few unions, like the Millers' and the Painters', refused to come out, and even they made levies on behalf of the strikers. To what extent defective or unscrupulous leadership is responsible for this upheaval demands further discussion.

So far as the strike is traceable to the condition of labour organisation and the state of mind of the workers the situation of Australian politics must be held largely responsible. The workers and their leaders were genuinely surprised at their defeat in the New South Wales election, and this was speedily followed by defeat at the Commonwealth election. They themselves estimate that at least 25 per cent. of the Unionists voted for the newly formed National Party led by Messrs. Holman and Hughes, who had been recently expelled from the Labour Party for supporting Conscription. This political motive of the strike was frankly confessed by some of the leaders in New South Wales. It also influenced, in varying degrees, the

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minds of the most class conscious of the rank and file. Desire for revenge and recovery of power in the community was accompanied by an over-weening confidence in the minds of industrial extremists due to their belief in industrial as against political action and to finding themselves in control of the unions in place of the "political" leaders whom they had expelled. They found ready material in the irritated and suspicious minds of the Trade Unionists. At the same time, it is very easy to exaggerate the extent to which deliberate policy and systematic preparation were responsible for the strike. One fact that points to the conclusion that there was very little deliberate preparation is the exposure of the inefficiency of the leaders in the management of the strike. There were various factors in the situation unfavourable to such an enterprise. The volume of employment tended to shrink. Owing to the lack of shipping, large stocks of wool, wheat and meat had accumulated. Increased cost and scarcity of materials was affecting every industry. The financial position of the unions was very weak, owing to unemployment, loss of members, expenditure on the anti-Conscription campaign. The time of year was favourable for drawing workers from the country. The correct conclusion seems to be that the workers were quite ready for a strike, as were the leaders also, but nobody had thought out any plan of organisation; all trusted to solidarity, and for the rest the movement was allowed to progress by its own momentum. Evidence of the lack of control by the leaders is furnished by the contradictory applications of the "black" doctrine. Some ridiculous incidents occurred, the same commodity often changing from "black" to "white," and vice versa, several times in its precarious journey.

Another aggravation of the conditions which led to the strike was the award by Mr. Justice Edmunds, twelve months ago, under emergency legislation, of the demands of the coalminers after a big strike. It is widely felt that

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such an easy surrender gave the men an exaggerated sense of power, which largely accounts for the abounding confidence with which they entered upon the struggle. Another contributing cause was the rise in the cost of living, resulting, of course, in increased stringency in working-class homes. Moreover, the knowledge that while prices were high foodstuffs in abundance were available in Australia and large quantities of wheat had been destroyed by plagues of mice was a source of grave irritation amongst the workers. The fact that all the stores were under contract to the Imperial Government was no satisfaction to the less thoughtful. Whether enemy influence was stimulating trouble cannot be said with certainty. The increase in strikes in essential industries has certainly had a most serious effect upon Australia's share in the conduct of the war. Enemy agents could, of course, do effective propaganda without the workers being conscious of their presence. At the same time, it is regrettable that allegations of disloyalty and susceptibility to German bribery were brought against the strikers without qualification. No doubt a small percentage of them were actually disloyal. But it is just as certain that the vast majority, though careless and wanting in a sense of responsibility regarding the war, were quite innocent of any disloyalty or corruption. At the Commonwealth elections the combination of Liberals and of Labour men following Mr. Hughes adopted the term "Nationalist" for their designation, and came to be known as the "Win-the-War Party" among their supporters. The assumption of this title by one party, with its obvious implication, was in itself a source of irritation, though the Labour Press subsequently found some satisfaction in applying it derisively to the Ministry and its supporters. But the frequent claims to a monopoly of loyalty tended, naturally and most unfortunately, to give to professions of loyalty some party colour and to provoke counter professions. This tendency was aggravated intensely by the strike, the

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constant reference to the volunteers as loyalists and to the strikers as rebels and disloyalists being a gravely irritating factor in the situation. While any division of the political parties by such titles as Win-the-War and Pacifist respectively is false and misleading, it is true that to the present Labour Party naturally gravitate all the elements of disloyalty and pacifism, and the whole Party is lamentably wanting in a realisation of the injury done to the cause of the Allies by their irresponsible stoppages of industry. On the other hand, the public and the employers are far too apt to be impatient of all industrial unrest in war time, whatever the cause. There are two sides to the wage bargain. The worker's legitimate grievances must not be neglected. The employer does not need to strike to secure his redress. On the other hand, Australian institutions offer peculiar facilities for the investigation of grievances, and it is difficult to find any excuse for the men's deliberate breach of agreements entered into in the Arbitration Courts, or the thoughtless neglect of the higher interests of the country and humanity which such action implies.

In the system of Industrial Arbitration the conflict and overlapping of Commonwealth and State awards has been the cause of a great deal of unrest for some years. The ill-defined spheres of the two jurisdictions have made inevitable a great number of inequalities in the awards. Such conditions inevitably encourage strikes, as the workers in a particular trade find it extremely galling to be earning less under one award, while their fellow-workers are much more favourably situated under another award. The tendency of the Commonwealth Court to give higher awards than State Courts has caused a multiplication of industrial disputes, inter-State in scope, so as to provide the technical condition under which the workers may secure an adjudication by the Commonwealth Court. Further, many people contend that it is the general tendency of Industrial Courts to unsettle the mind of

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the worker by offering him a constant inducement to agitate for increases in wages. War-time conditions have, of course, aggravated this general tendency to unrest.

The Australian Labour movement suffers from a very inferior newspaper Press. The tone and outlook of its principal periodicals are intensely prejudiced, while their actual misrepresentations in making out a case exceed those familiar enough in party journalism. The Labour Press generally wielded but little influence before the Conscription Referendum. With that came its opportunity, and it used it very successfully. The same bitter and aggressive spirit which marked its conduct of that campaign is still at work fomenting all causes of industrial unrest and political agitation. It seldom contains any articles marked by deep thought or of an educational character. It is devoted almost exclusively to operating upon the minds of the workers as an irritant, so as to intensify bitter class consciousness. The tone of its personal allusions is generally vindictive.

Another serious disadvantage of the working class is that all their important decisions and movements are conditioned by a state of mind which suffers from all the defects of mass action. Whereas all groups and associations in other ranks of society enjoy a better education and more opportunities for deliberation, and therefore are much more likely to arrive at well-considered decisions, the workers are practically always exposed to the ignorance, prejudice and hastiness of crowd psychology. In ordinary times they suffer from the apathy of the mass, and in times of excitement from its irresponsibility and fanaticism, Thus the organised workers are generally at the mercy of

the agitator and the junta.

Though the immediate causes of the outbreak reveal much that is fundamental to the analysis of industrial and political conditions in Australia, there are still more important factors of a general character, an understanding of which is essential to the student of Australian sociology.

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In a previous article in The ROUND TABLE (December 1916, p. 165) occurs this passage:

The continued existence and violence of industrial disputes has proved puzzling to many observers, even when resident in the Commonwealth. They point to the evident fact that the conditions of labour, including wages, are far more favourable to the worker in Australia than to his fellows in any other part of the world. The standard of comfort is admittedly high, the power of Unionism very great, all of which advantages are enhanced by excellent climatic conditions. Why, then, it is asked, should the workers be unsatisfied?

It was further pointed out that periods of prosperity and power are more marked by unrest than periods of stringency and unemployment. The Australian workers have enjoyed a long period of political power. The lavish expenditure of public money by Labour Governments, the want of understanding of large interests and public policies and of social responsibility, natural in the circumstances of their class, have caused a feeling amongst the workers that government is easy, and that the most sweeping changes can be effected with little thought. To these causes also may be attributed that excessive belief in equality common to advanced democracies. The Australian worker is as firm in his belief that the social millennium is easy of accomplishment as in his belief in his own worth and in his right to the economic benefits enjoyed by the more fortunate or more able of his fellow-citizens.

This also accounts in part for the intense class hostility which so keen an observer as Lord Bryce remarked as being possibly more acute in Australia than in any other place in the world. Comparatively good conditions have not prevented the Labour movement from adopting the Marxian theory of the class war. There is within the movement a large and growing minority of irreconcilables whose influence has recently increased to an extraordinary degree. Large quantities of syndicalist literature have been imported from America. A well-known trade

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union secretary sent to America some time ago for literature. He received a ton of I.W.W. pamphlets, and declares that they completely destroyed his authority with his union. The war has greatly increased the influence of this revolutionary school of thought, for it provides numerous apparent proofs of the truth of the doctrine of the class war. The trial and conviction of twelve members of the I.W.W. in Sydney for sedition and arson aroused a remarkable degree of sympathy amongst unionists entirely opposed to the methods of the I.W.W.; it was enough for them that "these men suffered for their class," a significant indication of the strength of the idea of class solidarity. It is not enough to say that there is no room for the philosophy of violence in a country like Australia, where the worker enjoys good conditions and frequently holds the reins of government. His more fortunate situation whets his appetite, without providing him with the new social system on which he believes. What the ordinary member of the middle class fails to understand is that the doctrine of the class war is sufficiently close to the facts of modern industrialism to offer a plausible explanation of all its abuses in one simple generalisation capitalism. The Australian worker's class consciousness is deep enough to lead him to see the force of the Marxian call to world-wide labour solidarity. Certainly it is grotesque for the imported revolutionary to preach the same jehad in Australia as in America or England; but once the worker has become fully class conscious nothing is easier than to persuade him that the capitalist system is the same all the world over, and that in spite of all the boasted reforms of Australia he is still a wage-slave; there are degrees of slavery, but it is slavery still. Thus Marxianism appeals to the ordinary worker through its simple theory of exploitation, and to the more intellectual through its internationalism and its abstract economic reasoning. It is curious that this growth of a class-consciousness, based on internationalism, exists together with an extraordinary ignorance

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of the world outside Australia. And yet the one assists the other. In Australia there are few of those many influences which modify extremes and exaggerations of opinion in England. There is no cultured and leisured contribution to the stream of thought and art. There is no complex system of civilisation to give variety and distraction to our society. Issues are too clear cut. The position and outlook of Australia are exceedingly insular and her domestic life very parochial. Everybody's material interests are so obviously involved with those of everybody else; we live too close together. Again, there is no recognition of such striking distinctions between the ability of the best intellects and that of the average worker to give pause to the assumption of equality. Especially is this true in the political sphere, where the continued lack of men of great distinction is remarkable in all parties. The Labour Party has suffered in particular by the fact that the split took away its ablest men in State and Federal politics and among the leaders of official Labour to-day in Australia there are none who can approach in capacity of mind and force of personality the leaders of the British Labour Party. Further, the Australian worker has an even narrower conception of the State than the average Marxian. Not only is his outlook narrowly industrial, but he uses political action as merely another form of industrial action. He neither knows nor cares that politics is wider than economics. It is to him but one part of the great fight against capitalism. If high ability coupled with the statesman's breadth of view is absent from Labour counsels, there has grown up in the last few years a chicane that will seize every tactical advantage and opportunity in a way that the most astute politician of the old parties might envy. This tendency has been fostered by the arbitration system, which turns Union officials and men into special pleaders, keenly on the look-out for the smallest chance to make a point in their favour.

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The social and economic theory of the Australian Liberal has all the defects of a commercial and individualist tradition. His natural tendency to repudiate responsibility for the condition of life of the workers has been intensified rather than mitigated by the paternal intervention of the State on the worker's behalf. If the employer admits generally the right of the worker to good conditions, he so frequently opposes any particular efforts to maintain or better those conditions as to induce the belief that he still regards the worker merely as an item in the cost of production and not as a citizen exercising his social function. The striker is a rebel, to be dealt with by the strong hand. Of the worker's psychology the majority of employers know practically nothing. Such employers fail entirely to understand that the most deep-seated cause of industrial unrest throughout the world is the feeling of the worker that his personality has no opportunity in the present industrial system of expressing itself, and his self-respect is deeply injured by his being treated as an inanimate tool. This feeling is even stronger than the sense of economic insecurity. Though such insecurity is by no means so prevalent in Australia as elsewhere, it is within the experience of practically all Australian workers. But far more powerful is the determination of the worker to be satisfied with nothing less than a full human share in the control of industry as in the control of government, and the growing belief that this will not be realised without fundamental social changes—a belief that is greatly reinforced by the worker's exaggerated interpretation of equality. Always opposed to profit-making in any form, he is able to point to the increased prosperity of many capitalists as a direct result of the war. Though he generalises with gross unfairness over the whole field of capitalist enterprise, it is not surprising that he exhibits intense impatience when talk of loyalty and sacrifice differentiates against his class, which has suffered like others in the war. A further aggravation

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of class division during the war is due to resentment in Labour circles at the number of prosecutions of workers for industrial offences in the last few months, which to them have a decided colouring of political bias. Under the Unlawful Associations Act, many members of the I.W.W. have been imprisoned for six months; three of the strike leaders were prosecuted for conspiracy, though they were not convicted owing to a disagreement of the jury. However divided may be the rank and file upon economic doctrine, they are absolutely at one in regarding these cases as demonstrations of class bias. Furthermore, the use of the censorship to examine the correspondence of the Trades Hall during the strike greatly increased the belief in a political

and capitalist conspiracy against Unionism.

Australian Governments are alive to some of the dangers exposed by recent events. At the moment of writing a Conference is being held of representatives of the various States and the Commonwealth for the purpose of dealing with the overlapping of industrial awards. Another measure of amelioration foreshadowed by the Government of New South Wales is a scheme of Unemployment Insurance. It is unlikely, however, that for reasons already indicated, any mere improvement in governmental machinery or in wages and conditions is likely to go to the root of the industrial trouble. Even the system of industrial arbitration, though its potentialities are by no means exhausted, tends to stereotype the cleavage between employers and workers. The workers are certain to go on organising towards the One Big Union. The employers show an equal propensity towards closer union. Many employers have suffered so grievously in recent years from the operations of the Unions that there may be some temptation in the recent success over the workers to use the occasion for breaking the power of Unionism. But there could be no greater curse to Australia than any such deliberate fomentation of the already bitter antagonism between the two sides. There could be no other result

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than a large increase of I.W.W. influence, to be followed by something in the nature of a social revolution. The prevailing narrowness of outlook and want of social responsibility can be reformed, partly by such movements as the Workers' Educational Association, but chiefly by means designed to carry the worker through his apprenticeship in playing his part in the control of industry. There are so many State enterprises in Australia that the Governments are offered an excellent opportunity for experimenting with some of the measures proposed by the Reconstruction Committee appointed by the Prime Minister in England. It would be comparatively easy to draw the workers into a share of the control of the purely Labour side of Government enterprises, delaying their introduction to any purely business aspect of industry until such an extension should be proved to be safe and practicable. It might be possible also to base upon the Arbitration Courts a similar system of co-operation between employers, workers, and the State for the management of industry. The greatest barrier to any such constructive scheme as that of industrial parliaments outlined in the Whitley Report is the hostility between the two classes. But unless some positive effort is to be made to set up a workable scheme of co-operation more extensive than the experiments hitherto made the outlook for Australia is dark indeed. Some words written in The ROUND TABLE of June, 1916, are even more true of the Australian than of the English worker:

The unrest in the industrial world to-day has not its roots solely in poverty and want. There is something deeper still at work. The wage-earners are filled with a vague but profound sentiment that the industrial system, as it is now, denies to them the liberties, opportunities and responsibilities of free men.

The problem of industry is to satisfy the demands of human liberty, while inculcating the spirit of true social discipline.

The Reinforcements Referendum

II. THE REINFORCEMENTS REFERENDUM

N December 20 a vote will be taken by Executive Act under the War Precautions Act, 1914–1916, to obtain the answer of the men and women of Australia to the following question: "Are you in favour of the proposal of the Commonwealth Government for reinforcing the A.I.F. oversea?" The proposal is set forth in a Proclamation of November 16, and the gist of it is that voluntary enlistment is to continue, but that to the extent to which this fails in any month to supply 7,000 men, or such less number as may be actually required, compulsory reinforcements are to be called up by ballot from among single men between the ages of 20 and 44 years. As on the last occasion the vote will have no legal effect, but will give an expression of opinion which will justify the Government, in the event of an affirmative answer, in passing the necessary legislation.

In order to give a clear idea of the position it is necessary to review very briefly what has happened since the Conscription Referendum on October 28, 1916. The vote on that day-"Yes" 1,087,557, "No" 1,160,033; majority against conscription 72,476—was disheartening. Those who believed that it was the plain duty and interest of Australia to assist the Empire to the utmost in the prosecution of the war felt that in the face of the adverse decision of the people the only practical course was to make greater efforts to secure the necessary men by voluntary recruiting, though they had a more than uneasy feeling that this method would be inadequate. The National Government, which was formed by a coalition of the Liberals under Mr. Cook with Mr. Hughes and the minority of his former Labour supporters, went to the country on a "win-the-war" policy, and was returned to office on May 5 last, with a strong majority in both the Senate and

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the House of Representatives, but the size of this majority was possibly due, in some measure at least, to the abandonment of conscription. The Government gave a definite pledge in the following terms:

The Government will not enforce or attempt to enforce conscription, either by regulation or statute, during the life of the forthcoming Parliament. If, however, national safety demands it, the question will again be referred to the people. That is the policy of the Government on this question.

On a later occasion the words used were:

We shall put it only if the tide of battle, which now flows strongly for the Allies, turns against them; in that case we shall put it before the people.

At the same time the Government owed the bulk of its support to an undertaking that, subject to its pledge, it would subordinate every other interest to the war. In the circumstances there was a general feeling among its supporters that the Government was entitled to a reasonable time in which to fulfil its "win-the-war" promises. Those who believed in conscription loyally assisted the Government in a further and more systematic attempt to obtain volunteers, while many of those who during the Referendum Campaign professed their faith in voluntary recruiting remained coldly and unmistakably aloof.

With the Russian débâcle many individuals, and notably Sir William Irvine, who had refused to be a party to the Government's pledge, thought that the conditions indicated in the pledge had arisen, and that the end of the period during which the Government might claim to be testing the possibilities of the voluntary system was already in sight. There was a good deal of private discussion, in several at least of the States, by groups of men who thought that the need for conscription was daily becoming more

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obvious. These groups were composed of men who had no close association with politics or political parties, and were in fact rather distrustful of politicians in general. They realised something of the gravity of the European situation, and were anxious to stir public feeling in such a way that the politicians would be bound to reopen the question of conscription. In New South Wales, which was responsible for the "No" majority, a movement for a petition to the Government to submit the question to another referendum was started, but practically the whole of the New South Wales conscriptionists were strongly of opinion that the proper course was to have a dissolution of the House of Representatives and a general election in which the Government would ask the electors for a release from the pledge. Sir William Irvine, who had already spoken in Victoria on the necessity for conscription, came to New South Wales on the invitation of the Committee which was launching the petition, with the idea, no doubt, of helping the movement for conscription, but without any intention of advocating a referendum as the right solution of the difficulty in which the Government had been placed by its pledge. A few days before he spoke in Sydney the disaster in Italy had become known, and had aroused people to a sense of the real gravity of the situation. Sir William Irvine's speeches at Sydney and Brisbane at once evoked widespread and strong approval. At Brisbane he crystallised the position by asking whether it was too much to ask members of Parliament to risk their seats when our soldiers were risking their lives. It was becoming plainer every day that the conscriptionists wanted a prompt and courageous decision. On October 31 Senator Pearce, Minister for Defence, had expressed a wish that the large meeting, which he was then addressing in the Sydney Town Hall, might have been postponed for a fortnight, because in a fortnight's time the Federal Cabinet, with a full knowledge of the recruiting figures and of the requirements in the matter of reinforcements for those at the

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front, would have come to a decision as to its policy for the future. On November 7, at a hurriedly convened meeting of the Cabinet, it was decided to take a referendum. This decision was a profound disappointment to a very large number of people throughout the Commonwealth, but especially perhaps in New South Wales, where it was felt that the right course and the course most likely to be successful was an appeal to the people at a general election to choose between the National Government with conscription and the Opposition without conscription. Even after the announcement of the Government's decision to take a referendum efforts were made to induce the Government to declare for a dissolution. Failing this, the Government was strongly urged to stake its existence on the result of the referendum. Eventually, and apparently at the last moment, the Government made up its mind to say to the people, through Mr. Hughes at Bendigo on November 12, that it could not and would not attempt to govern without the powers for which By powers, of course, it meant an answer of the people that would tell the Government that its pledge against conscription was no longer binding, and so leave it free to give effect to its proposal to introduce conscription.

Why the Government did not decide in favour of a dissolution is not quite clear, but in a general way it might be said that the explanation is to be found in the history of political events in Australia since Mr. Hughes's return shortly before the last referendum. Probably some Government supporters in the House of Representatives felt that, though the Government might come back with a majority, there would be some casualties by the way, and that they ran a considerable risk of being included in the list. Even those whose seats were safe enough probably had no inclination to face an election so soon after the contest of May 5. Members of the Senate who had also given the pledge probably stressed the view that the pledge con-

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templated that the question of conscription should be submitted to the people by way of a referendum and not by way of a general election, and that, even if the Government were returned to power after a dissolution of the House of Representatives, that would not free the pledged Senators.

While it seems impossible to contend that the Government has taken the best course, it is a matter for consideraable satisfaction that it has taken the next best course by staking its existence on the result of the referendum. That decision was at least some evidence that the Government was sincere in its undertaking to subordinate party interests to the war and that it was genuinely convinced of the necessity for conscription. The increased gravity of the military situation, the clearly demonstrated inadequacy of voluntary enlistment, the limited character of the Government's proposal, the definite exemption of rural and other essential industries, the elimination of the German vote and the decision of the Government not to remain in office if its proposal is rejected make the prospect of success better than on the last referendum. The present campaign, however, has to contend with a bitterer and more vigorous opposition from the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne (Dr. Mannix), though many leading Catholics have publicly and emphatically dissociated themselves with his sentiments and have strongly deprecated his effort to apply Sinn Feinism to Australian conditions and his doctrine of "Australia first-the Empire second." An unfortunate conflict has also arisen between the Commonwealth and the State of Queensland with respect to the publication of anti-conscription matter in the Queensland Hansard, but with the information at present available it is impossible to offer any definite opinion as to the merits of this conflict or as to its effect upon the referendum, though it may not improbably have a most serious influence. Any discussion of this, however, must be left to a later article. Persons of enemy origin,

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probably exceeding 100,000, will not be entitled to vote on this occasion.

Australia. December, 1917.

Postcript.—The result of the referendum was as follows:

"Yes" .. 1,013,361 "No" .. 1,173,256 "No" majority .. 159,895

SOUTH AFRICA

Albert, Earl Grey, and Leander Starr Jameson.

THEIR WORK IN RHODESIA.

EATH has within the last few months robbed the Empire of two of its most splendid and striking personalities. Both men did the State great service in great positions. The life of each in its different way has been an inspiration to all to whom the idea of the British Empire conveys no vulgar notion of mere aggrandisement, but a call to strenuous and self-sacrificing labour for mankind. The two men were close and lifelong friends; both spirits were finely touched to the fine issues of their lives by the genius of Rhodes; and though both men strove and succeeded in a larger sphere, it was in Rhodesia that the real careers of both men began. It is above all in connection with Rhodesia that the work of Jameson in particular deserves to be held in everlasting remembrance.

Grey, who had previously been known as a popular and charming member of Parliament with a generous enthusiasm for projects of social reform, was travelling in Mashonaland when he succeeded to his earldom in 1894. He had been drawn there by the friendship he had formed with Rhodes in London, and had already, if unconsciously, been a benefactor to the country by directing to it the footsteps of his gallant cousin, George Grey, one of the noblest of Rhodesian pioneers.

At the end of 1895 came the great catastrophe in Rhodes's career when the fiasco of the Jameson Raid appeared to

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have overthrown him irretrievably and had cast all the affairs of the young territory of Rhodesia into confusion. Grey was appointed to be Administrator of Rhodesia in succession to Jameson, in February 1896, at a time of unexampled difficulty. Many of the settlers were impoverished and discontented. The rinderpest swept through the country, destroying the cattle in which all the wealth of the natives consisted. The Chartered Company's forces were depleted and the Matebele rose in revolt in March. The crisis was so serious that no man of less calibre than Rhodes himself could have controlled it, and it was by the personal ascendancy of Rhodes over his fellow-men, white and black, of Rhodes at the very ebb of his fortunes and politically ruined as he appeared to be, that the native rising was settled rather than suppressed, and the situation saved. Had Grey been other than he was, his official position as Administrator might well have made his relations with Rhodes impossible, but Grey's generous nature was marred by no taint of self-seeking, of jealousy or meanness. He was a brave and adventurous man; his personality was one of the most vivid in the world, but it never craved the limelight. He possessed, indeed, to an extraordinary degree the true Christian virtue of humility and the genius for friendship, and his letters at this time are full of his admiration for the great achievement of his friend.

For the rest his kindly accessibility and ready sympathy endeared him to all sorts and conditions of men. He threw himself with all the keen uncritical enthusiasm that was characteristic of him into schemes for the advancement of the native population; and when he retired from his post in 1897 he carried with him universal affection and an experience of administrative problems that must have stood him in good stead in the higher offices which he was afterwards called upon to fill. On his return to England he joined the Board of the Chartered Company, and though he resigned his seat upon it when he went to

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Canada as Governor General in 1904, his love for Rhodesia and the keenness of his interest in its affairs never failed to the day of his death. He had been along with Jameson appointed to be one of the Trustees under Rhodes's famous Will, and his connection with Rhodesia was happily renewed towards the end of his life when he went out again to South Africa in 1912 to dedicate the noble memorial to Rhodes on the slopes of Table Mountain.

To attempt to do justice to Jameson's work in Rhodesia is an impossible task. A mere catalogue of his work in and for the territory would fill a volume. To convey to men who did not know him any idea of his indomitable spirit and amazing courage would tax the powers of a great historian or a great poet. He has been described as the follower of Rhodes, and truly, since it was from Rhodes that his inspiration was drawn, and he himself spoke of Rhodes as the "master mind." Yet the follower may well have been the equal of the leader; indeed as between the two men it is somewhat idle to speculate whether either was before or after the other, for each was alike indispensable for the work which as partners they had to do. But for Rhodes's foresight and imagination, but for his persuasive power over others, his schemes for securing for the British Empire the great territories lying to the north of the Transvaal would never have taken practical shape; and the outbreak of war in August, 1914, would have revealed as an instant menace the peril which General Smuts's recent speeches have pointed out of a great continuous belt of German-African territory, from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, with a vast native population armed, drilled and trained under German leaders for aggression and conquest. Yet if the creative brain was Rhodes's, the hand and the sword were Jameson's, and but for Jameson's splendid audacity, his boundless energy and tenacity of purpose, and his irresistible personal charm, Rhodes's schemes could not have been translated into action.

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The years of Jameson's life from 1888 to 1896 are filled with a whole series of Odysseys of adventure, of high endeavour and great achievement. The series ends in gloom and disaster, but the unconquerable mind of the man, fortified with a new patience born of adversity, rises superior to all the blows of fortune; and for fifteen years after the death of Rhodes the record of his life is one of strenuous and successful service of the State in the spheres of politics and administration, ending happily amid the cordial admiration of his countrymen alike in England and in South Africa.

It was in 1888 that Lobengula, the paramount chief of the Matabele, ruling over the whole country now known as Southern Rhodesia, granted the original concession over the minerals in his territory which was the basis of the formation of the Chartered Company; but to grant the concession was one thing, to allow the concessionaires to avail themselves of it in the face of the opposition of indunas and warriors fiercely jealous of the advent of the white man was another. Between October 1888 and May 1890 Jameson, throwing up without a thought his lucrative medical practice at Kimberley, made no less than three perilous journeys as Rhodes's emissary to Lobengula's kraal at Bulawayo with the object of inducing him to allow the pioneer column to enter the eastern portion of the chief's territory, known as Mashonaland. His courage and charm succeeded in the face of every danger and every obstacle, and in 1890 he accompanied the pioneer column on their hazardous but, as it turned out, unmolested march from Macloutsie, on the borders of Matabeleland, to Salisbury, now the capital of Southern Rhodesia. Arrived in Mashonaland, Jameson set himself to find a road of communication, through country then wholly unexplored, with the port of Beira; and no sooner was this adventure accomplished than he started off on another with the object, successfully achieved, of obtaining a mineral concession from a chief named Gungunhana, in the wilds of Portu-

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Albert, Earl Grey, and Leander Starr Jameson guese East Africa. This last adventure led to Jameson being taken by the Portuguese to Delagoa Bay under arrest; and both adventures involved a degree of physical hardship and suffering hardly to be imagined in these days when, thanks to Jameson and the pioneers, a man may travel to Beira in all the luxury of a railway sleeping saloon. Jameson, whose camp on one occasion had been burnt through an accident, had had to row nearly a hundred miles half naked on a tropical river; he had been alternately scorched by the sun and soaked by the rain; he had been starved and shaken through and through with fever; his health had been permanently injured, but not his gaiety or his spirit. He returned cheerful, kindly, and uncomplaining to all the difficulties of administration in a territory which lacked every resource of civilisation, where the little band of pioneers were growing discontented and dispirited under their hardships, but where nevertheless his first duty was ruthlessly to cut down expenditure. No man with a personality less magnetic than "the Doctor's," whose very vituperation (freely enough dispensed) was felt by its victims as a kind of endearment, could have carried such a burden. But another and yet

The juxtaposition of what was in process of becoming a settled white community with the armed and organized savagery of the Matabele was not permanently possible; and in 1893 sundry outrages committed by them on Mashona servants of the white men at Fort Victoria convinced Jameson that the military power of the Matabele must be broken. In October a Matabele attack on a patrol of Bechuanaland Border Police (an Imperial force) brought matters to a head, and Jameson with some 700 European volunteers and police, under the military command of Major Forbes, started out to attack the legions of Lobengula. For the hundredth time he dared and achieved the impossible. The Matabele were twice beaten at the Bambesi and Shangani rivers. Lobengula evacuated his

greater adventure awaited him.

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head kraal at Bulawayo and fled away to die in the bush; and with the completion of the conquest of Matabeleland the new state of Rhodesia was established on foundations which none of the storms that have since swept South Africa have been strong enough to shake.

Jameson seemed now at the zenith of a brilliant career. To the adventurous spirit of a Cortes and the prowess of a paladin he had shown that he joined the skill of a successful civil administrator; and cordially as he detested all pomps and flatteries he could not wholly escape these public tributes of admiration which his countrymen crowded round him to bestow.

And then, as it were in a moment, his whole career lay in ruins, and he became an outlaw, a prisoner and a convict. The story of the events of the Raid has been told many times, and this is not the place to tell it again. That it was a blunder and a wrong no man insisted more sternly than Jameson himself. That it required the fullest expiation no man realised half so clearly as he who schooled himself to pay it in such abundant measure. That he was impelled by no mean or sordid motive, and that his conduct throughout was marred by not an instant's failure of courage or personal dignity, requires no demonstration now. He erred greatly, failed and fell; but when a man's whole life has been an example of obedience to Danton's maxim,

"De l'audace, et encore de l'audace, toujours de l'audace,"

posterity may well pardon him, as his contemporaries have done, if one stroke of audacity failed and if his consummate self-confidence once led him into transgression.

Released from prison in 1897, broken in health but not in spirit, he was back again in South Africa in the days of the war in 1899. Nearly dead from enteric fever in Ladysmith, he recovered slowly at Groote Schuur, Rhodes's house at Cape Town, and set himself, by patient political service, to make amends for the past. Men's minds were

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aflame with the passions let loose by the South African War, and the Dutch, not quite unnaturally, looked upon him as the incarnation of all that they hated. Obloquy was showered upon him, but he sat silent, and in 1902 he suffered the heaviest blow of all when Rhodes's death parted him from his lifelong friend and left him to stand alone. In that year he broke his long silence in the Cape Parliament, and, almost as it were at a bound, found himself at the head of the British party. In 1904 he stood in the House as Prime Minister, an astonishing example of how a man's unconquerable spirit may meet and recover from overwhelming disaster. During his tenure of office his ready sympathies, his gay wit and personal charm, which had to be felt to be believed, softened the fiercest animosities; and one of the greatest of his services to South Africa and the Empire was rendered in the part he played in bringing about the South African Union.

It fell to him to address to Lord Selborne as High Commissioner the invitation that he should review the then existing situation in his now celebrated Memorandum from which the Union Movement may be said to have taken its formal start. He was out of office before the Union Convention met at Durban in October, 1908, but the part which he played at that Convention, as leader of the Opposition in the Cape Parliament, was none the less vital on that account. The whole force of his personality and of his influence was directed towards accommodation and compromise between conflicting views and to the allaying of racial antagonisms. He showed, as he had done throughout his parliamentary career at the Cape, the friendliest sympathy with all the reasonable aspirations and a kindly understanding even of the prejudices of the Dutch South Africans; and by common consent he shares with General Botha the chief credit for the happy issue of the Convention's labours. His policy of a Government for the new Union composed of all the "best men," irrespective of race or party, unhappily

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failed of adoption; but he continued nevertheless as leader of the Opposition from 1910 to 1912, when failing health compelled his return to England, to give to General Botha, with whom he had established relations of the most cordial intimacy, a generous support in all measures

for the common good of the country.

Jameson's parliamentary work at the Cape had necessarily separated him to a considerable extent from Rhodesia, and though he had been elected a director of the Chartered Company after the death of Rhodes, he was not able to pay more than an occasional visit to the territory. But after his return to England in 1912 Rhodesia once more claimed the greatest share of his energies. He was elected President of the Chartered Company in 1913 in succession to the late Duke of Abercorn. He threw into the work of the Company all his unexhausted vitality; he revisited the territory in the winter of 1913-14 and again in the winter of 1915-16, travelling from end to end of it, speaking to the settlers, and watching the growth of the young white state which he had done so much to found. In ill-health always, and often in acute physical pain, he continued to the very end to work tirelessly and cheeril for Rhodesia, and so his great career closes where it began in service to the ideals of his friend.

And to his friend he will return at the last, to lie by the side of Rhodes in the Matopos, with the granite hills to stand as sentinels round the grave of the last of the Elizabethans.

"Lofty designs must close in like effects:

Loftily lying,

Leave him—still loftier than the world suspects,

Living and dying."

London. February, 1918.

NEW ZEALAND

I. AFTER THREE YEARS OF WAR

N October 15, 1914, the First Expeditionary Force, numbering about 8,000 men, left the Dominion. Little then did anyone dream what was in store for the men who went with that force, for the people who sent them, or for the world at large. The great tragedy was only just beginning, and its magnitude was only dimly realised, and indeed it may be doubted if it is yet fully realised. We knew this, however, that a great crisis in our national life had arisen, that our liberties and our national existence were at stake, and that the time had arrived when we were to be put to the test as to whether we were deserving of the privileges we had enjoyed through long years of peace. It was a supreme challenge to our race to prove that it was worthy of its traditions. And no one can recall without a thrill of pride how eagerly the flower of our youth and our manhood responded. Without bargaining, without reservation, but rejoicing in their opportunity, they placed their services and their lives at the disposal of their country. We did not then even faintly conceive what these men were to achieve and to suffer. Gallipoli, with its deeds of glory and honour, with its long months of suspense for us and of trial for them, and its tragic failure, was in the unrevealed future. Nor could we foresee that after three years of war list after list of killed and wounded would still be spreading anguish and mourning throughout the land.

Though New Zealand has so far been spared the worst of the grim horrors that are experienced where the enemy is within striking distance, it has ample reason to realise the gravity of the struggle it is engaged in. Not only do the continued losses in the ranks, the gaps in families, and the increasing number of those returning maimed and sick combine to deepen the growing sense of its real meaning to us, but the question of ways and means in itself has become a matter for grave concern. The prospect of calling up before long the Second Division, comprising married men, with the consequent further dislocation of industry and disturbance of family relations and need for making greater provision for dependents, has made the financial aspect still more prominent. Yet with all there is no sign of weakening in determination to go through to the finish. The married men assert their willingness to join the ranks, and the country declares its readiness to shoulder the financial burden, and its resources still seem ample to meet the abnormal strain on its finances. The continued prosperity of the country is evidenced by the general style of living which so far shows no outward decline.

Patriotic workers, men and women, are still devoting themselves to maintaining the funds and supplies for Red Cross and kindred purposes, and there are many evidences that throughout the community there is a quickening of the sense of individual responsibility. Amongst the many associations and more or less organised efforts which have been called into being by the war the dominant note is voluntary service and devotion to the common purpose of national needs. With a view to furthering this end a new association has now been formed under the name of "The Empire Service League." Its general object is to endeavour to improve the relations between antagonistic classes by seeking to convince them that the common welfare demands sympathetic consideration of each other's needs and to persuade them that their own interests will

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be better advanced by working in harmony for the good of the community instead of wasting their resources and the resources of the community in strife. The League was established at Hastings in Hawke's Bay, and its keynote is indicated by the title of the pamphlet, "What Freedom Means," read by its author at the inaugural meeting. If the League realises any substantial part of

its objects its existence will be justified.

Apart from casualties, nothing else has brought the war really home to us so much as the decrease in the shipping facilities. Unless some adequate relief can be obtained we have to anticipate a considerable shortage in exports, and a consequent reduction in the national income. The Government has been held by many to be to blame for allowing the U.S.S. Company's service, which has been of such value to the country in the past, to pass into the hands of an outside company, in consequence of its amalgamation with the P. & O. Company. The entry of the two American Continents into the war may involve still further decrease of our shipping, owing to the deflection of available ships for the transport of troops across the Atlantic.

One illustration of the healthy financial condition of the country and of the readiness of the people to help in carrying on the war is afforded by the remarkable response to the appeal of the Government for a further War Loan. Last year £8,000,000 of a required loan of £16,000,000 was offered to the public, and it was regarded as doubtful whether any large portion of it would be subscribed. The amount subscribed was, however, £9,250,000, and it was considered a matter for gratification that such an amount could be obtained within the Dominion. This year the amount required to be raised was £24,000,000, and it was decided to raise the whole of it locally. f.12,000,000 was offered in September, to be followed by £12,000,000 in March. The term of the loan is 21 years, and the rate of interest offered the same as last year, 41 per cent. free of income tax. This exemption of income tax has been

strongly criticised in many quarters, but no doubt it had a material effect in getting the money, and it was on that ground the Ministry justified it. Sir Joseph Ward said that he must have the money, and that this was the only way to get it. There are some new features in connection with this loan; bonds can be applied in payment of death duties if specially taken up for the purpose, and the investor can at his option take up the loan in the form of inscribed stock. The success of this loan has been still more marked than that of last year, for within the time allowed for closing subscriptions it was over subscribed to the extent of £5,000,000, and further subscriptions have been coming in since the time expired.

In consequence of the expenditure for the current year being found to have been underestimated in the first instance, it has since proved necessary to increase the amount required to be raised, and a further loan of £4,000,000 has been decided on, making a total of

£28,000,000 for the current year.

II. THE SESSION

THE events of the session have shown that the principle of a National Government is still approved by Parliament and people. The Government throughout retained the solid support on all vital matters of the whole House. Some three or four members whose loquacity has been in inverse ratio to their numerical strength have shown consistent opposition to the Government on the chief features of its policy, but have been quite ineffective in influencing it. Nevertheless a considerable amount of restiveness was displayed at one part of the session by a section of the Liberal element in the coalition which maintains the national Government in power, and it is probable that the Government has suffered some loss of public support.

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The taxation proposals were, of course, a fertile source of dissatisfaction. The Government was charged with failure to deal with war "profiteers" by not re-enacting in some form the tax on excess profits, though it was generally agreed that the tax of last year had been properly repealed. Demands for some other form of taxation to secure excess profits were opposed by the Government on the ground of impracticability. The Government objected to an export tax because of the danger of discouraging production and raising prices still further to the home consumers. Another cause of dissatisfaction was an alleged want of candour in regard to reinforcements. Certain members strongly criticised the Government for withholding information as to the strength of the Expeditionary Force, the obligations entered into, and the actual requirements as to reinforcements. The Government defended itself on the ground of its inability to disclose confidential information received from the Imperial Government, and generally because military necessity forbade the publication of information which might be useful to the enemy.

The chief controversy of the session centred on allowances to dependents of soldiers. Substantial increases were demanded, and the Government was faced with a threatening prospect of disruption in the ranks of its supporters. The possibility even of a general election was freely discussed. Mr. Massey declared that, if a general election was desired, it could be held; but this challenge was not accepted.* A feature of the proceedings was the holding of three separate caucuses—one of the Conservative element, another of the Liberal, and the third a combined caucus or conference convened at the invitation of the Government at which financial and other statements were understood to have been made by the two leaders of the Ministry. The only other well-defined

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^{*}The present New Zealand House of Representatives was elected in December, 1914, and would expire through effluxion of time this year.

Party is the Labour Party, which consists of five or six members only. Exception was taken in the House to Government statements being made in this manner. One member, who evidently voiced the feeling of the dissentients, when taunted with not knowing the financial position as disclosed at the conference, emphatically declared that the proper place to make a financial statement was on the floor of the House. However, the object of the Government was attained, as fifty out of fifty-two members who attended did not thereafter question its reason for opposing further increase in expenditure, declaring that they were satisfied with the information which had been disclosed. The result of the Covernment.

When it had become apparent that they would eventually be called up, the men of the Second Division organised with a view to securing more adequate allowances for their families and dependents than were provided by the original scale. This organisation was mainly responsible for the demands made in the House for increased allowances. Under the scale proposed by the Government the estimated expenditure compared with the present rates for the ensuing twelve months for the next thirteen reinforcements were as follows:

	Present Rates.		New Rates.	Increase.	
Wives Children	••	£301,000 246,000	£826,000 318,000	£525,000 72,000	
Total		£547,000	£1,144,000	£597,000	

In addition to these, provision was made for new allowances for widowed mothers and for brothers and sisters up to sixteen years of age dependent on the soldier, which added to the above would increase the total estimate as follows:

Present Rates. £558,000	New Rates. £1,157,000	Increase.	
416	2,15/,000	2377,000	

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The allowances were computed on a basis of a standard minimum, the standard being not that of the well-to-do

but of the ordinary working man.

According to these rates a married soldier would get 35s. a week, his wife 21s., and his child 7s. Further than this the Government refused to go, although these proposals fell short of the demands of the Second Division League.

Much heated debate ensued; but, after the statements made to members at the combined conference, those members present who had pressed for further increase admitted that they were satisfied the Government had gone as far as it was warranted having regard to the obligations it had to meet and the condition of the country's finances.

In comparison with other countries affected by the war the rise in cost of living has not been relatively high in respect of necessary food supplies. The following comparison is taken from published official returns and shows the increase, between July 31, 1914, and July 31, 1917, in the retail prices of food, weighted according to the proportions consumed by the working classes: United Kingdom, 102%; Australia, 26%; New Zealand, 27%; Canada (June 30), 60%; Sweden (April 30), 75%; Italy (April 30), 64%; Vienna (May 31), 188%.

It will be seen from this that the people of New Zealand have, comparatively speaking, not much cause for complaint. But that they do not all realise this is evident from the many and loud expressions of dissatisfaction

from popular representatives and newspapers.

Money wages have risen since the outbreak of the war, and employment has been very good, but it is realised that the tendency to lower real wages will become stronger as the war proceeds and that every reasonable effort ought to be made to minimise the force of all factors operating to diminish the real income in the shape of goods and services enjoyed by the mass of the people. But the danger

of misguidance is very great when politicians seek to legislate upon economic problems in response to popular clamour.

It is a firmly rooted popular belief that it is in the power of the governing authorities to find an external remedy against increased cost of living, and the Government which fails to apply one promptly is apt to be regarded with suspicion and distrust. It is natural to suppose that when the price of commodities is going up someone is making an increased profit and that by dealing with the "profiteer" the matter will be remedied. It does not so readily occur to the popular mind that scarcity owing to increased difficulties of production may be an important factor in causing a rise in prices, and that the scarcity might be remedied at least in some degree by the exercise of personal economy of consumption and of other ways of saving. What appears most obvious is that it is a matter that the Government can and should remedy, and pressure is accordingly brought to bear on it with that object. The usual formula has been tried in New Zealand. The Government was appealed to and did what might be expected: it set up a Parliamentary Committee to enquire and report. Its report was duly presented to Parliament, but whether it will result in any material assistance in solving the problem remains to be seen. The report in its original form cannot be said to have thrown much light either on the origin or on the remedy of the trouble. It was rather a statement of the objects aimed at than of the means by which they are to be attained. It recommended the appointment of a food controller with "plenary" powers "to control and regulate the prices of tood supplies and any other necessaries of life." This, no doubt, would give him power to order an importer, for instance, to import at a certain limited price, but, if the importer could not or would not import at the price named, it was not made clear how the controller was next to proceed, whether by importing himself or conscripting

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others to do it. Amongst his other powers were to be included "powers to effectually prevent increase in prices where such proposed increase is not justified to his satisfaction."

In regard to retail prices the heroic remedy was suggested of Government purchasing at the ruling export prices and selling at such lower prices as the Controller should think fit, the loss to be paid out of the Consolidated Fund-in other words, buying food and distributing it gratis if need be. No solution was proposed of the problem which would arise when the Consolidated Fund was used up, nor was reference made to the vital difficulty of the uncertainty introduced into the estimates of the Minister of Finance. The Controller was also to eliminate the middleman, but how to do so was left for him to find out. Other remedies suggested were protection of the public from short weight and short measure (oblivious of existing efficient legislation), the encouragement of the formation of co-operative societies, Government trading, and the development of the fishing industry. The report also advocated the establishment of a State controlled co-operative line of steamships.

Neither the country nor the House showed any enthusiasm for these proposals. The newspapers were mostly satirical and certain members of the Ministry were emphatic in their criticisms. Referring to the shipping proposals the Minister of Finance laughed the idea to scorn, saying that the Government had no more chance of getting the shipping than of jumping over the moon. The report was referred back to the Committee and was afterwards again presented to the House with the clauses giving plenary powers to the Food Controller and for payment of loss out of Consolidated Fund deleted.

The Government has been charged with failure to grapple effectively with the organisation of industries and commerce, with having done little or nothing beyond the appointment of a National Efficiency Board. It cannot

be said that there is much in evidence with which to meet this charge. Some considerable discussion has arisen in reference to the relations between the Government and the Board, and the institution of such a Board has been sharply criticised in principle. The powers of the Board were limited to making recommendations, but recommendations made by men who are chosen for their special capacity to deal with the questions at issue are naturally regarded by the public as having great weight; and the Government was placed in the dilemma of either ignoring and so by implication discrediting the Board or of accepting its recommendations, whether or not it could agree with them, and so practically submitting to its dictation. When it was found that few if any of its recommendations were acted upon, the Board, not unnaturally, asked whether it was not wasting its time. Mr. Massey replied that he was not going to allow the Board to be the Government, and emphatically asserted his right to accept or decline its recommendations. The position became acute, and the Board tendered its resignation.

Much interest had been taken in this experiment in endeavouring to secure the services of specially qualified men in order to bring Government methods somewhat into line with the undoubtedly more efficient methods of commercial undertakings. Government methods are notoriously inefficient in many important respects. Take, for instance, the Army. Though we must concede that it effects the object it is designed for—the conversion of civilians into an ordered and disciplined military forceit unquestionably does so at an enormous waste of both money and energy, unless it is controlled by a mastermind in organisation and commercial methods. It is only to be expected that this is seldom found combined with military genius; and, as military genius must be given sole control, the economic aspect has to take its chance. Every other Government enterprise suffers more or less in the same way. In the commercial enterprises of the

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Government the man in power is the politician; and as political genius, like military genius, is rarely combined with commercial training or natural business ability, the economic aspect is always subordinate in these enterprises to the political. Suppose such methods were applied to the science of navigation, and the commanders of ships were chosen from the ranks of successful politicians. A wreck-strewn ocean would soon point the moral.

In these days of war the incapacity of politicians to deal with problems requiring special skill and experience becomes more apparent than in ordinary times and is more fraught with peril; and it is this that accounts for the Government's attempt to obtain the assistance of specially qualified men. It is a recognition firstly of the fact that direct popular election does not supply the country with the best brains and most capable men for enterprises requiring special skill and knowledge, and, secondly, that there should be some way of securing such men for the service of the State. There is, however, no answer to the objection that there must be only one Government. The existence of an irresponsible body controlling the Government involves an abnegation of governmental functions. It has been contended that the course which should have been adopted was to appoint to the Upper House, and, if need be, to the Cabinet, the men whose services were deemed essential on account of their special capabilities. The Board has now been reconstituted by including two Cabinet Ministers and reappointing some of the members of the original Board.

It should be stated, however, that the National Efficiency Board has been of material service to the country in many respects, notably in regard to the organisation of committees to deal with the case of farms of soldiers absent on active service and generally to see that labour in the essential industry of agriculture is not unduly depleted. In this connection it may be noted that the Government has definitely decided that the last man on the farm is

not to be taken. It considers it essential that every farm should be left with labour to work it, and that in no case should a man doing the whole of his farm work or the last son of parents unable to work be taken. The Efficiency Board was also in some degree responsible for further legislation in connection with the liquor trade.

Public feeling in regard to the necessity for the restriction of the consumption of liquor resulted in a very insistent demand for shortening hours of sale. This movement had not been merely one of the Prohibition Party. The feeling that unnecessary waste should be curbed is an outcome of the public appreciation of the seriousness of the war and the conditions which it has brought, and of the necessity of making an endeavour to live more economically. The liquor trade is regarded as presenting one of the most conspicuous instances of preventable waste, and not merely of waste but of habit seriously interfering with efficiency. On these grounds numbers of people having no connection with the party of prohibition have interested themselves in advocating reduction of hours of trade. At meetings held in all the chief centres many prominent business men and other citizens who had not hitherto taken any part in dealing with the liquor question were outspoken in their condemnation of allowing the state of things to continue as it was. The movement eventually resulted in strong petitions to Parliament and other representations urging the need for a Bill to provide for closing all licensed premises from 6 p.m. to 9 a.m., instead of 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. as hitherto. Their case was very much strengthened by a report of the National Efficiency Board recommending National Prohibition with compensation. The Government, recognising that public opinion was undoubtedly in favour of a measure of reform, brought down, somewhat reluctantly as many thought, a Bill to provide for closing from 8 p.m. to 9 a.m. The advocates of the six o'clock measure were, however, not to be denied, and declined to compromise. The Government

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did not make their Bill a party measure, and on its coming before the House it was found, to the surprise of most people, that the advocates of six-o'clock closing were largely in the majority. The Government bowed to their opinion, and the Bill as finally enacted fixed the hours at 6 p.m. to 9 a.m.

III. FINANCE

DURING the month of October, just closing, there have been several important Ministerial statements in the House regarding the condition of the national finances. On the 9th Sir Joseph Ward, Minister of Finance, announced that certain alterations had been necessitated in the estimates of war expenditure for the current year, since the delivery of the Budget. These would result by September 30, 1918, in an estimated deficiency in war finance of eight millions as against the revenue to be provided by the Budget proposals. place the finance on a firm basis he announced the intention of the Government to obtain authority to borrow an additional five millions, which would, he thought, be ample to meet the expenditure to July 31, 1918, by which time Parliament would again be in session. The revised estimate of war expenditure for the eighteen months, April I, 1917, to September 30, 1918, was 364 millions. Sir Joseph warned the House that the whole position required "to be looked at and dealt with very cautiously." The revenue from the railways, Customs, and other departments of Government had fallen so that there had been during the six months April to September of this year a net decrease of £300,000 in total revenue. Still, he went on to say, "I am not for a moment of opinion that there is any ground for apprehension, because to a large extent I have made provision for the altered position which has been brought about." But there is the probability of a much greater

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falling off in Customs revenue than estimated in the Budget, now that freights are rising so high (at present the rate from the United Kingdom to New Zealand is £10 a ton), and our Home suppliers find it almost impossible to fulfil orders. When Sir Joseph was speaking there were four or five steamers coming out with no cargo at all. After reviewing the possible sources of any heavy additions to the revenue, Sir Joseph stated his opinion that we cannot obtain adequate revenue within the short time required by the exigencies of the situation created by the war if it proceeds beyond another year except through the Customs tariff, and that would mean sending up the cost of living still higher.

The interest on the war loans of the New Zealand Government had reached the sum of £3,170,000 per annum by September 30 last, and the corresponding sinking fund charges £600,000, making a total war loan charge of £3,770,000. On our ordinary debt before the war the corresponding total charge was £2,888,000, so that the present grand total is about six and three-quarter millions. Up to September 30 £46,847,000 had actually been borrowed for war purposes, and at the time of writing the total amount of loans authorised from the beginning of the war is £67,335,000. Sir Joseph said he hoped to be able to get the Home Government to accept some of our stock, at least four millions, in part payment to the Imperial Treasury for amounts disbursed for the maintenance of our troops at the front.

The state of the ordinary finances of the Dominion has not escaped criticism, though there is no ground for believing that they are in anything but a healthy condition. The chief cause of complaint is the absolute increase of expenditure compared with pre-war years. For the last financial year ending March 31, 1917, the expenditure was just upon eight millions, or £380,000 more than that in the last pre-war year; and during the six months April to September, 1917, it increased by £101,000, whilst the

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revenue decreased by £300,000. It is to be noted, however, that in the recent Budget the Minister had estimated that the revenue would decrease by a million, whilst the expenditure would increase by two millions, and in his statement on the 9th inst. he said: "That the country can stand what is being done, I have no hesitation in saying." But it is certain that, in order that we may shoulder the war burdens to which he was alluding, we shall have to set about lightening the cost of the ordinary work of Government.

The returns of the banks doing business in the Dominion for the quarter ending September 30 illustrate some of the more striking economic features of the country. In particular they afford some evidence of the extent to which the currency in its widest sense has been inflated since the proclamation in August, 1914, of bank notes as legal tender, the great increase in the note issue, the fall in the ratio of gold coin and bullion on hand to total liabilities, the great increase in deposits and in credit generally. The velocity of circulation of the currency has undoubtedly greatly increased since the outbreak of war. Most of these factors tend to raise the level of prices and are too often altogether neglected by those seeking to discover causes of the rise in the cost of living. The following table gives a rough comparison of the figures on September 30 last, with the figures representing the average quarterly returns for the four years 1910-1913, when conditions were almost stable:

	Sept. 30th		th, A	h, Average fo	
		1917.		1910-	13.
		£		£	
Deposits		43	1	26)
Advances		281		211	
Gold coin and bullion	in		millions		-millions
hand		8.3		5.5	
Notes in circulation		5.7	1	1.7)
Ratio per cent. of coin	and				
bullion to total liabilit		17		19	
Population: 1,096,000	1,042,000				

Before the war it was estimated that about 87% of the value of our trading was done by cheques, 7% by notes, 5% by gold and 1% by silver. Since the war gold currency has almost disappeared for ordinary trade purposes.

At June 30 of this year there were 554,983 depositors in the Post Office Savings Bank alone (representing more than half the population), the corresponding average for the years 1910–1913 being about 419,000. These had a total amount of deposits to their credit of over twenty-five millions compared with not quite sixteen millions in 1910–1913. There were also 81,000 depositors in other savings banks, with deposits of nearly two and a half millions, at the end of 1916. These savings bank figures are, of course, not included in the banking returns given above, but they tell the same tale of greatly increased or inflated bank deposits and credits.

New Zealand. October, 1917.

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
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